- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED on Embedded Platform

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, I have ported mbedtls library on am embedded platform developed to encrypt / decrypt messages using AES GCM 256 key. After several hours of running, we are experiencing error MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED 0x6180 and malloc functions fails as the heap seems to be piled-up. How could I is using correct free function and the actual allocated memory is freed? Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

3 years, 9 months

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Tentative: MBed TLS Technical Forum

by Gergely Pintér

3 years, 10 months

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Future crypto library features

by Hulshof, Robert

All, Not sure if this is the right audience (If it is not let me know if there is a better place to ask the following question) We have been looking at future security requirements for CPE devices, and we think that we need the following functionality that is currently not really available in the current crypto libraries. - Support for Quantum computing secure algorithms (Post Quantum of PQ algorithms) - Support for Hybrid keys ( PQ plus Classic algorithm), preferable in any configuration. - Modularized public key crypto algorithms implementation, to simplify adding new algorithms - Updating public key architecture to simplify off-loading private key operations to a Trusted Execution environment or other security HW. We initially looked at openssl, but found the openssl difficult to work with, so we decided to look at Mbedtls, which has a more lightweight design. We modified the mbedtls 'pkey' code to make it more modularized (building on the pkwrap design), and added to support for Hybrid keys, which was relatively easy to do. Updating the TLS library to support hybrid keys has however been a big challenge. The TLS code is very interwoven with the 'pkey' code, and seems to have almost unique implementation for each type of key, making it difficult to follow and modify. Adding support for other (PQ) algorithms within that design will be challenge. Before spending too much time on this we would like to know if there is an interest in the MBEDTLS community for a redesign of the code to support hybrid keys, PQ algorithms and modularized public key architecture. Thanks, Robert E-MAIL CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: The contents of this e-mail message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient of this message or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please immediately alert the sender by reply e-mail and then delete this message and any attachments. If you are not the intended recipient, you are notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, copying, or storage of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited.

3 years, 10 months

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MBed TLS Technical Forum - reminder

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the US-Europe timezone-friendly MBest TLS Tech forum is next Monday. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum Time: Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM Nov 22, 2021 04:30 PM Dec 20, 2021 04:30 PM Jan 17, 2022 04:30 PM Feb 14, 2022 04:30 PM Mar 14, 2022 04:30 PM Apr 11, 2022 04:30 PM May 9, 2022 04:30 PM Jun 6, 2022 04:30 PM Jul 4, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 1, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 29, 2022 04:30 PM Sep 26, 2022 04:30 PM Oct 24, 2022 04:30 PM Nov 21, 2022 04:30 PM Dec 19, 2022 04:30 PM Jan 16, 2023 04:30 PM Feb 13, 2023 04:30 PM Mar 13, 2023 04:30 PM Apr 10, 2023 04:30 PM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJEkceuurT4sGdaksikbUn6FARB9Kuk3ac2o/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95962635632?pwd=STFkQVltejAzRDJ6NmoxZjhmZC9RUT… Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Passcode: 018366 One tap mobile +13462487799,,95962635632# US (Houston) +16699009128,,95962635632# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) 877 853 5247 US Toll-free 888 788 0099 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/aewUpnQu5y When: Mon Feb 14, 2022 9:30am – 10:30am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Who: * Don Harbin - creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com

3 years, 10 months

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mbedTLS Question

by SHIRLEY Murray

Hello, I am evaluating the mbedTLS library and trying to create a build with Visual Studio 2010, but I am encountering errors. Below are the steps I have taken: 1. Downloaded "mbedtls-3.1.0.zip" and extracted the contents to my Windows 10 computer. 2. Run Visual Studio 2010 and open the solution "mbedTLS.sln" in the folder "mbedtls-3.1.0\visualc\VS2010". 3. Select the "mbedTLS" project and select "Rebuild Only mbedTLS". This is for the Release configuration targeting Win32. 4. During the build process multiple errors are encounter, which seem to be related to Visual Studio's limited C Compiler support. The build output is attached. Am I missing any steps for configuring the solution or project? I was under the impression that mbedTLS offered support for compiling with Visual Studio 2010? Any help that you can provide would be greatly appreciated. Best regards, Murray Shirley, P.Eng. MicroSurvey Software, Inc. (250) 707-0000 murray.shirley(a)microsurvey.com<mailto:murray.shirley@microsurvey.com>

3 years, 10 months

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TLS Only for Data Authentication

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, I am developing TLS client and server for embedded systems. Considering the operational efficiency, it is sufficient to have data authentication. Is it possible to setup a TLS communication with data authentication and without encryption? Consider a PLC network, 1. Within physical secure zone. 2. Requires faster data transfer. 3. Data are not confidential, but must be cryptographically authenticated. Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

3 years, 10 months

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Please, help me about Mbedtls_ssl_handshake return error -0x2700

by Dmitrij Shabroff

Hello. I am facing the issue of certificate verification error during handshake.The problem is described by me in the appropriate section of the forum. https://forums.mbed.com/t/mbedtls-failing-with-the-certificate-is-not-corre… Please help me figure it out - there is no one else to turn to. Sincerely, Shabrov Dmitry

3 years, 10 months

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Does MbedTLS provide paid tech support?

by Tom Zhu

We are interested in whether there are paid supports from MbedTLS regarding optimization on some ARM MCUs. If so, whom should we contact? Thanks! Tom

3 years, 10 months

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TLS 1.3 support

by Lukas Frei

Good morning, My team and me are starting a bigger project concerning object control on the rail. The security specifications shall use TLS version 1.3. I could read on some forums that you are actually working on it. Could I please get some information about the release date of it? If not provided soon we will be forced to switch to another library. Thanks a lot for your help. Best Regards, Lukas Frei Dipl. MSc Universität Bern und BFH in Biomedical Engineering Embedded Software Engineer CSA Engineering AG Hans Huber-Strasse 38 CH-4500 Solothurn Direkt +41 32 626 35 81 Telefon +41 32 626 35 55 Fax +41 32 626 35 50 mailto:lukas.frei@csa.ch https://www.csa.ch ________________________________ Confidentiality Note: This message is intended only for the use of the named recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the/an intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete this message. Any unauthorized use of the information contained in this message is prohibited.

