- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by Ahmed Mohammed

Hello, What is the difference between these two macros in include/mbedtls/build_info.h: MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE In other words, why would I have two different user configuration files? Or I misunderstand the difference between such files. Kind regards, Ahmed Mohammed

3 years, 6 months

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Slowness in verification of a ecdsa secp256r1 signature using S32K Microcontroller (clock speed 112MHz) - bare metal implementation

by ammar.ahmed.mughal＠gmail.com

I am verifying a signature generated using ecdsa secp256r1. The signature is getting verified but the time taken by the verification step is too long. It takes 4-5 seconds to verify the signature. The implementation is bare metal i.e. no RTOS (one realizes the use of RTOS but still the time is too long). Can you please guide a way around for this issue. How to make it work faster , the ideal verification time would be 30ms - 60ms. Here is a gist of my code mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = NULL; mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_context; /// Initialization mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa_context); curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(23); /// 23 is tls_id of secp256r1 mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecdsa_context.grp, curve_info->grp_id); /// Processing result = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecdsa_context.grp, &ecdsa_context.Q, public_key_data, // public key data in uncompressed format i.e. including leading 0x04 sizeof(public_key_data) ); /// 32 /// 71 status_verify_signature = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature(&ecdsa_context, hash, sizeof(hash), signature, sizeof(sig)); /// converts the signature data to ASN1, verifies the signature Thank you :)

3 years, 6 months

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Mutual authentication support in Embed tls

by Anupma Jain

Hello, Can please provide me with any example on "how to achieve Mutual authentication(Client and server certificate validation)" in mbed-tls. Please help me with this.It is a little urgent. Thank you Regards Anupma Jain

3 years, 6 months

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Website update

by Dave Rodgman

Hi all, Apologies for the website outage. We have now restored the majority of the old content, which is reachable via our Trusted Firmware website (the old website address will redirect here). The new location for our documentation, including the knowledge base and security advisories, is: https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ Please let us know (on the mailing list, via the Tech Forum, or raise a GitHub issue or PR) if you find any issues or missing documentation. The source repository for the docs is here: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-docs Community contributions to the docs are welcome! Regards Dave Rodgman

3 years, 6 months

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OID Issue

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, We have developed a propriety protocol that authenticate node using certificate. In our PKI, we have four level of certificates as ROOT_CA, PROXY_CA, LOCAL_CA, and DEVICE_CERTIFICATE. Parsing of trusted CA certificate is getting success. However, verifying PROXY_CA against ROOT_CA fails with below error code. MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND I have viewed the certificates transacted using OpenSSL command, the ASN1 OID is ECDSA_SHA384. Though, I have enabled the algorithm, it is failing. Any support would be appreciated. Attached the config.h for your reference. Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

3 years, 7 months

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Adding option to disable the zeroisation of internal buffers

by joel.petersson＠dirac.com

After recently updating mbedtls I noticed a considerable slowdown (over 70% on my cortex-m7 board) in the sha256 implementation, and after some digging I found the offending commit: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/commit/76749aea784cfec245390d0d6f0ab0a2… I understand the motivation behind the commit, but I think it may not be relevant to all use cases. So my question is if an option to disable the clearing of internal buffers in mbedtls_config.h would be a reasonable improvement? Or would that be considered to much of a foot gun? Regards, Joel Petersson

3 years, 7 months

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support of Certificate exchange between client and server in Mbedtls

by Anupma Jain

Hi, In Embed tls version 2.28, is there any support to validate client certificate fields like for example: validity of certificate, CA validation or role extraction ? If support is present then, how can we enable that ? Please help me with this.Thanks in advance. Regards Anupma

3 years, 7 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - US/Europe

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the US-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday at 4:30 PM UK time. Invite details can be found on the online calendar here <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years, 8 months

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totally beginner question...

by boddeke＠mac.com

hello, we are testing a secure communication and got example code that uses the mbed-tls library. i am using the online keil studio with mbed.org: created a new project (compiles fine) and added in the mbed-tls library but this already gives compile errors. see below. i am using the latest greatest versions (mbed-os 6.16.0 and mbedtls-3.2.1) and tried some older versions. all seem to give the same problems. see below. i have tried commenting out MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME in mbedtls_config.h but that does not seem to make any difference tried different target boards, also no difference any help is greatly appreciated! thanks frank Build started Using toolchain ARMC6 profile {'ENV': {'ARMLMD_LICENSE_FILE': '8224@10.10.101.194:8224@10.10.109.222'}, 'PATHS': {'ARMC6_PATH': '/opt/ARMCompiler6.15.13/bin/', 'ARM_PATH': '/opt/armcc5_06_u6/'}, 'common': ['-c', '--gnu', '-O3', '-Otime', '--split_sections', '--apcs=interwork'], 'cxx': ['--cpp', '--no_rtti'], 'COMPILE_C_AS_CPP': False, 'NEW_SCAN_RESOURCES': True} scan /tmp/chroots/ch-59110c86-ee99-44c4-9ef0-79f3efde74a7/src scan /tmp/chroots/ch-59110c86-ee99-44c4-9ef0-79f3efde74a7/extras/mbed-os.lib compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Config/RTX_Config.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/TOOLCHAIN_ARM/TARGET_RTOS_M4_M7/irq_cm4f.S compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_evflags.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_lib.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_mempool.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Library/cmsis_os1.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_evr.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_memory.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_delay.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_msgqueue.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_kernel.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_mutex.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_semaphore.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_system.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/Source/os_systick.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/TARGET_CORTEX_M/Source/mbed_tz_context.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_timer.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/Source/os_tick_ptim.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_thread.c "time.h included in a configuration without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME" unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? compile mbed-os/cmsis/device/rtos/source/mbed_rtos_rtx.c In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/cmsis/device/rtos/source/mbed_rtos_rtx.c:23: In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_error.h:21: In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_retarget.h:107: /src/mbedtls/tests/include/baremetal-override/time.h:18:2: error: "time.h included in a configuration without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME" #error "time.h included in a configuration without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME" ^ In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/cmsis/device/rtos/source/mbed_rtos_rtx.c:23: In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_error.h:21: /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_retarget.h:669:5: error: unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? time_t st_atime; ///< Time of last access ^~~~~~ size_t /opt/ARMCompiler6.15.13/bin/../include/stdio.h:53:26: note: 'size_t' declared here typedef unsigned int size_t; /* see <stddef.h> */ ^ In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/cmsis/device/rtos/source/mbed_rtos_rtx.c:23: In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_error.h:21: /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_retarget.h:670:5: error: unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? time_t st_mtime; ///< Time of last data modification ^~~~~~ size_t /opt/ARMCompiler6.15.13/bin/../include/stdio.h:53:26: note: 'size_t' declared here typedef unsigned int size_t; /* see <stddef.h> */ ^ In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/cmsis/device/rtos/source/mbed_rtos_rtx.c:23: In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_error.h:21: /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_retarget.h:671:5: error: unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? time_t st_ctime; ///< Time of last status change ^~~~~~ size_t /opt/ARMCompiler6.15.13/bin/../include/stdio.h:53:26: note: 'size_t' declared here typedef unsigned int size_t; /* see <stddef.h> */ ^ 4 errors generated. Internal error. Build failed Build failed

