- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Notice of refactoring of C11 and Unix-like platform adherence

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, In the next release of TF-PSA-Crypto 1.1.0 and Mbed TLS 4.1.0, we have made significant changes to code that detects features that are not part of C99 proper. The changes are mainly: * Uniformization of POSIX/Unix feature detection macros. * Assume a C99-compliant printf (dropping hacks for ancient MSVC and forcing compliant printf on MinGW). * Expansion of “static assert” in C99 when an official C11 static_assert isn't available. We believe the new code to be standards-compliant, however it may break the build on some platforms that are not strictly POSIX compliant or cause some new compiler warnings. If you use TF-PSA-Crypto or Mbed TLS on a “less mainstream” Unix-like platform, or with a compiler that isn't GCC or Clang, and the break builds for you, please open a pull request with the necessary fixes (probably in core/tf_psa_crypto_platform_requirements.h, core/tf_psa_crypto_common.h, or library/mbedtls_platform_requirements.h). We have also made some minor changes in the Mbed TLS 3.6 long-time support branch. They are significantly less expansive, but may affect platforms that are mostly Linux-like but are not Linux or are using an unusual libc. Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine TF-PSA-Crypto and Mbed TLS developer

2 weeks, 4 days

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ECDH and key interfaces on development branch

by Leonie Reichert

Dear MbedTLS contributors, I'm reaching out with a question regarding the ECDH and similar interfaces on the MbedTLS development branch. I hope this mailing list is the appropriate venue for this discussion. I am preparing a pull request for an implementation of the Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) standard for MbedTLS/TF-PSA-Crypo. It seems like the development branch at TF-PSA-Crypo does not seem to support ecdh.h anymore. While this is not seem to be explicitly stated anywhere, there are instructions on how to use the PSA interface instead to create ECDH keys. Now my question: So the my code meets the desired quality criteria, does all other key interfaces also have to be changed? I am using the ECP interface a lot, so mbedtls_ecp_group_init, mbedtls_ecp_point_init, mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init and so on. The functions are still available but the instructions in psa_tranistion.md in Section "translating a legacy ephemeral key agreement TLS server workflow" make me believe that using non-psa key interfaces might be undesirable in MbedTLS in general. I would greatly appreciate any clarification on this matter. Best regards, Leonie [ABB logotype] — Dr. Leonie Reichert Research Scientist "Secure Connected Systems" ABB AG Kallstadter Strasse 1 Mannheim Mobile: +49 160 99002896 E-mail: leonie.reichert(a)de.abb.com<mailto:leonie.reichert@de.abb.com> abb.com<https://www.abb.com/> [ABB logotype] ABB AG Sitz/Head Office: Mannheim Registergericht/Registry Court: Mannheim Handelsregisternummer/Commercial Register No.: HRB 4664 Vorstand/Managing Board: Klaus Eble (Vorsitzender/Chairman), Alexander Zumkeller Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats/ Chairman of Supervisory Board: Adrian Guggisberg Diese E-Mail enthält vertrauliche und/oder rechtlich geschützte Informationen. Wenn Sie nicht der richtige Adressat sind oder diese E-Mail irrtümlich erhalten haben, informieren Sie bitte sofort den Absender und vernichten Sie diese Mail. Das unerlaubte Kopieren sowie die unbefugte Weitergabe dieser Mail ist nicht gestattet. Bitte beachten Sie auch unsere Datenschutzerklärung, die Sie auf unserer Webseite<https://new.abb.com/privacy-policy/de/datenschutz> finden. This E-mail may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient (or have received this E-mail in error) please notify the sender immediately and destroy this E-mail. Any unauthorized copying, disclosure or distribution of the material in this E-mail is strictly forbidden. Please also take note of our privacy notice, which you can find on our webpage<https://new.abb.com/privacy-notice>.

3 weeks, 4 days

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[TLS 1.2][ECDHE][RX65N] point is not on curve (secp256r1)