3 years, 10 months

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Now Im subscribe

by Dmitrij Shabroff

Good afternoon. I am a microcontroller product designer. I ported MBED TLS to STM 32L471 microcontroller. While I do not understand how can I use the certificate. My customer gave me a certificate in the form of a center2m.com.cer file. The file contains the 3 fields: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIGVzCCBT+gAwIBAgIMEnU/ ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIET ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIDDX ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- tell me please, how to port my certificate to certs.c file. The question is which fields to insert where? Please help. No one can answer this question except you. Sincerely, development engineer, Shabrov Dmitrii

3 years, 10 months

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Next MBed TLS Tech Forum - Monday

by Don Harbin

Hi All, This is a gentle reminder that the next MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday @10am UK time. Reminders: - This is the "Asia timezone friendly" session, but the session recording and supporting content are archived here <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-technical-forum/>. - Dial-in details can be found in the online calendar <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you click on this event in the calendar, it also provides the option to add it to your personal calendar if you wish If anyone has topics you would like to see added to the agenda, please share and Dave and the team will work to get these onto the agenda. Best regards, Don

3 years, 10 months

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Tentative: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia

by Gergely Pintér

3 years, 10 months

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mbedtls handshake error

by MATRIX 小牧

Hello. I'm sorry for the sudden email. I have a question about mbedtls. Currently, HTTPS communication is performed by mbedtls with a microcomputer called esp32-wroom-32d. The following error occurs when validating the root certificate. --------------------------------------------- mbedtls: ssl_tls.c: 5808 x509_verify_cert () returned -12288 (-0x3000) --------------------------------------------- I can't find out the details even if I check the error code. Changing the certificate will eliminate the error. It has been confirmed that the certificate is legitimate and can be used. [SecurityCommunicationRootCA1.pem] ---- Success [SecurityCommunicationRootCA2.pem] ---- Failure I would like to have any information. Sorry for the unfamiliar English. I look forward to working with you. Komaki

3 years, 10 months

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Updated invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 3am to 3:50am on Monday 17 times (MST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

This event has been changed. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Every 4 weeks from 3am to 3:50am on Monday 17 times Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin - creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MmU4dm1iNzJ0dmV1… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

3 years, 11 months

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Updated invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum @ Every 4 weeks from 9:30am to 10:30am on Monday 17 times (MST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

This event has been changed. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum Time: Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM Nov 22, 2021 04:30 PM Dec 20, 2021 04:30 PM Jan 17, 2022 04:30 PM Feb 14, 2022 04:30 PM Mar 14, 2022 04:30 PM Apr 11, 2022 04:30 PM May 9, 2022 04:30 PM Jun 6, 2022 04:30 PM Jul 4, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 1, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 29, 2022 04:30 PM Sep 26, 2022 04:30 PM Oct 24, 2022 04:30 PM Nov 21, 2022 04:30 PM Dec 19, 2022 04:30 PM Jan 16, 2023 04:30 PM Feb 13, 2023 04:30 PM Mar 13, 2023 04:30 PM Apr 10, 2023 04:30 PM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJEkceuurT4sGdaksikbUn6FARB9Kuk3ac2o/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95962635632?pwd=STFkQVltejAzRDJ6NmoxZjhmZC9RUT… Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Passcode: 018366 One tap mobile +13462487799,,95962635632# US (Houston) +16699009128,,95962635632# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) 877 853 5247 US Toll-free 888 788 0099 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/aewUpnQu5y When: Every 4 weeks from 9:30am to 10:30am on Monday 17 times Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin - creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NWdhMWpuZ2ZpdWNp… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

3 years, 11 months

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Entropy PSA Crypto driver support

by François Beerten

Hi everyone, The PSA Crypto Driver Interface describes entry points for collecting entropy from drivers: |psa_status_t acme_get_entropy(uint32_t flags, size_t *estimate_bits, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size);| Currently, MbedTLS does not have any kind of support for those PSA driver entry points. I'm currently looking at trying to add initial support for those in the code. The idea is to write a very simple solution to get the ball rolling and that can be extended and improved later on. Is there interest for a patch to add this? There are different ways to integrate it into the current MbedTLS code. Do you already have plans or ideas on how it should be done? After multiple attempts locally, I've came up with an approach that can work well. Like for other PSA Crypto drivers, the entropy entry points would be listed in the generated "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c" file. Those entry points can then be used by a sub-function of mbedtls_entropy_gather(). What do you think of that approach? Best regards, François.

3 years, 11 months

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Re: License conflict with OpenVPN

by Dave Rodgman

Hi Max, Unfortunately, it would not be possible for us to re-license the project to GPLv2 - this would require agreement with all copyright holders of code contributed to Mbed TLS 2.17, which isn't feasible. For this reason I'm afraid we cannot offer an exception for individual projects. Regards Dave Rodgman On 13/01/2022, 10:28, "Maximilian Fillinger via mbed-tls" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: Hello! OpenVPN can be compiled with OpenSSL or mbedtls. However, OpenVPN is licensed under GPLv2 only. If I understand correctly, that means it is not legal to distribute binaries of OpenVPN that are linked with mbedtls 2.17 or later. At Fox Crypto, we produce a hardened version of OpenVPN, called OpenVPN-NL, for use by the Dutch government, which uses mbedtls. (The latest release is rather old and still uses 2.16.) Is there anyone I could ask about making an exception for linking OpenVPN with mbedtls? Regards, Max Fillinger -- mbed-tls mailing list -- mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

3 years, 11 months

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Invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 3am to 3:50am on Monday 17 times (MST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

You have been invited to the following event. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Every 4 weeks from 3am to 3:50am on Monday 17 times Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Joining info: Join with Google Meet https://meet.google.com/fwh-srqw-rgf?hs=224 Join by phone (US) +1 304-397-0314 (PIN: 358348986) More phone numbers: https://tel.meet/fwh-srqw-rgf?pin=6539665554630&hs=0 Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin - creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MmU4dm1iNzJ0dmV1… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

3 years, 11 months

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Invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum @ Every 4 weeks from 9:30am to 10:30am on Monday 17 times (MST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

You have been invited to the following event. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum Time: Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM Nov 22, 2021 04:30 PM Dec 20, 2021 04:30 PM Jan 17, 2022 04:30 PM Feb 14, 2022 04:30 PM Mar 14, 2022 04:30 PM Apr 11, 2022 04:30 PM May 9, 2022 04:30 PM Jun 6, 2022 04:30 PM Jul 4, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 1, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 29, 2022 04:30 PM Sep 26, 2022 04:30 PM Oct 24, 2022 04:30 PM Nov 21, 2022 04:30 PM Dec 19, 2022 04:30 PM Jan 16, 2023 04:30 PM Feb 13, 2023 04:30 PM Mar 13, 2023 04:30 PM Apr 10, 2023 04:30 PM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJEkceuurT4sGdaksikbUn6FARB9Kuk3ac2o/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95962635632?pwd=STFkQVltejAzRDJ6NmoxZjhmZC9RUT… Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Passcode: 018366 One tap mobile +13462487799,,95962635632# US (Houston) +16699009128,,95962635632# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) 877 853 5247 US Toll-free 888 788 0099 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/aewUpnQu5y When: Every 4 weeks from 9:30am to 10:30am on Monday 17 times Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Joining info: Join with Google Meet https://meet.google.com/ofy-jxph-boy?hs=224 Join by phone (US) +1 704-705-7047 (PIN: 141276187) More phone numbers: https://tel.meet/ofy-jxph-boy?pin=3695767709143&hs=0 Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin - creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NWdhMWpuZ2ZpdWNp… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