3 years, 8 months

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misc. questions

by Frank Bergmann

Hi all, I have some questions. 1) If you have an established TLS connection (mbed TLS 3.x) and while the connection is up the (server-) certificate expires: Will the connection stay up? Or is a new handshake (with valid cert) REQUIRED? 2) Related to question 1: CAN mbed TLS switch to a new cert on an existing TLS connection? (e.g. by doing another handshake from server OR client side) 3) With 3.x some struct members are now "private". Even if you can allow private access by a define it would be better to use a getter. But for ssl context's "state" I am missing this and also for "p_bio" (to access fd). Is there a chance to get this implemented? BTW - a big "LIKE" for 3.x! I really appreciate the changes. Thank you! kind regards, Frank

3 years, 8 months

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inline assembly MULADDC_CORE for Cortex M4

by Work Only

Hello everyone, Can anyone share some example code or hints on writing MULADDC_CORE for Cortex M4 in bn_mul.h? With Many thanks! Wade

3 years, 8 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - US/Europe

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the US-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is tomorrow (Monday) at 4:30 PM UK time. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years, 8 months

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[Mbed-tls-announce] Mbed TLS 3.2.1 release

by Paul Elliott via Mbed-tls-announce

Hi Mbed TLS users, We have released Mbed TLS version 3.2.1. This release is functionally identical to 3.2.0, but includes a file that was missing from the 3.2.0 release (see https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/6084). Full details are available in the release notes (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v3.2.1). We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately. Many thanks, Mbed TLS Team. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

3 years, 8 months

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Release of Mbed TLS 3.2.0 and 2.28.1

by Dave Rodgman

Hi Mbed TLS users, We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.2.0 and 2.28.1. These releases of Mbed TLS address several security issues, provide bug fixes, and for 3.2.0, add various features. Full details are available in the release notes (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v3.2.0, https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.1). We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately. Dave Rodgman

3 years, 8 months

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What is the URL to access the Mbed TLS knowledge base?

by Max Peng

Hi mbed-tls Team, I notice that https://tls.mbed.org has been directed to https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/mbed-tls/. However, I does not see any link to the old Mbed TLS knowledge base. It is a good resource for learning Mbed TLS. What is the URL to access it? Thanks, Max Peng

3 years, 8 months

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State of documentation

by Tim Becker

Hi all, it feels like the state of documentation has deteriorated since the last time I've used mbedtls (a couple of months ago). I'm not sure if the google index hasn't fully been updated yet, or I don't understand the new structure of the docs or ... Also, is this the proper forum to make suggestions? Should I raise an issue on Github? 1.) a lot of previously linked, useful information now redirects here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/mbed-tls/ which (please excuse my frankness) feels like an utterly useless abomination that only marketing people could love. - Some examples of previously useful links: from the wiki ( https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/) : > Old Mbed TLS website > Documentation: Mbed TLS API Reference; Knowledge base; Dev corner all redirect to trustedfirmware.org ! As do nearly all the links in https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/SUPPORT.md 2.) there is no longer an doxygen generated API documentation anywhere only. I could generate it myself, but then I'd need to get and install Doxygen, figure how to use it, etc. It would be great if this were restored. It can't be that expensive to host :) Anyway, it feels like I've been running around for hours trying to find _anything_ useful, but I just realized everything is redirected to trustedfirmware.org ... Is there any way to still access the old, useful docs? Thanks & sorry that this post is so negative, -tim

3 years, 8 months

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TLS Handshake failure while connecting to mqtt broker from device

by urvi＠milltech.in

Hello Sir/Madam, I am developing TI's EFM32 series micro controller based IOT device. This device will connect to mqtt broker and publish/ subscribes to/from data. In my application, I am trying to connect to AWS using mbedtls library over lwIP (no rtos mode). While my device is in debug mode (i.e. JTAG programmer connected) then it gets connected to AWS successfully. But when I remove JTAG programmer and operate device in normal running mode, then it failed to get connect to broker (i.e. AWS). I observe following errors occured while performing TLS handshaking stage: SSL - The connection indicated an EOF X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signatur SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed

3 years, 8 months

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Setup to test and debug a single funciton.

by Victor Micó

Hi all, First of all apologies if this is not the right place for this topic. For my master thesis I am using the mbedtls library to analyze it using side channel analysis. My objective was to use it as a starting point to analyze the resistance of different exponentiation algorithms. With this objective I am trying to set up a environment where I can call the function "mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod" https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/f5b7082f6e8af72868966b6ea99eae228f… and debug it. I have been trying for at least two weeks but I couldn't be able to succeed. I believe that when If I can get a debugging environment for that function I will be able to adapt it and use other exponentiation algorithms such as the Left-to-right k-ary (HAC 14.82). I am using VScode and the code is located in WLS Ubuntu 20.04. So far I been able to compile the full library and run all the tests. Anyone here could give mean indication on how to set up the environment to debug this function? Thanks! Victor.

3 years, 8 months

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Looking for information regarding the long-term support of the MbedTls library.

by heinrich.mueller＠g-ushin.com

Hello, Currently, we are evaluating the MbedLib to be eventually used in small and midsized automotive ECUs. * Since we have to follow the UNECE Regulation R155, R156, and ISO/SAE 21434 I need some information regarding the long-term support of the library and how the communication of bugs is organized? * I also do not understand the involvement and responsibility of ARM company? * Furthermore, I'm not sure if I understood the terms PSA and MbedTls and their mutual dependencies as well as the technical meaning? I checked the web for I but did not find anything about it yet. It would be just great if somebody can give me some hints or links to the information I am looking for. Regards Heico

3 years, 8 months

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How to secure two simultaneous sockets?

by Fred Wedemeier

I have an application using mbedTls 2.9.0 that's been running successfully for a few years. It secures connections for the AWS MQTT broker, for https GET/PUT transfers, and for SSL/TLS email servers - But only one secure connection at a time. I need to add support for an FTPS client. This requires opening/securing a control channel on port 21, then opening/securing a second port for data transfer. Opening/securing the control channel works as expected. Then, when the client calls connect() for the data transfer socket, the server log shows messages indicating it is preparing for a TLS handshake. Now, here's where I may be missing something... The client calls the same code as for the control connection: Allocates a second mbedtls_ssl_context, mbedtls_ssl_config, mbedtls_x509_crt, et.al, and calls some mbedtls_ssl_*() functions which were copy/pasted from example code several years ago. The server name and root cert are the same. I think the only difference in the second negotiation is the underlying socket descriptor allocated by the IP stack for the data channel. When mbedtls_ssl_handshake() is called, both the filezilla log and client log show a successful handshake. The filezilla log then shows it trying to establish yet another secure data connection, which fails, and reports "TLS session of data connection not resumed." Questions: -- Is the above sequence correct for opening and securing a second connection? -- In searching through ssl.h I see mbedtls_ssl_get_session() and mbedtls_ssl_set_session(). Are these relevant to the situation? I cannot tell from their one-sentence descriptions.

3 years, 8 months

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How to use just RSA algorithm in the tls library with stm32

by arman_ilmak＠yahoo.com

Hi I just needed to use rsa.c but its a little complicated. Can anyone help me or give me any document about how i can use it without use of tls. I just saw a doc on tls.mbed.org but the site is not working anymore.

3 years, 8 months

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psa_crypto_init() asks for entropy even it is not needed for every use case

by heinrich.mueller＠g-ushin.com

Hello, currently, I am evaluating the mbed-tls. I already created some smaller demos regarding AES and RSA. I do so on a PC with cygwin and with Keil micro vision for a NXP S32K144. One demo is just validating some data with a signature and an existing public key. Here is the point that puzzles me a bit. As far as I understand this cybersecurity stuff entropy is not needed for the above use case. Some of my colleagues would agree with me. Once psa_crypto_init() is called on a target NXP S32K144 the function returns PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY. So far so good https://os.mbed.com/docs/mbed-os/v6.15/porting/entropy-sources.html gives the hints on how to handle this in general but I did not find any information on how to disable the "request for entropy" in a save way once your use case does not need any new secrets. Can you give me a hint why psa_crypto_init() is implemented that way? It may also be that I still have a conceptual understanding problem!? Regards Heico

3 years, 8 months

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*_ALT vs PSA for HW crypto and upstreaming

by mathieu.rondonneau＠broadcom.com

Hi mbed-tls Team, PSA crypto API for HW acceleration seems pretty new. Question1: is there some reference code or project I could poke around to see how it is being used? Currently I have added (locally) a set of driver to make use of our HW crypto using the *_ALT way (the old way?) and for what I understand, the PSA API is the "new way" to do things. But It is still unclear how vendor do upstream there HW acceleration drivers. If this part is kept in another repo, then the mbedTLS build does not have any "hooks" to pull-in the vendor specific code to build the mbedTLS library with. The current implementation seems to be agnostic to any vendor specific HW so I am wondering if there is a "standard" way for vendor to upstream their mbedTLS HW acceleration code that would be built as part of mbedTLS library. I have posted a similar thread to the "issue" ticket of the mbedtls repo for reference: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5975 Thanks for any feedback/pointers/ideas. Regards, -Mathieu

3 years, 8 months

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LWIP/MbedTLS - any idea if SPI SRAM (block-accessible RAM) could be used for buffers?