by Adrien LEGER

Hello, I am using mbedTLS 3.6.5 on a Renesas RX65N with compiler ccrx. I am implementing a TLS 1.2 server using: - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ECDSA P-256 server certificate - ECDHE secp256r1 During the handshake (I use openssl s_client), I get: >>> TLS 1.2, Alert [length 0002], fatal illegal_parameter 02 2f 140605661713728:error:1012606B:elliptic curve routines:EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates:point is not on curve:../crypto/ec/ec_lib.c:812: 140605661713728:error:141A4132:SSL routines:tls_process_ske_ecdhe:bad ecpoint:../ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c:2229: mbedtls_ecdh_make_params() returned -0x4C80 (MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY) This happens right after: ssl_tls12_server.c:4304: server state: 4 ssl_tls12_server.c:3234: => write server key exchange ssl_tls12_server.c:2971: ECDHE curve: secp256r1 ssl_tls12_server.c:3075: value of 'ECDH: Q(X)' (256 bits) is: ssl_tls12_server.c:3075: f0 7e c6 f3 cc 41 71 bb a8 01 0b cc 3a 8a 5e 72 ssl_tls12_server.c:3075: 9d db bc d9 a1 5a 04 91 47 44 e0 ff 6f 42 de b3 ssl_tls12_server.c:3075: value of 'ECDH: Q(Y)' (255 bits) is: ssl_tls12_server.c:3075: 5e ba af af 86 55 1a 6e 04 a8 97 b4 13 12 c2 3c ssl_tls12_server.c:3075: a3 2e 00 a4 2d 44 e8 63 bf 98 08 74 81 94 5f 5e ssl_tls12_server.c:3130: pick hash algorithm 9 for signing ssl_tls.c:9231: Perform mbedtls-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange ssl_tls12_server.c:3148: dumping 'parameters hash' (32 bytes) ssl_tls12_server.c:3148: 0000: 2d b3 aa 62 c4 5a 87 18 39 a6 b6 91 0e 6d fb 81 -..b.Z..9....m.. ssl_tls12_server.c:3148: 0010: f7 55 38 54 33 1d 30 cc 85 83 10 2e 39 5c 5d 67 .U8T3.0.....9\]g ssl_tls12_server.c:3296: dumping 'my signature' (72 bytes) ssl_tls12_server.c:3296: 0000: 30 46 02 21 00 ee 81 dd 1f 32 62 66 57 5c 90 31 0F.!.....2bfW\.1 ssl_tls12_server.c:3296: 0010: a9 84 2a c4 e8 ee 6a c5 f0 db 39 01 58 d5 9c e3 ..*...j...9.X... ssl_tls12_server.c:3296: 0020: 6e e6 bd 04 25 02 21 00 f5 c6 89 97 d8 dd 2f 93 n...%.!......./. ssl_tls12_server.c:3296: 0030: d0 11 19 f7 0a e7 c4 6b ae 27 b8 d5 db b4 a9 2c .......k.'....., ssl_tls12_server.c:3296: 0040: 2f ec 2e b4 53 1a 72 01 I suspect an entropy / RNG issue. My RNG initialization is: - custom entropy source based on XXX - added via mbedtls_entropy_add_source(...) - CTR_DRBG seeded with personalization string "debug-seed" Do you see any problem in this setup ? Do not hesitate if you need any other information. I'm new to cryptography and currently learning TLS with mbedTLS. Thanks in advance, Adrien.

1 month

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Performance Inquiry- High read/write latency observed in Mbedtls 3.6.2 (DTLS)

by Ankita Hatmode

Hi Team, We are working on an embedded security project using MbedTLS 3.6.2 for DTLS communication. As part of our performance evaluation, we analyzed the timing metrics for DTLS handshake and application data read/write operations. During testing, we observed that the time taken for data read and write operations is significantly higher than expected. [image: image.png] We would appreciate your guidance on the following: 1. What factors in MbedTLS could contribute to higher read/write latency? 2. Are there any known performance limitations or configuration settings that impact DTLS data transfer timing? 3. Are there recommended optimizations for embedded platforms to improve throughput? Please let us know if any more info is required. Looking forward to your response. Thanks and regards, Ankita Hatmode -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **Disclaimer:** This email message including any attachments is confidential, and may be privileged and proprietary to Agiliad. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify us immediately by replying to this message and destroy all copies of this message including any attachments. You are NOT authorized to read, print, retain, copy, disseminate, distribute, or use this message or any part thereof. Thank you. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 month, 1 week

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mbedtls 2.28 - resumption in an ongoing session (abbreviated renegotiation)

by Tommaso Mancini

Hello, I am trying to test a device’s conformance to IEC62351-3 which defines some rules about TLS implementations, in particular im wondering if it’s possible to: Use mbedtls on a TLS server to accept a session resumption when a client sends a ClientHello message with a session ID in an ongoing TLS session. Also RFC 5246 says this about resumption for tls v1.2: The ClientHello message includes a variable-length session identifier. If not empty, the value identifies a session between the same client and server whose security parameters the client wishes to reuse. The session identifier MAY be from an earlier connection, this connection, or from another currently active connection. so it should be possible to resume in an ongoing session but: I already have a working implementation of a TLS 1.2 server using mbedtls 2.28, but if a client sends a clienthello with a session ID in an ongoing session, the server always responds with a renegotiation by default. Taking a look at the library code i tried to change the function: static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) found in the file ssl_srv.c in mbedtls 2.28, and removed a check which skipped resumption if a client hello was received during a session, this does not work properly however because the server closes the connection after sending the finished message due to a MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR. Im wondering if there is anyway to allow resumption in this manner using mbedtls or if im doing something wrong? If you require further information please let me know and i will try to add as much as i can! [1741361442716] <mailto:tommaso.mancini@sel-electric.it> Tommaso Mancini SEL S.p.A. R&D Software and Test Engineer Via Amendola 9,11,13,15,17 51035 Lamporecchio (PT) Tel. +39 0573 80051 Fax +39 0573 803110 website: www.sel-electric.com<http://www.sel-electric.com/> e-mail: tommaso.mancini(a)sel-electric.it<mailto:tommaso.mancini@sel-electric.it> <mailto:tommaso.mancini@sel-electric.it>Questo è un messaggio di posta elettronica proveniente da SEL s.p.a. Le informazioni contenut in questa comunicazione sono altamente riservate e possono essere utilizzate solo dalla persona o dall’ente cui sono destinate. La diffusione, distribuzione e/o copiatura del documento trasmesso da parte di qualsiasi soggetto diverso dal destinatario è proibita. Se avete ricevuto questo messaggio per errore, Vi preghiamo di contattarci immediatamente. Grazie. This communication is intended only for use by the addressee. It may contain confidential or privileged information. Transmission cannot be guaranteed to be secure or error-free. If you receive this communication unintentionally, please inform us immediately. Thank you. Per favore, pensa all’ambiente prima di stampare. Please, consider the environment before you print.