3 years, 11 months

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Adding lists to the MBed TLS Tech Forum invite

by Don Harbin

Hi All, FYI, per Shebu, I'm adding both mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org and psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org to the MBed TLS Tech Forum invites. Please look for this in your inbox and accept it if you would like the series added to your calendar. - Note that this is a monthly meeting but you will see two invites, one that is for Asia timezones and one for Europe/US. Just delete the series that isn't timezone friendly for you. - FYI, recall that this and other tech forums can be found in the meeting calendar on the TF website <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you see a meeting in that calendar, click on the entry and an option comes up saying "copy to my calendar." It will import that single instance into your personal calendar from there if you wish. I wasn't able to test this feature with outlook, but it worked fine for google calendar. Please let me know if you have any questions. Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years, 11 months

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License conflict with OpenVPN

by Maximilian Fillinger

Hello! OpenVPN can be compiled with OpenSSL or mbedtls. However, OpenVPN is licensed under GPLv2 only. If I understand correctly, that means it is not legal to distribute binaries of OpenVPN that are linked with mbedtls 2.17 or later. At Fox Crypto, we produce a hardened version of OpenVPN, called OpenVPN-NL, for use by the Dutch government, which uses mbedtls. (The latest release is rather old and still uses 2.16.) Is there anyone I could ask about making an exception for linking OpenVPN with mbedtls? Regards, Max Fillinger

3 years, 11 months

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Tinycrypt performance & integration

by andrei.menzopol＠nxp.com

Hello, I want to test/analyze the performance increase of using tinycrypt for ECC operations instead of the standard MbedTLS ECC functions. Could you please help me with a few answers regarding this? I am aware that tinycrypt is already integrated in the baremetal branch. Do you happen to know what is the performance increase of using this tinycrypt uECC implementation instead of the standard one on arm cortex m4 microcontrollers? I would like to port the tinycrypt uECC changes from baremetal branch to a Mbed TLS 2.25.0 version used in Matter repo (from where Mbed TLS repo is refered), more exactly this commit: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/1c54b5410fd48d6bcada97e30cac417c5c7… What do you think is the best approach? I thought of forking Mbed TLS, creating a separate branch with that commit and adding there the tinycrypt changes from baremetal branch. However, I'm not sure how to proceed next since the Matter repo refers the MbedTLS repo. Is this approach ok? Thank you!

3 years, 11 months

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EC and FF checks support

by Thomas Fossati

Hi all, Does mbedTLS implement any of the checks in NIST SP 800 56Ar3? (In particular, I am interested in those defined in Section 5.6.2 [1]?) Thanks, cheers! [1] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf…

3 years, 11 months

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request to unsubscribe from this mailing list

by Innocenti, Michele

Hi, I have completed my job on these topics so I would like to unsubscribe from this mailing list, can you help me? Thank you! Michele [cid:image001.png@01D7FCCB.D711FD40] Hillrom is now a part of Baxter Michele Innocenti Sr Principal Engineer, SW Eng Gambro Dasco S.p.A. Via Modenese 66 / 41036 Medolla, Modena, Italy T. +39 0535.50578 michele_innocenti(a)baxter.com<mailto:michele_innocenti@baxter.com>

3 years, 11 months

3
2
0 0

Side by side installation of mbedtls 2.x and mbedtls 3.x

by Fabrice Fontaine

Dear all, mbedtls 3.x is incompatible with mbedtls 2.x so the transition of all the packages using mbedtls will take a long time. However, from my understanding, it is not possible to install both versions side by side as a lot of headers are common to both versions and installed in include/mbedtls. This fact is raising concern on buildroot side, see: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/buildroot/patch/20211228153345.4087026… Can you confirm that a side-by-side installation of both mbedtls versions is not possible and/or can you share some inputs on this topic? Best Regards, Fabrice

3 years, 11 months

2
1
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Mbed TLS releases: 2.16.12, 2.28.0, 3.1.0

by Dave Rodgman

Hi, We are pleased to announce the release of Mbed TLS 2.16.12, 2.28.0 and 3.1.0. These releases of Mbed TLS address several security issues, provide bug fixes, and new features, including initial support for TLS 1.3 in Mbed TLS 3.1.0. Full details are available in the release notes (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/v3.1.0, https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.0, https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.16.12). Mbed TLS 2.16.12 will be the last release in the 2.16 LTS; it will no longer be supported. Mbed TLS 2.28 is the new long-term support release, and will be supported with bug-fixes and security fixes until end of 2024. We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately. Dave Rodgman

3 years, 12 months

1
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0 0

Commercial Support Request

by Felix Knorr

Dear MBedTLS-Team, we are currently evaluating MBedTLS for use in our Product. We develop an implant for blood pressure patients, and our implant and its charger need to communicate securely. We already have an AES encrypted communication running, but so far we just store the password in every device, and we would like to switch to RSA to exchange an AES key. It would also be important for us to be able to validate an x509 certificate on the implant. However, due to energy constraints, our internal flash memory on the implant is extremely small, and we would like to not parse the certificate on the implant, but rather send only the key and the signature directly, and then "validate by hand" on the implant. If I understand the procedure correctly, that would only involve taking a hash of the pubkey, decrypting the signature with a stored CA-public key, and compare them, correct? Would that be possible? Besides normal support during our implementation phase, we would be interested in being informed whenever a vulnerability is found in MBedTLS and a fast update. Do you offer such a service? If so, what will it cost? Kind Rergards, Felix Knorr -- Mit freundlichen Grüßen neuroloop GmbH i.A. Felix Knorr Senior Software Developer -------------------------------------- neuroloop GmbH Engesserstr. 4, 79108 Freiburg, Germany Amtsgericht Freiburg HRB 713935 Geschäftsführer: Dr. Michael Lauk, Dr. Dennis Plachta The information contained in this communication is confidential, may be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of the company of the sender of this e-mail. Unauthorized use, disclosure, or copying of this communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail and destroy this communication and all copies thereof, including all attachments.

3 years, 12 months

2
1
0 0

mbedtls communication issue - handshake error -0x50 - NET - Connection was reset by pee