by Peter

Hi All, My target has 128k SRAM which has about 60k spare, and 64k CCM which is allocated whole to FreeRTOS stacks etc (its private heap, memory model #4). I am running a simplified HTTP server (for local config etc), which uses fairly minimal RAM (a few k), and an HTTPS/TLS client which uses about 50k (for its private heap). So if both of the above are running concurrently, there is only ~10k RAM left, but it does work, but when TLS is doing its handshake/negotiation (which on a 168MHz 32F417 takes 2-3 seconds) the HTTP server temporarily hangs. Investigating this, it appears that LWIP is running out of buffers during TLS and is rejecting incoming packets. I don't really want to change the CPU to the next one up which has another 64k RAM, because a) I have stock of the 417 and this took about a year to get, b) the design is rock solid and I don't want to tempt fate (there is a lot of subtle hardware usage e.g. DAC ADC DMA timers) even though in theory it should be just alternate function pin changes, c) some versions of the product may not need TLS at all. I have an option of an 8 megabyte SPI-attached RAM https://www.eevblog.com/forum/microcontrollers/lyontek-ly68l6400-8-megabyte… which does work and is not bad at $3 (there are cheaper 128kbyte versions too), but obviously cannot be addressed as normal RAM. The ESP32 can do that but the 32F4 can't. Does anyone know enough about the internals of MbedTLS, or even LWIP, to know whether the memory usage structure lends itself to this kind of "overlay" memory? One can read or write say 1k bytes in 400us, in my target (21MHz SPI with DMA). Obviously this would be horribly inefficient for a byte at a time emulation but perhaps one can switch buffers in and out... Thank you in advance. If somebody knows of a concrete route, I am happy to pay for the time. Regards, Peter

3 years, 8 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum next Monday

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

Hi All, This is a gentle reminder that the next MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday 4:30 PM UK time. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don MBed TLS Technical Forum Monday Jul 4, 2022 ⋅ 8:30am – 9:30am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum Time: Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM Nov 22, 2021 04:30 PM Dec 20, 2021 04:30 PM Jan 17, 2022 04:30 PM Feb 14, 2022 04:30 PM Mar 14, 2022 04:30 PM Apr 11, 2022 04:30 PM May 9, 2022 04:30 PM Jun 6, 2022 04:30 PM Jul 4, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 1, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 29, 2022 04:30 PM Sep 26, 2022 04:30 PM Oct 24, 2022 04:30 PM Nov 21, 2022 04:30 PM Dec 19, 2022 04:30 PM Jan 16, 2023 04:30 PM Feb 13, 2023 04:30 PM Mar 13, 2023 04:30 PM Apr 10, 2023 04:30 PM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJEkceuurT4sGdaksikbUn6FARB9Kuk3ac2o/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95962635632?pwd=STFkQVltejAzRDJ6NmoxZjhmZC9RUT… Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Passcode: 018366 One tap mobile +13462487799,,95962635632# US (Houston) +16699009128,,95962635632# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) 877 853 5247 US Toll-free 888 788 0099 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/aewUpnQu5y Guests psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org nnac123(a)gmail.com

3 years, 9 months

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Is tls.mbed.org down?

by Max Peng

I wanted to access Mbed TLS knowledge Base (https://tls.mbed.org/kb) but fails. It seems tls.mbed.org was down for few days. Is this a known issue?

3 years, 9 months

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RFC: removing support for DHE in TLS 1.2 in Mbed TLS 4.0?

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi all, We're seeking feedback on our plans regarding support for Finite-Field DHE (also known as FFDH(E), as opposed to the Elliptic Curve version, ECDH(E)). Currently the PSA Crypto API only supports FFDH with named groups, which aligns well with modern cryptographic practice and the needs of TLS 1.3, but less well with TLS 1.2 where arbitrary parameters can be chosen by the server, leading to various interoperability and security issues (see the introduction of RFC 7919, hence the general move to named groups). Some data suggests that FFDH is already seeing very little use (less than 1% of TLS 1.2 traffic) on major websites, and presumably this would be even less when constrained devices are involved, since ECDH is less resource-intensive. So, we are currently planning on removing support for DHE-RSA and DHE-PSK key exchanges in TLS 1.2 in the next major version of Mbed TLS. We would retain support of ECDHE in TLS 1.2, and of DHE (in addition to ECDHE) in TLS 1.3. (Support for FFDH in TLS 1.2 would also be present in the LTS version released around the same time as the next major version.) If you have any objection to this plan, please let us know about your use case and motivations, either by responding to this email, or by commenting on the corresponding github issue: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5278 Thank you! Best regards, Manuel for the Mbed TLS team.

3 years, 9 months

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Verify cert chain

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, I have one root ca, intermediate ca, and device certificate in der format. While am trying to verify one by one as intermediate-ca with root-ca and device cert with intermediate-ca; things work fine. But if I tried to verify like having two context one for ca and one chain. I parse root ca on CA context and intermediate ca and device cert on chain context. Now verification fails with flag 8 error code -0x2700. I have attached verify_der_one_by_one.c it is working without any issue; but verify_der_chain.c is causing the issue stated above. Any help would be appreciated. Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

3 years, 9 months

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VIA padlock support

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, Mbed TLS supports AES acceleration with VIA Padlock (MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C). We do not have the hardware to test it, so this should be considered strictly community-maintained. We are making a patch to the AES module which has a small risk of breaking VIA padlock support: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/5896 . If you are using VIA padlock, please test this change and let us know if something's wrong. On a related note, we intend to drop the Padlock code in the next major version of Mbed TLS (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5903). If you care about this feature, please let us know. Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer

3 years, 9 months

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Clear master secret from mbedtls_ssl_session after handshake is ready

by Maarten Meijer

Hi all, I'm using an mbedTLS server on a CPU with a small memory foot print. In a search to serve as many as possible TLS clients, I found that the mbedtls_ssl_session.master[48] structure member is still in memory after the handshake is over. (I filed an issue to start with, but was quickly directed to this mailing list, thanks to Tom Cosgrove. See Clear master secret from mbedtls_ssl_session after handshake is ready * Issue #5832 * Mbed-TLS/mbedtls (github.com)<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5832>) I'm wondering why this is needed. The `master` secret references I can find in the code are either related to the TLS handshake, or to serialization/deserialization. I am wondering whether it makes sense to serialize/deserialize the master secret but I'm not sure if it is a use case to support serialization of ongoing handshake operations. Based on this 2 questions: * Is the master secret relevant when the handshake is over? * Is the master secret really useful in serialization/deserialization? If so, I could use `MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION` in my eventual merge request to keep facilitating this. Looking forward for relevant answers. Thanks in advance, Maarten

3 years, 9 months

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Invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 2am to 2:50am on Monday 20 times (MST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

You have been invited to the following event. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Every 4 weeks from 2am to 2:50am on Monday 20 times Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin - creator * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com * schoenle.thomas(a)googlemail.com * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MzE1cHJuZGxwMDFo… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

3 years, 9 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum June 6th

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the next MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday at 4:30pm UK time. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years, 9 months

1
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PSA API on non-threaded environment

by gergely.nagymate＠generalmechatronics.com

Hi, I am using mbedTLS v3.0.0 on a low performance CPU on a non-threaded environment, a custom task manager, which is not a preemptive operating system. I have been using MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE so even the long ECC calculations during the handshake periodically returned so the external logic and task manager could run without being blocked for too long. Recently an IoT SAFE implementation was introduced through PSA API. It is used for RNG and verification calculation, but not for ECDSA and ECDH during key exchange. PSA API is designed for threaded environments and can not simultaneously use MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. Now the ECC functions block for several seconds. Do you have a recommendation on how to use PSA on non-threaded environments, or how to inject external logic execution during these long ECC operations? Thanks, Gergely

3 years, 10 months

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PSA API on non-threaded environment

by Gergely Nagymáté

Hi, I am using mbedTLS v3.0.0 on a low performance CPU on a non-threaded environment, a custom task manager, which is not a preemptive operating system. I have been using MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE so even the long ECC calculations during the handshake periodically returned so the external logic and task manager could run without being blocked for too long. Recently an IoT SAFE implementation was introduced through PSA API. It is used for RNG and verification calculation, but not for ECDSA and ECDH during key exchange. PSA API is designed for threaded environments and can not simultaneously use MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. Now the ECC functions block for several seconds. Do you have a recommendation on how to use PSA on non-threaded environments, or how to inject external logic execution during these long ECC operations? Thanks, Gergely

3 years, 10 months

1
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"RAW RSA" encoding method for signatures

by THIERRY BINIGUER

Hi all, I can see a "RAW RSA" encoding method for signatures both implemented in mbed TLS and PSA API and I'm wondering about the motivations and rational of this variant. Could you tell more about it, please ? Below details. Thierry It was introduced since 2017 in mbed TLS in this sha1 ID : fdf38030de70b95a77205f17d65591f05e74be08 ("Outsource code for generating PKCS1 v1.5 encoding"). As far as I know, standard does not specifically mention it but RFC 8017 ($9.2) specifies EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as a deterministic encoding method (no randomness) with a buffer that is built as an encoded message EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T, where PS being padding bytes, T being a DER encoding of a digestInfo, where digestInfo contains : - the hash function (so called AlgorithmIdentifier applied on the message) - and the hash value (so called digest H = = Hash(M)) PSA defines the RAW RSA in its API. It is said a signature algorithm, without hashing. In this raw RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, the hash parameter to psa_sign_hash is computed "externally". It is a DER encoding, “ready-to-use" hash, so called raw data in PSA and mbed TLS. In the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, the hash parameter to psa_sign_hash is H (computed with the hash function as indicated in the standard). mbed TLS implementation manages RAW data in rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(), it copies raw data as they are given and pads accordingly. Even if from a security perspective, this variant does not seem to introduce vulnerabilities, there is no information on the used hash algorithm inside the signature itself, therefore making mandatory for the verifier to know exactly which algorithm is used, and therefore less trivial in term of device interoperability.

3 years, 10 months

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Cancelled event: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ (BST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Mike Holmes

This event has been cancelled. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: United Kingdom Time Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin- creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com * schoenle.thomas(a)googlemail.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

3 years, 10 months

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Updated invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 19:00 to 19:50 on Monday 13 times (AEST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by santosdanillo＠gmail.com

This event has been changed. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Every 4 weeks from 19:00 to 19:50 on Monday 13 times Eastern Australia Time - Sydney (changed) Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin- creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com * schoenle.thomas(a)googlemail.com Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MmU4dm1iNzJ0dmV1… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

3 years, 10 months

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Updated invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 21:00 to 21:50 on Monday from Mon 31 Jan to Mon 23 May (AEDT) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by santosdanillo＠gmail.com

This event has been changed. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Every 4 weeks from 21:00 to 21:50 on Monday from Mon 31 Jan to Mon 23 May Eastern Australia Time - Sydney (changed) Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin- creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com * schoenle.thomas(a)googlemail.com Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MmU4dm1iNzJ0dmV1… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