by Alugoju, Shailaja

Hi, I am trying to encrypt data on my rabbitmq communication. On the rabbitmq server end I am using the openssl and on the client end I cant use openssl but I can use mbedtls. I am using mbedtls-2.26.0 version in my rabbimq-c client . The certificate is generated via https://github.com/michaelklishin/tls-gen The certificate is valid and has no issue because the communication works fine when I use the ssl_client2 and ssl_server2 applications from the mbedtls-2.26.0\programs. The communication works fine when I use the rabbitmq openssl client and openssl server. But when I try to use the rabbitmq openssl server and ssl_client2 from mbedtls-2.26.0\programs the connection is reset. I think it’s a config issue but I am not able to figure out the solution or the rootcause. I am not sure if I can use mbedtls client with openssl server. Could you please help me in this. Below is the log from wireshark. Attached is the log from sslclient2 program. After the certificate is verified the broker resets the connection TCP 60271 → 5671 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=65475 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1 TCP 5671 → 60271 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=65475 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1 TCP 60271 → 5671 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=2618880 Len=0 TLSv1.2 Client Hello TCP 5671 → 60271 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=305 Win=2618880 Len=0 TLSv1.2 Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Certificate Request, Server Hello Done TCP 60271 → 5671 [ACK] Seq=305 Ack=1976 Win=2616832 Len=0 TLSv1.2 Certificate TCP 5671 → 60271 [ACK] Seq=1976 Ack=945 Win=2618112 Len=0 TLSv1.2 Client Key Exchange TCP 5671 → 60271 [ACK] Seq=1976 Ack=1088 Win=2618112 Len=0 TLSv1.2 Certificate Verify TCP 5671 → 60271 [ACK] Seq=1976 Ack=1173 Win=2618112 Len=0 TLSv1.2 Change Cipher Spec TCP 5671 → 60271 [ACK] Seq=1976 Ack=1179 Win=2618112 Len=0 TLSv1.2 Encrypted Handshake Message TCP 5671 → 60271 [ACK] Seq=1976 Ack=1216 Win=2617856 Len=0 TLSv1.2 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message TCP 60271 → 5671 [ACK] Seq=1216 Ack=2019 Win=2616832 Len=0 TLSv1.2 Application Data TCP 5671 → 60271 [ACK] Seq=2019 Ack=1245 Win=2617856 Len=0 TLSv1.2 Application Data TCP 60271 → 5671 [ACK] Seq=1245 Ack=2048 Win=2616832 Len=0 TLSv1.2 Encrypted Alert TCP 60271 → 5671 [ACK] Seq=1245 Ack=2071 Win=2616832 Len=0 TCP 5671 → 60271 [RST, ACK] Seq=2071 Ack=1245 Win=0 Len=0 Thanks, Shailaja

4 years

1
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Mbed TLS Tech Forum

by Dave Rodgman

Hi, On Monday at 10am UK time, we will hold the Mbed TLS Tech Forum. This is an open forum conference call for anyone to participate; please reply here if there are any agenda topics you would like to raise. Zoom details are in the TF calendar: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-technical-forum/ or see below Dave Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt

4 years

3
4
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Help troubleshooting mbedtls_pk_sign() returned -17280 (-0x4380)

by Martin Man

Hi guys, I have a mbetls based server client application (DTLS) written in Apple Swift language, wrapping the mbedtls C api, running just fine for many years now on iOS, Android, and Linux. We have been compiling the code with Swift 5.0, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 in both release and debug mode. Recently I just recompiled my code with Swift 5.5 in release mode, and my handshakes started failing on the Linux server with cryptic mbedtls_pk_sign() returned -17280 (-0x4380). When I take the same code and recompile in debug mode (-Onone) it works as expected. The same code compiled with Swift+C for iOS and macOS still works in both debug and release mode on both client/server. If I understand the compilation process correctly, the Swift Package Manager that we use to wrap mbedtls simply uses CMakeLists.txt to compile mbedtls and pick up the right flags. I am attaching excerpt from the log where the server part of the handshake fails (in release mode) and succeeds (in debug mode). I am certain this is probably caused by my code and how I wrap C mbedtls sources in Swift, but I can not yet rule out a bug in Swift/C compiler part for Linux which from time to time does have bugs related to code optimization. Could any good soul who understands the parts of the code below point me in the direction where to look and why would the mbedtls_pk_sign fail this way? What parts of the SSL context does it use? I will deep dive into the code to see whether this can be caused by memory corruption or anything else. It’s on LTS mbedtls-2.16.11. Could I run some tests to perhaps verify that mbedtls is compiled and working correctly? thanks for any help, Martin — failing handshake — Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3296 => write server key exchange Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3074 ECDHE curve: secp521r1 Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 value of 'ECDH: Q(X)' (521 bits) is: Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 01 d0 5f 4a fa 12 f8 46 75 fb 3e 38 db ba 88 ff Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 73 72 79 78 21 dd 9f ac ac 02 db e7 7e 91 6e 5c Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 06 ed 77 19 42 f1 11 6a f5 75 04 20 d8 51 50 a5 Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 8f 5a 3d 8c b3 c0 15 df cc d7 5b e5 eb 04 2e b6 Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 2f e7 Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 value of 'ECDH: Q(Y)' (518 bits) is: Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 26 c1 52 f0 b6 20 4c aa 53 7c aa 27 12 5f 72 7f Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 11 ea a9 34 9a f5 ef 63 28 76 d8 52 4e 31 a3 13 Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 52 a5 c9 52 5f 6b 41 b6 7e 47 0e 2a 68 c5 e5 80 Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 14 27 ad aa 96 5b 89 41 55 5b d5 52 61 66 8c 06 Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3100 4b Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3163 pick hash algorithm 8 for signing Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3201 dumping 'parameters hash' (64 bytes) Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3201 0000: 55 c8 d2 5c 83 d8 6b e3 9f 9c b2 f4 e7 f7 4d 26 U..\..k.......M& Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3201 0010: b4 ce c9 df c2 ae 7a 60 cb e8 02 13 d5 6d d8 ec ......z`.....m.. Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3201 0020: 48 72 77 9f e2 69 4e f5 b4 1d db 9a 75 2a 5e c7 Hrw..iN.....u*^. Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3201 0030: e1 1b 66 fc a6 ff 37 c6 6d 42 9b b3 cf 63 bb 0e ..f...7.mB...c.. Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_srv.c:3274 mbedtls_pk_sign() returned -17280 (-0x4380) Dec 7 15:54:53 ssl_tls.c:8219 <= handshake — successful handshake — Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3296 => write server key exchange Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3074 ECDHE curve: secp521r1 Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 value of 'ECDH: Q(X)' (519 bits) is: Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 52 5f 4e 78 48 bd be 6a e4 98 21 30 ce 1c ba 08 Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 b7 ae 88 d3 ff c9 c4 a5 8c 13 1e 73 5b 1f 08 60 Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 7c 51 a7 ec 91 54 d7 52 f3 55 6a 34 92 cf 92 e8 Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 c8 39 33 5e d3 46 3d 89 e7 6d 8f 41 d9 e0 67 e6 Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 7c Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 value of 'ECDH: Q(Y)' (520 bits) is: Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 87 48 29 20 93 8e f8 9a a9 54 70 26 58 79 9d 67 Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 8c ec 0f 06 ae 73 13 40 72 58 fe c1 6e 14 b4 48 Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 55 a1 27 74 9d 63 36 aa db 80 29 f8 ab 9c 64 ba Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 f9 0a 19 af 9a 65 6f 02 96 c6 53 4d 49 4f b4 f5 Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3100 46 Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3163 pick hash algorithm 8 for signing Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3201 dumping 'parameters hash' (64 bytes) Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3201 0000: e1 65 f4 f0 a6 a3 67 7d 32 55 ed 2a 13 08 71 8a .e....g}2U.*..q. Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3201 0010: 7e 13 f6 30 85 ed c3 c9 10 e8 b2 43 75 bc 6c 24 ~..0.......Cu.l$ Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3201 0020: 8f fb d8 90 cb 53 7f 13 53 13 1b f4 eb bd 38 5c .....S..S.....8\ Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3201 0030: ec 46 c2 0c a9 93 5b 60 5e 5d 81 f2 b3 b0 b5 a8 .F....[`^]...... Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 dumping 'my signature' (256 bytes) Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 0000: 7a a7 0f 17 79 33 36 b7 0c 17 84 5b cc ca 1c 0c z...y36....[.... Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 0010: cb f5 56 80 ea 5d 7f cf ab 86 d5 f9 91 36 0e 68 ..V..].......6.h Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 0020: 76 c6 c0 4b 77 bf 28 e7 b8 c0 a7 de ea d8 a0 30 v..Kw.(........0 Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 0030: 3a b3 4e 24 ea e0 c8 0b e7 ad ba 4d 35 30 c0 39 :.N$.......M50.9 Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 0040: a8 ff f0 6d 8f 28 db fc 5e c3 fb 21 fe 76 dd 07 ...m.(..^..!.v.. Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 0050: 1b 2c 58 fe 7b 0a f5 72 49 d9 d1 9a 10 af 29 21 .,X.{..rI.....)! Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 0060: 7a d9 01 a4 99 01 de 6e ae fd 76 ce b9 64 84 49 z......n..v..d.I Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 0070: 96 97 2d 3a 15 ed 5b de d5 99 9d 1b eb 4c 1a aa ..-:..[......L.. Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 0080: a8 e6 36 29 bd 67 b0 50 91 6e b8 cb 0a 42 4a 79 ..6).g.P.n...BJy Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 0090: 4a 65 ae 95 d0 bc 5a e1 e7 75 2a f9 ba 51 1c 2c Je....Z..u*..Q., Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 00a0: ff 67 e3 df eb a0 d7 6c d2 cf 71 d2 ea 24 7c 16 .g.....l..q..$|. Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 00b0: f8 5b 72 83 56 a9 48 e1 b6 cd d0 bd dd 20 23 d5 .[r.V.H...... #. Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 00c0: 80 c4 bd 6e 42 1c 61 b2 e4 41 01 ce c8 85 26 21 ...nB.a..A....&! Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 00d0: b4 0a 5e fe 50 0d 6f 45 a8 fe 15 18 87 e3 ae b3 ..^.P.oE........ Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 00e0: ac 46 c5 c6 bb bc 70 1b 32 b7 15 c5 3d fb 09 1e .F....p.2...=... Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3361 00f0: 8f 69 f7 e7 a8 86 4d 0b 87 ea 4b fe 08 7e 00 0b .i....M...K..~.. Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_tls.c:3289 => write handshake message Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_tls.c:2917 => ssl_flight_append Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_tls.c:2953 <= ssl_flight_append Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_tls.c:3425 <= write handshake message Dec 7 16:13:52 ssl_srv.c:3380 <= write server key exchange

4 years

2
2
0 0

Benchmark on esp32

by Marco Portoni

Hi, Is it possible to run the benchmark of all cyphers natively on a ESP32 board? I have already run them on laptop but my goal is to run them on esp32, using for example tool like espifd.

4 years

1
0
0 0

lists.trustedfirmware.org

by Philip Colmer

Hello You are receiving this email because you are subscribed to one or more mailing lists on lists.trustedfirmware.org. The purpose of this email is to let you know that the software on the server is being upgraded between Wednesday 29th December and Friday 31st December. During that time, the server will be unavailable and any email sent to a list on the server will be queued for later delivery. After the upgrade has been completed, you will receive a follow-up email from me to confirm that the upgrade has been completed and to provide you with instructions on how to set up your account on the new server. With the new software, you have one account regardless of how many mailing lists you are subscribed to. Regards Philip Colmer Director, Information Services Linaro

4 years

1
0
0 0

Output a mbedtls_x509_crt?

by Felipe Gasper

Hello, Is it possible to output a mbedtls_x509_crt as PEM or DER? I’ve been combing the API docs but don’t see how I can do this export. I see controls for exporting a newly-built cert, but not one that comes from, e.g., mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(). Thank you! Cheers, -Felipe Gasper

4 years

2
3
0 0

What am I doing wrong?

by Felipe Gasper

https://gist.github.com/FGasper/43758d13e987518009d18ec8951ffcbb ^^ With 3.0.0 this prints: seeded entropy mbedtls connected trust loaded ok SNI set ok handshake tried handshake: X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed … but if I switch to the development branch, it works. Same trust chain, same code … but the production code fails while the dev one works … Am I just “holding it wrong”? Thank you in advance! -FG

4 years

1
1
0 0

MbedTLS - which protocols are advisable to support, and memory usage

by Peter

Hi All, I am new here. With a colleague, I am working on a product which previously used PolarSSL but was later changed to MbedTLS which, in the ST ARM 32F417 implementation, is believed to be less buggy. It is working ok as far as we have got, but we are finding that as well as needing some 100k more FLASH, it needs nearly 50k of RAM, which on the 32F417 (128k RAM) would normally be OK but due to other required functionality it leaves us just 10k. The architecture we are using for MbedTLS is a 48k (48k was found to be the smallest that works) static buffer within which TLS runs its own heap. I am aware that in the most generic case one has to have enough for one 16k buffer (plus a bit) for HTTPS, but what concerns me is that there appears to be no way to determine the worst case memory usage, across various usage scenarios. It would also be great to reduce this 48k to say 30k. Some of the protocols we know we don't need (e.g. PPP) but within any of them there is the question of which cipher suite needs supporting. What is the minimum cipher suite required to be able to use MbedTLS as an HTTPS client for use with typical current cloud-based file storage or data logging APIs such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Loggly etc? And what is the recommended minimum cipher suite required to implement an HTTPS server that would be able to negotiate a session with most current web-browsers? The goal is to ideally reduce both RAM and code size requirements for use in an embedded device that needs to work both as a general purpose server and client, without requiring support for multiple concurrent sessions. The other thing is that even the ST port of MbedTLS doesn't appear to make use of ST CPU hardware features such as AES256, DES, etc, which the 32F417 has in hardware. This speeds things up hugely but much more importantly in our case, saves a lot of RAM. For example AES256 can use about 10k if done in software. Thank you very much in advance for any input on what can be done. Peter

4 years

1
0
0 0

Question about a research project: ESP32 mbed-tls

by Marco Portoni

Hello, I am Marco Portoni and I am working on a thesis research for the University of Study of Milan. It is focused on cryptographic libraries in the IoT world, and my question is: is it possible to run the benchmark on a ESP32? I have already runned the benchmark on 2 of my laptops to test and collected the results, but my ultimate goal is to make the benchmark run on the ESP. Is it possible to do it? Thanks for every help! Marco

4 years

1
0
0 0

Build shared on macOS?