3 years, 10 months

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Require cross compilation steps

by Krunal Chauhan

Hi, I need updated mbed TLS library version 3.1.0 I need step/procedure to cross compile mbed TLS library. Best Regards, [Logo]<https://www.slscorp.com/> Krunal Chauhan Senior Engineer Email: krunal.chauhan(a)slscorp.com | www.slscorp.com<http://www.slscorp.com> Plot#32, Zone-D/4, Phase-1, GIDC Estate V.U. Nagar - 388 121, Gujarat, India

3 years, 10 months

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Re: AES Memory Leak

by Minos Galanakis

Hi Subramanian. Thank you for your report. Would it be possible to provide some further information on how the program is structured? Is the code snippet running in a single thread or a multithreaded application? How often is data transmitted (As to many invocations are we considering for an 8-hour window)? How is that while(1) loop interrupted? Which platform architecture is the program running at? I have been trying to reproduce it by expanding the Valgrind test suite, as to repeat the logic included in the example for UINT_MAX iterations, without success. Minos ________________________________ From: Subramanian Gopi Krishnan via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 16 March 2022 04:24 To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] AES Memory Leak Hi, I have developed a program to send encrypted data continuously. The program is working fine for few hours. After 6 to 8 Hrs, I get returned MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED -0x6180 Do I need to free the gcm context for every time I send data? What would be the root cause. #define AEAD_KEY_SIZE (32) /**< AEAD Key Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_IV_SIZE (12) /**< AEAD IV Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_AD_SIZE (16) /**< AEAD AAD Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_TAG_SIZE (16) /**< AEAD Tag Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_ID_SIZE (4) /**< AEAD Tag Size(in bytes). */ #define MAX_CIPHER_SIZE (2048)/**< AEAD Cipher/Plaintext Segent Size unoperation(in bytes). */ typedef struct { mbedtls_gcm_context CtxAead; /**< aes-gcm 3rd party library context */ uint8_t pu8Key[AEAD_KEY_SIZE]; /**< Key - Randomly Generated */ uint8_t pu8InitVector[AEAD_IV_SIZE]; /**< Randomly Generated */ uint8_t pu8AddData[AEAD_AD_SIZE]; /**< Additional Associated Data - md5sum() */ uint8_t pu8Tag[AEAD_TAG_SIZE]; /**< Hold Digest/Tag of encryped data */ uint8_t pu8Id[AEAD_ID_SIZE]; /**< KeyID is generated */ uint8_t pu8Data[MAX_CIPHER_SIZE]; /**< Buffer to hold plain-text after decipher */ uint8_t pu8Cipher[MAX_CIPHER_SIZE]; /**< Buffer to hold cipher-text after cipher */ uint16_t u16Length; /**< Current length of buffer to encrypt/decrypt */ }S_Aead; int32_t i32Aead_EncryptionCycle(S_Aead *ctx ,uint8_t *pu8AddData, uint16_t u16Length ) { int32_t i32Ret = 0; if(NULL == ctx) { return (NULL_AEAD_CTX); } /* Initilaze GCM Context **/ mbedtls_gcm_init ( &(ctx->CtxAead) ); /*SETTING ADDITIONAL DATA as MD5 of incoming data **/ if( AEAD_AD_SIZE < u16Length ) { return (ERROR_INPUT_BUFFER_TOO_LONG); } memset( ctx->pu8AddData, 0x00, AEAD_AD_SIZE ); i32Ret = mbedtls_md5_ret(pu8AddData, u16Length, ctx->pu8AddData); if (i32Ret) { return (i32Ret); } /* symetric key for testing */ memset( ctx->pu8Key, 0xAB, AEAD_KEY_SIZE ) /* Setting the key */ if( i32Ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey ( &(ctx->CtxAead), MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, ctx->pu8Key, AEAD_KEY_SIZE*OCTETS ) ) { return (i32Ret); } while(1) { /* OS Wait for 1000ms for data to get ready */ if( OS_WaitSingleEventTimed( TX_DATA_BUFFER_READY, WAIT_1000MS ) ) { if( ctx->u16Length == 0 ) { /* No data ready for sending (or) timed-out */; continue; } /* New Initial Vector */ if( i32Ret = i32NewRandomByte( ctx->pu8InitVector, AEAD_IV_SIZE, "AEAD_NEW_IV_GENERATION" ) ) { return(i32Ret); } ctx->u16Length = u16Length; if( i32Ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &(ctx->CtxAead), MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, ctx->u16Length, ctx->pu8InitVector, AEAD_IV_SIZE, ctx->pu8AddData, AEAD_AD_SIZE, ctx->pu8Data, ctx->pu8Cipher, AEAD_TAG_SIZE, ctx->pu8Tag)) { return(i32Ret); } if( ctx->u16Length == send_data(ctx->pu8Cipher, ctx->u16Length) ) { /* tx success*/ memset( ctx->pu8Data, 0x00, ctx->u16Length ); memset( ctx->pu8Cipher, 0x00, ctx->u16Length ); ctx->u16Length = 0; } } } /* Free GCM Context */ mbedtls_gcm_free( &(ctx->CtxAead) ); /* Reset context memory */ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(S_Aead)); }