by Felipe Gasper

Hello, I’m trying to build shared from git on macOS and having no luck. I’m doing: > mkdir build; cd build > cmake DUSE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY=On .. … > make … > ls -la library total 2944 drwxr-xr-x 10 felipe staff 320 Dec 1 08:49 . drwxr-xr-x 15 felipe staff 480 Dec 1 08:49 .. drwxr-xr-x 8 felipe staff 256 Dec 1 08:49 CMakeFiles -rw-r--r-- 1 felipe staff 92755 Dec 1 08:49 Makefile -rw-r--r-- 1 felipe staff 2942 Dec 1 08:49 cmake_install.cmake -rw-r--r-- 1 felipe staff 34055 Dec 1 08:49 error.c -rw-r--r-- 1 felipe staff 916112 Dec 1 08:49 libmbedcrypto.a -rw-r--r-- 1 felipe staff 315856 Dec 1 08:49 libmbedtls.a -rw-r--r-- 1 felipe staff 104072 Dec 1 08:49 libmbedx509.a -rw-r--r-- 1 felipe staff 26265 Dec 1 08:49 version_features.c Am I just missing something? It seems like I’m following what the README says to do; I also did `export SHARED=1` just in case, but that made no difference. Thank you in advance! -FG

4 years

3
3
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Re: [mbed-tls] End of Life of LTS branch 2.16

by Dave Rodgman

Hi Radhika, We do not plan to extend support for Mbed TLS 2.16 beyond the three year support period. We do plan to release a 2.x LTS (probably 2.28) alongside the final 2.16 release, so that we always have an LTS available. Regards Dave Rodgman From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Radhika Jandhyala via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Radhika Jandhyala <radhikaj(a)microsoft.com> Date: Monday, 22 November 2021 at 10:50 To: "mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] End of Life of LTS branch 2.16 Hi, I am a maintainer for https://github.com/openenclave/openenclave. We include mbedtls 2.16 as a submodule in our project. Reading the article below, it states that 2.16 support will last at least till Dec 2021. Will you continue to support 2.16 in 2022? https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/blog/announcing-lts-branch-mbedtls-2.16 We are specifically interested in CVE fixes being backported to 2.16 and the timeframe where that will continue. Is there an updated timeline for this? We do plan to upgrade to 3.0 in early 2022, but we anticipate that will take some effort due to breaking changes. Thank you very much! Radhika

4 years

2
2
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Mbed TLS long term support release plans

by Dave Rodgman

Hi, Mbed TLS 2.16 LTS is approaching the end of its support period – it was originally announced that it would be maintained for at least 3 years up until the end of 2021 – and currently there is no other LTS branch. To ensure that there is no period of time without a supported LTS branch, we plan to release 2.28 LTS in the near future (which will have the usual 3 year support period). We will continue supporting 2.16 LTS until this is available. The expectation is that as 2.28 will be API-compatible with 2.16, users of 2.16 LTS will be able to upgrade to 2.28 very easily. Progress towards 2.28 LTS can be followed here: https://github.com/orgs/ARMmbed/projects/18#column-15836286 Dave Rodgman

4 years

1
0
0 0

End of Life of LTS branch 2.16

by Radhika Jandhyala

Hi, I am a maintainer for https://github.com/openenclave/openenclave. We include mbedtls 2.16 as a submodule in our project. Reading the article below, it states that 2.16 support will last at least till Dec 2021. Will you continue to support 2.16 in 2022? https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/blog/announcing-lts-branch-mbedtls-2.16 We are specifically interested in CVE fixes being backported to 2.16 and the timeframe where that will continue. Is there an updated timeline for this? We do plan to upgrade to 3.0 in early 2022, but we anticipate that will take some effort due to breaking changes. Thank you very much! Radhika

4 years

1
0
0 0

PSA Crypto non-optional in Mbed TLS 3.1

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi, We'd like to announce a change we intend to make: starting with Mbed TLS 3.1, it will no longer be possible to build with TLS, X.509, or PK without support for PSA Crypto. Details: currently, use of PSA Crypto APIs from the TLS, X.509 and PK layers is controlled by the option MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. When this option is disabled (which is the default), it's possible to build without MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. Starting with 3.1, we intend to start making TLS, X.509 and PK use PSA Crypto unconditionally, so MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C will be automatically enabled in the build as soon as TLS, X.509 or PK is enabled. Impact: for users who already build with PSA Crypto enabled (the default), no impact. For users who currently disable MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C in their configuration, starting with 3.1 there will be no functional changes, but the size of the built library will increase due to the additional features enabled. The increase depends on the configuration, application, platform, and toolchain, but the order of magnitude currently ranges from about 9 KB for a minimal TLS configuration with LTO (link-time optimisation) to about 30 KB for a full configuration without link-time garbage collection (though size-constrained devices are very unlikely to use such a configuration); we aim to reduce this overhead in the future. Rationale: maintaining two versions of every cryptographic operation in upper layers (one PSA, one non-PSA) imposes a significant burden on new developments. By removing that burden, we hope to progress faster on things that are more important in the long run, including better integration of PSA Crypto in TLS and X.509, and future code size optimisation of PSA Crypto. We realise the impact on users who were excluding PSA Crypto is significant. We're going to release Mbed TLS 2.28 in the coming months, which is not affected by this change and will receive bug fixes and security fixes for at least 3 years; we hope it provides an acceptable fall-back solution to affected users. In the long run, PSA Crypto will become the only Crypto API we offer; we want to make its footprint as small as possible considering its feature set and we hope this change will enable us to make faster progress towards that goal. Best regards, Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard for the Mbed TLS team.

4 years, 1 month

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About `MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS`

by Aditya Patwardhan

Hi, While working on updating mbedtls to v3.0, I saw that the internal fields in MBEDTLS have been made private. ( ref- here<https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/3.0-migration-guid…>). It says there and I quote "As a last resort, you can access the field foo of a structure bar by writing bar.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(foo). Note that you do so at your own risk, since such code is likely to break in a future minor version of Mbed TLS.” I just wanted to know if there is any alternative solution to this, rather than using `MBEDTLS_PRIVATE` everywhere. I know the next release of mbedtls probably plans to fix this with appropriate solution. But we wanted to push out our feature branch As early as possible. I saw in the PR<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/pull/37753> in zephyr RTOS about updating to mbedtls-3.0. They have just added this line<https://github.com/ceolin/zephyr/blob/5bf3128a9703561e578651218f5bcdafb96f8…> #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS) #define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS # endif Is this an alternative solution to using `MBEDTLS_PRIVATE` for accessing a private field. If yes, can somebody please point me to respective document as this would greatly reduce our code-changes. I understand there is some discussion going on in mbedtls about this change, and appropriate getter-setter functions shall be provided. But we wanted to push out out feature branch for early testing. Thanks and Regards, Aditya

4 years, 1 month

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Mbed TLS Tech Forum

by Dave Rodgman

Hi, On Monday 8th we will have the next Mbed TLS Tech Forum. Please reply to the list if you have any agenda topics to raise. As a starter for the agenda, we will likely discuss: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/5067 Proposal for driver dispatch code gen Dave Rodgman Zoom details below. The call will be recorded and made available on the TF website : https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/ Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt

4 years, 1 month

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mbedtls client: TLS 1.2 Client Hello triggers a -0x7780 fatal internal server error...?

by secretimap＠nickpelling.com

Hi everyone, The company I’m working for uses mbedtls to drive an embedded TLS server (for HTTPS): but now needs the same device to also act as a TLS client for logging in to remote servers (e.g. for LDAP etc). My embedded test code tries (but fails) to connect to a remote HTTPS server on port 443: I can connect to the same server via openssl on a desktop command line, so it seems to be working. Basically, the client hello message goes out fine (for brevity, I’ve skipped all the ciphersuites, but note that the list does contain the 0xC030 ciphersuite that desktop openssl is able to connect to OK): .ssl_cli.c:934: client hello, got 25 ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs) .ssl_cli.c:943: adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV .ssl_cli.c:992: client hello, compress len.: 1 .ssl_cli.c:994: client hello, compress alg.: 0 .ssl_cli.c:186: client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension .ssl_cli.c:271: client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension .ssl_cli.c:336: client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension .ssl_cli.c:518: client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension .ssl_cli.c:552: client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension .ssl_cli.c:585: client hello, adding session ticket extension .ssl_cli.c:1071: client hello, total extension length: 52 0000: 16 03 01 00 95 01 00 00 91 03 03 16 e9 7a ea aa 0010: 31 81 60 b6 a8 d3 32 93 a4 50 ca f3 e0 66 f8 47 0020: 56 95 0c cd a0 db b6 0e ae a7 d4 00 00 34 c0 30 0030: 00 9f c0 ad c0 9f c0 24 c0 28 00 6b c0 0a c0 14 0040: 00 39 c0 af c0 a3 c0 2b c0 2f 00 9e c0 ac c0 9e 0050: c0 23 c0 27 00 67 c0 09 c0 13 00 33 c0 ae c0 a2 0060: 00 ff 01 00 00 34 00 0d 00 16 00 14 06 03 06 01 0070: 05 03 05 01 04 03 04 01 03 03 03 01 02 03 02 01 0080: 00 0a 00 04 00 02 00 17 00 0b 00 02 01 00 00 16 0090: 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 23 00 00 However, the server hello that comes back is both unhappy and unhelpful: .ssl_tls.c:2721: in_left: 5, nb_want: 7 .ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 2 (-0xfffffffe) .ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input .ssl_tls.c:4233: dumping 'input record from network' (7 bytes) .ssl_tls.c:4233: 0000: 15 03 03 00 02 02 50 ......P .ssl_tls.c:5170: got an alert message, type: [2:80] .ssl_tls.c:5178: is a fatal alert message (msg 80) .ssl_tls.c:4369: mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type() returned -30592 (-0x7780) .ssl_cli.c:1506: mbedtls_ssl_read_record() returned -30592 (-0x7780) Putting the ciphersuites to one side, I suspect that what is happening here is that the (remote) server is complaining about a TLS extension the mbedtls client is either including or omitting. (I’ve already disabled the max fragment extension). But because I can’t see inside the remote server, I can’t tell. ☹ Might the mbedtls TLS client need the supported_versions extension (43) to work with many remote TLS servers? Is this a known issue? I’ve gone through loads of mailing list archive messages here, but haven’t found anything that matches this. Thanks, Nick PS: when OpenSSL connects to the server, the client hello message (that works fine) looks like this in Wireshark: Transport Layer Security TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Length: 358 Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 354 Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Random: [SNIP] GMT Unix Time: Jan 21, 2095 20:50:07.000000000 GMT Standard Time Random Bytes: [SNIP] Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: [SNIP] Cipher Suites Length: 90 Cipher Suites (45 suites) [SNIP!] Cipher Suite: TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV (0x00ff) Compression Methods Length: 1 Compression Methods (1 method) Compression Method: null (0) Extensions Length: 191 Extension: status_request (len=5) Type: status_request (5) Length: 5 Certificate Status Type: OCSP (1) Responder ID list Length: 0 Request Extensions Length: 0 Extension: supported_groups (len=22) Type: supported_groups (10) Length: 22 Supported Groups List Length: 20 Supported Groups (10 groups) Supported Group: x25519 (0x001d) Supported Group: secp256r1 (0x0017) Supported Group: secp384r1 (0x0018) Supported Group: secp521r1 (0x0019) Supported Group: x448 (0x001e) Supported Group: ffdhe2048 (0x0100) Supported Group: ffdhe3072 (0x0101) Supported Group: ffdhe4096 (0x0102) Supported Group: ffdhe6144 (0x0103) Supported Group: ffdhe8192 (0x0104) Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2) Type: ec_point_formats (11) Length: 2 EC point formats Length: 1 Elliptic curves point formats (1) EC point format: uncompressed (0) Extension: signature_algorithms (len=34) Type: signature_algorithms (13) Length: 34 Signature Hash Algorithms Length: 32 Signature Hash Algorithms (16 algorithms) [SNIP!] Extension: signature_algorithms_cert (len=34) Type: signature_algorithms_cert (50) Length: 34 Signature Hash Algorithms Length: 32 Signature Hash Algorithms (16 algorithms) [SNIP!] Extension: status_request_v2 (len=9) Type: status_request_v2 (17) Length: 9 Certificate Status List Length: 7 Certificate Status Type: OCSP Multi (2) Certificate Status Length: 4 Responder ID list Length: 0 Request Extensions Length: 0 Extension: extended_master_secret (len=0) Type: extended_master_secret (23) Length: 0 Extension: supported_versions (len=5) Type: supported_versions (43) Length: 5 Supported Versions length: 4 Supported Version: TLS 1.3 (0x0304) Supported Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Extension: psk_key_exchange_modes (len=2) Type: psk_key_exchange_modes (45) Length: 2 PSK Key Exchange Modes Length: 1 PSK Key Exchange Mode: PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment (psk_dhe_ke) (1) Extension: key_share (len=38) Type: key_share (51) Length: 38 Key Share extension Client Key Share Length: 36 Key Share Entry: Group: x25519, Key Exchange length: 32 Group: x25519 (29) Key Exchange Length: 32 Key Exchange: 9f8e83a6859e6b4c6c3e43b524b81e6f63cc409c5757692a2343a2929c681c17

4 years, 1 month

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Compact public ECC key representation