3 years, 11 months

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Re: mbed-tls Digest, Vol 26, Issue 5

by Christie Su

Hi, Is there anyone who can tell me how to send the question related to MbedTLS? Which forum can I sign in? Thanks, Christie -----Original Message----- From: mbed-tls-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: April-25-22 8:00 PM To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: mbed-tls Digest, Vol 26, Issue 5 Send mbed-tls mailing list submissions to mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To subscribe or unsubscribe via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to mbed-tls-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org You can reach the person managing the list at mbed-tls-owner(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of mbed-tls digest..." Today's Topics: 1. misc. questions (Frank Bergmann) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 12:47:07 +0200 From: Frank Bergmann <mbedtls(a)tuxad.com> Subject: [mbed-tls] misc. questions To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Message-ID: <20220425104707.GA3579(a)treferpol.tuxad.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi all, I have some questions. 1) If you have an established TLS connection (mbed TLS 3.x) and while the connection is up the (server-) certificate expires: Will the connection stay up? Or is a new handshake (with valid cert) REQUIRED? 2) Related to question 1: CAN mbed TLS switch to a new cert on an existing TLS connection? (e.g. by doing another handshake from server OR client side) 3) With 3.x some struct members are now "private". Even if you can allow private access by a define it would be better to use a getter. But for ssl context's "state" I am missing this and also for "p_bio" (to access fd). Is there a chance to get this implemented? BTW - a big "LIKE" for 3.x! I really appreciate the changes. Thank you! kind regards, Frank ------------------------------ Subject: Digest Footer mbed-tls mailing list -- mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org ------------------------------ End of mbed-tls Digest, Vol 26, Issue 5 ***************************************

3 years, 11 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the Asia-Europe timezone-friendly MBest TLS Tech forum is next Monday. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Mon Apr 25, 2022 2am – 2:50am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Who: * Don Harbin - creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com * schoenle.thomas(a)googlemail.com

3 years, 11 months

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Mbed tls handshake returns –x7200

by arman_ilmak＠yahoo.com

Hey friends Im trying to do a secure connection between my stm32 board and server. I wrote the code based on GitHub - eziya/STM32F4_HAL_ETH_MBEDTLS: STM32 mbedTLS library testing (SSL/TLS client) that i found. My board is based on stm32h7 series. And im using google to test my app.(ip 142.250.74.196 port 443) This is the debug section: https://aws1.discourse-cdn.com/standard17/uploads/mbed/original/2X/e/ee636c… How should i solve the problem?

3 years, 11 months

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Issues with mbedtls_rsa_import_raw + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify

by m4D

Greetings! I'm having an issue while veryfing signature with imported RSA2048 public key, generated with Win7 CryptoAPI (PUBLICKEYBLOB) into latest mbedtls 2.28.x. The blob contains RSA modulus N (256 bytes) and public exponent E (4 bytes) - I do extract them succesfully, then provide into mbedtls_rsa_import_raw. It all goes smth. like this: u32 errval = mbedtls_rsa_init(ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0); // errval == 0 here errval = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(ctx, n, nlen, 0l, 0, 0l, 0, 0l, 0, e, elen); // errval == 0 here errval = mbedtls_rsa_complete(ctx); // errval == 0 here errval = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(ctx); // errval == 0 here Then i ran: errval = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(ctx, 0l, 0l, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, 0, _src, _sign); and get -0x4380 (verify failed) _src - is sha512 hash of data to be verified (64 bytes) _sign - is 256 bytes of signature, provided by win7 cryptoapi P.S. just in case, i did tried messing with endianess in every way for e AND n, it didn't help. I added a little debugging inside library/rsa.cpp, turned out we do call mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify, and there is a memcmp between 'encoded' and 'encoded_expected' bufs. 'encoded' is derived from signature (_sign), and 'encoded_expected' is derived from hash (_src) printhex for 'encoded' looks like this: 1a1da83b 14be17a2 c8401d41 1d453909 ... total 16 lines (256 bytes) ... 7fb37ea2 719a5562 aebdb3ed 296e0ed1 but printhex for 'encoded_expected' looks like this: ffff0100 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ... wtf??? padding ??? ... ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 30513000 6009060d 65014886 03020403 40040005 b190b45a a40b354f 32271b34 f022abd3 ... sha512-derived data here, 64 bytes 557abf2b e2cc4e0f 0b77bdfc b45688b0 So, there is no way these two bufs match. I wonded if there is some issue in parsing _sign, or I didn't prepared input data good enough. Any ideas? B.R., m4D.

3 years, 11 months

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How to verify in a server that session cache resumption was used for a given connection

by eoin.mcmahon.dev＠gmail.com

I am trying to modify the dtls_server.c example to keep track of whether session caching was used for a given connection. Ideally I would have an interget value i.e `session_resumed = #1 or 0` One way I tried to do this was by reading the value of the mbedtls_ssl_context struct `ssl`: ``` /* * 5. Handshake */ do ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ); while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) { printf( " hello verification requested\n" ); ret = 0; goto reset; } else if( ret != 0 ) { printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); goto reset; } printf( " session cache status: %d\n", ssl.handshake.resume ); ``` The issue with this is that the ssl struct is set to private, so the code fails to compile with the error: 'struct mbedtls_ssl_context' has no member named 'handshake' Can somebody help me with some example code that would make this possible?