by Hristozov, Stefan

Hi all, For an IETF protocol that I am currently implementing a compact representation [1] of ECDH public keys needs to be sent over the network and be used on the receiving side for deriving a shared secret. With psa_export_public_key() I can export the public key form a psa_key_id_t object. The exported key is 65 bytes long (I am working with P256) which has the format 04|x|y as documented in [2]. It is easy to compress the public key before sending it -> just send the x part. How to decompress the x part back to the representation 04|x|y. As far I understand the psa_raw_key_agreement() function the public key must be encoded "in the same format that psa_import_key() accepts", that is 04|x|y [3]. Is there a function for that? [1]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-12#appendix-B draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-12<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-12#appendix-B> Network Working Group G. Selander Internet-Draft J. Preuß Mattsson Intended status: Standards Track F. Palombini Expires: 23 April 2022 Ericsson 20 October 2021 Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-12 Abstract This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a very compact and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ephemeral keys. datatracker.ietf.org [2]: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/f660c7c92308b6080f8ca97fa1739370d1b… [https://opengraph.githubassets.com/aee6bf8d395880d12a54b66dd4188b9fd92064a1…]<https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/f660c7c92308b6080f8ca97fa1739370d1b…> mbedtls/crypto.h at f660c7c92308b6080f8ca97fa1739370d1b2fab5 · ARMmbed/mbedtls<https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/f660c7c92308b6080f8ca97fa1739370d1b…> An open source, portable, easy to use, readable and flexible SSL library - mbedtls/crypto.h at f660c7c92308b6080f8ca97fa1739370d1b2fab5 · ARMmbed/mbedtls github.com [3]: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/f660c7c92308b6080f8ca97fa1739370d1b… [https://opengraph.githubassets.com/aee6bf8d395880d12a54b66dd4188b9fd92064a1…]<https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/f660c7c92308b6080f8ca97fa1739370d1b…> mbedtls/crypto.h at f660c7c92308b6080f8ca97fa1739370d1b2fab5 · ARMmbed/mbedtls<https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/f660c7c92308b6080f8ca97fa1739370d1b…> An open source, portable, easy to use, readable and flexible SSL library - mbedtls/crypto.h at f660c7c92308b6080f8ca97fa1739370d1b2fab5 · ARMmbed/mbedtls github.com Br, Stefan

4 years, 1 month

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Using mbedtls with a CA chain

by Loren Rogers

I need to use mbedtls (bundled with Nordic SDK, and unsure of version) to do some cloud-based functionality (AWS cloud, using OpenAM with a CA chain containing 4 certs). According to something I read, I need to use a pkcs7 container? If so, it seems that mbedtls does not support pkcs7? I did hand-copy some code from a PR, but as I was looking through the pkcs7.c, it seems that it still only supports the CA Root. Is this true? Is there anyone that can give me a hand in solving what I am attempting to do? Thank you /Loren Rogers

4 years, 1 month

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password for the files root.cer, client1.cer and client1-key.pem

by lekshmi g

Dear Sir,/Madam We need to convert the files - root.cer,client1.cer and client1-key.pem to jks using the tool keystore explorer. For that, the password for the files are needed.Please provide passwords.We need to establish connection between java client and mbedtls c server.Kindly provide help. Regards Lekshmi G

4 years, 1 month

1
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TLS connection establishment between OpenMUC java client and mbedtls server

by lekshmi g

Dear Madam/Sir, We are working on a project which requires IEC 62351 standards. For that we had developed a TLS server in C language and we had the requirement of developing a TLS client in Java language. We had used the *mbedTLS library for server* and *OpenMUC libraries for client*. But we are getting exception while certificate exchange phase and all. We had attached the listed exceptions and errors. Kindly provide necessary support for the same. Also please confirm whether we can develop above specified architecture, ie TLS based server in C language and client in Java. If available please share some sample programs also. Please reply ASAP. We have debugged the code and the following are the messages we have got in mbedtls java server and OPENMUC java tls client . During certificate exchange from client to server (MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE case in server), the function returns a nonzero value and the alert shows in server is 49 (ie, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED). *Please check Fig 1 and Fig 2* for the messages displayed during connection establishment.Kindly help us to solve the issues. [image: image.png] Fig 1- case:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE fails [image: image.png] Fig 2-OPENMUC java client error when connecting to mbedtlsserver ReplyForward <https://drive.google.com/u/0/settings/storage?hl=en&utm_medium=web&utm_sour…> <https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/> <https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/> <https://www.google.com/gmail/about/policy/>

4 years, 1 month

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[Mbed-tls-announce] Mbed TLS Tech Forum

by Dave Rodgman via Mbed-tls-announce

Hi, I would like to announce the Mbed TLS Tech Forum, a regular engineering call to discuss topics of interest to the Mbed TLS community. The call is currently planned to take place every two weeks, alternating between US-friendly and China-friendly times (16:30 and 10:00 UK time), starting on the 25th October at 16:30 BST. Please reply to the list if you have any agenda topics to raise. As a starting point, we will cover: Format – check if times & cadence are suitable TLS 1.3 – high-level update on progress & direction PSA Cryptoprocessor Driver Interface – code generation for driver dispatch as per https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/5067 Zoom details below. The call will be recorded and made available on the TF website: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/ Dave Rodgman Mbed TLS tech lead -- Dave Rodgman is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Join Zoom Meeting https://armltd.zoom.us/j/93259847316?pwd=N0d4Z0o5RXRLKzZFaE1sd044bm14dz09&f… Meeting ID: 932 5984 7316 Passcode: 991642 One tap mobile +442034815240,,93259847316#,,,,*991642# United Kingdom Dial by your location +44 203 481 5240 United Kingdom +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 408 638 0968 US (San Jose) +1 646 518 9805 US (New York) +91 116 480 2722 India +91 224 879 8012 India +91 406 480 2722 India +91 806 480 2722 India +852 5803 3730 Hong Kong SAR +46 8 4468 2488 Sweden +972 3 978 6688 Israel +353 1 536 9320 Ireland +36 1 408 8456 Hungary +33 1 7037 2246 France +358 3 4109 2129 Finland +45 32 70 12 06 Denmark +1 438 809 7799 Canada +65 3158 7288 Singapore +27 87 550 3946 South Africa +32 1579 5132 Belgium +48 22 307 3488 Poland +386 1600 3102 Slovenia +60 3 3099 2229 Malaysia +886 (2) 7741 7473 Taiwan Meeting ID: 932 5984 7316 Passcode: 991642 Find your local number: https://armltd.zoom.us/u/adTMafG7oQ Join by SIP 93259847316(a)zoomcrc.com Join by H.323 162.255.37.11 (US West) 162.255.36.11 (US East) 115.114.131.7 (India Mumbai) 115.114.115.7 (India Hyderabad) 213.19.144.110 (Amsterdam Netherlands) 213.244.140.110 (Germany) 103.122.166.55 (Australia Sydney) 103.122.167.55 (Australia Melbourne) 209.9.211.110 (Hong Kong SAR) 149.137.40.110 (Singapore) 64.211.144.160 (Brazil) 69.174.57.160 (Canada Toronto) 65.39.152.160 (Canada Vancouver) 207.226.132.110 (Japan Tokyo) 149.137.24.110 (Japan Osaka) Meeting ID: 932 5984 7316 Passcode: 991642 IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list Mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls-announce

4 years, 1 month

3
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switching from libressl to MbedTLS

by LM

I'm hoping to make the switch from libressl to MbedTLS. I'm working on a Linux from scratch style project. Curl works fine with MbedTLS and most of the utilities I work with use libcurl. I'm also using libtomcrypt for some of its hash and cryptographic functionality. The only place I'm having a problem making the switch at present is when I follow the LFS logic to make certificates (make-ca). There's a openssl/libressl command in the script that looks like the following: openssl x509 -hash -noout -in "$1" Is there a way to replace this functionality with a command or procedure or function from another program so that libressl or openssl isn't needed to perform this step? Thanks.

4 years, 1 month

1
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