3 years, 11 months

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Mbed TLS GitHub migration

by Dave Rodgman

Hi all, Please note that in the next couple of weeks, we will migrate Mbed TLS to a new GitHub organisation. Your existing scripts, links etc for accessing Mbed TLS on GitHub should not be affected. This will change the url from https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls to https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls . GitHub will redirect any accesses to the old URL for the foreseeable future, but we would recommend updating your links once the migration is complete. All of the Mbed TLS repositories will migrate to this new organisation, i.e.: mbedtls mbedtls-docs mbedtls-test Thanks Dave Rodgman

3 years, 12 months

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ECDSA Help

by Deep Patel

Hello, mbedTLS has ECDSA module that takes Signature with ASN1 encoding as input mbedtls_pk_verify() The Signature I receive is without ASN1 encoded. Trying to find an implementation within mbedTLS that can add ASN1 to signature before I feed into the verify function. Any help ? [RF IDeas]<http://www.rfideas.com/> Deep Patel Sr. Embedded Software Engineer D: 224-333-2084 P: 847-870-1723 Ext 437 E: ddpatel(a)rfideas.com<mailto:ddpatel@rfideas.com> A: <https://www.rfideas.com/> 425 North Martingale Road, Suite 1680, Schaumburg, IL 60173 <https://www.rfideas.com/>

3 years, 12 months

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TrustedFirmware Code of Conduct

by Don Harbin

Hi All, Please find the link to the TrustedFirmware Community Code of Conduct here: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/community_guidelines/… Trusted Firmware has a very diverse and global developer community. It is important that we adhere to the code of conduct in all our interactions. For some of you all this may be new and for others just a gentle reminder. In either case, if you have any questions, please feel free to reach out to me directly. And thanks to you all for your contributions to the TrustedFirmware community! Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

4 years

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Official release with mutual authentication support

by Tove Rumar

Hello! Is there a time plan for when there will be an official release with TLS 1.3 (Client) that supports mutual authentication? Kind Regards Tove Rumar Software Engineer u-blox Malmo Östra Varvsgatan 4 SE- Malmö www.u-blox.com<https://www.u-blox.com> Reliable. Smart. Secure.

4 years

1
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AES Memory Leak

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, I have developed a program to send encrypted data continuously. The program is working fine for few hours. After 6 to 8 Hrs, I get returned MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED -0x6180 Do I need to free the gcm context for every time I send data? What would be the root cause. #define AEAD_KEY_SIZE (32) /**< AEAD Key Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_IV_SIZE (12) /**< AEAD IV Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_AD_SIZE (16) /**< AEAD AAD Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_TAG_SIZE (16) /**< AEAD Tag Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_ID_SIZE (4) /**< AEAD Tag Size(in bytes). */ #define MAX_CIPHER_SIZE (2048)/**< AEAD Cipher/Plaintext Segent Size unoperation(in bytes). */ typedef struct { mbedtls_gcm_context CtxAead; /**< aes-gcm 3rd party library context */ uint8_t pu8Key[AEAD_KEY_SIZE]; /**< Key - Randomly Generated */ uint8_t pu8InitVector[AEAD_IV_SIZE]; /**< Randomly Generated */ uint8_t pu8AddData[AEAD_AD_SIZE]; /**< Additional Associated Data - md5sum() */ uint8_t pu8Tag[AEAD_TAG_SIZE]; /**< Hold Digest/Tag of encryped data */ uint8_t pu8Id[AEAD_ID_SIZE]; /**< KeyID is generated */ uint8_t pu8Data[MAX_CIPHER_SIZE]; /**< Buffer to hold plain-text after decipher */ uint8_t pu8Cipher[MAX_CIPHER_SIZE]; /**< Buffer to hold cipher-text after cipher */ uint16_t u16Length; /**< Current length of buffer to encrypt/decrypt */ }S_Aead; int32_t i32Aead_EncryptionCycle(S_Aead *ctx ,uint8_t *pu8AddData, uint16_t u16Length ) { int32_t i32Ret = 0; if(NULL == ctx) { return (NULL_AEAD_CTX); } /* Initilaze GCM Context **/ mbedtls_gcm_init ( &(ctx->CtxAead) ); /*SETTING ADDITIONAL DATA as MD5 of incoming data **/ if( AEAD_AD_SIZE < u16Length ) { return (ERROR_INPUT_BUFFER_TOO_LONG); } memset( ctx->pu8AddData, 0x00, AEAD_AD_SIZE ); i32Ret = mbedtls_md5_ret(pu8AddData, u16Length, ctx->pu8AddData); if (i32Ret) { return (i32Ret); } /* symetric key for testing */ memset( ctx->pu8Key, 0xAB, AEAD_KEY_SIZE ) /* Setting the key */ if( i32Ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey ( &(ctx->CtxAead), MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, ctx->pu8Key, AEAD_KEY_SIZE*OCTETS ) ) { return (i32Ret); } while(1) { /* OS Wait for 1000ms for data to get ready */ if( OS_WaitSingleEventTimed( TX_DATA_BUFFER_READY, WAIT_1000MS ) ) { if( ctx->u16Length == 0 ) { /* No data ready for sending (or) timed-out */; continue; } /* New Initial Vector */ if( i32Ret = i32NewRandomByte( ctx->pu8InitVector, AEAD_IV_SIZE, "AEAD_NEW_IV_GENERATION" ) ) { return(i32Ret); } ctx->u16Length = u16Length; if( i32Ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &(ctx->CtxAead), MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, ctx->u16Length, ctx->pu8InitVector, AEAD_IV_SIZE, ctx->pu8AddData, AEAD_AD_SIZE, ctx->pu8Data, ctx->pu8Cipher, AEAD_TAG_SIZE, ctx->pu8Tag)) { return(i32Ret); } if( ctx->u16Length == send_data(ctx->pu8Cipher, ctx->u16Length) ) { /* tx success*/ memset( ctx->pu8Data, 0x00, ctx->u16Length ); memset( ctx->pu8Cipher, 0x00, ctx->u16Length ); ctx->u16Length = 0; } } } /* Free GCM Context */ mbedtls_gcm_free( &(ctx->CtxAead) ); /* Reset context memory */ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(S_Aead)); }

4 years

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