1 month, 4 weeks

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Some problems regarding mbed TLS

by Milorad Podoaba

Hello, Our devices are connecting to AWS IoT Core. Recently we had few customers with poor connection complaining that the device didn't reconnect. We are using ARM Keil MDK 8.1.0 + mbed TLS 3.6.4. On Wireshark logs we have identified 2 errors: 1. close notify from server after client hello 2. bad certificate or unknown CA from client after server hello The device was stuck on one of these errors and only a reboot would fix it. I think these 2 errors are not related. On detail analysis for the first error, we saw that the cipher suites list was missing and that was the reason for close notify from server. Looking at the TLS code saw that the list is being created only one time after reboot. So in ssl_ciphersuites.c just commented out supported_init = 1 and now seems to be good. I do not know the reason why the list was lost during runtime. For the second error, we were able to reproduce the problem quite consistently. Some logs at IoT client code showed that somehow the TLS lost the ability to parse properly the server certificates. I believe that this was some memory allocation problem, so I've configured the mbed TLS to get allocation from a separate buffer and that seems to fix the problem. This buffer has to be quite large, 56k size. Any smaller size would return memory allocation failure. Any reason why it has to be so big? Just want to know if someone had before these issues and if I can lower the buffer. Let me know if you need extra details about the problems. Thank you and regards, Milo -- MiloradPodoaba Firmware System Engineer Arrowhead Alarm Products Ltd. (09) 414 0085 <tel:%2809%29%20414%200085%20%20%20> milo(a)aap.co.nz <mailto:milo@aap.co.nz> www.aap.co.nz <//www.aap.co.nz> 1A Emirali Road, Silverdale, Auckland, New Zealand facebook <https://www.facebook.com/ArrowheadAlarmProductsLtd/?hc_ref=ARTrnwMZmLZimX6K…> linkedin <https://www.linkedin.com/company/arrowhead-alarm-products-ltd-/> instagram <https://instagram.com/aapltd?igshid=1356ehzmruf5r>

1 month, 4 weeks

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Fwd: Some problems regarding mbed TLS

by Ben Taylor

Also anything you can share around the size and quantity of certificates you are parsing would be useful. 56K does seem very high, though if at the time you are parsing large numbers of large certificates it could get up that far. Regards Ben ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Ben Taylor <ben.taylor(a)linaro.org> Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 at 11:33 Subject: Re: [mbed-tls] Some problems regarding mbed TLS To: Milorad Podoaba <milo(a)aap.co.nz> Hi Milo, For the second issue the memory allocation problem if you are able to share your mbedtls configuration, that would be useful as customising this could impact how much is allocated. Beyond this anything further you can share about how you are using the library when you encounter high usage would be useful. Ideally a code snippet which reproduces the error, though if not any further information will help us reproduce the error and attempt to assist you. For the first issue again if you can share your config and any code snippets you have that can reproduce the issue that would be helpful. Many thanks Ben On Mon, 26 Jan 2026 at 20:54, Milorad Podoaba <milo(a)aap.co.nz> wrote: > Hi Ben, > > Not sure how much code you want me to share. You need to be more specific. > There might be a memory problem in our application, it just hard to tell > and the mbed TLS seems not able to recover. > > At this stage, I only want to reduce the size of the buffer for the > alternative memory alloc. > Do you know a way to do it? > > Thank you and regards, > Milo > > > Milorad Podoaba > > Firmware System Engineer > > Arrowhead Alarm Products Ltd. > > > > (09) 414 0085 <%2809%29%20414%200085%20%20%20> > milo(a)aap.co.nz > www.aap.co.nz <//www.aap.co.nz> > 1A Emirali Road, Silverdale, Auckland, New Zealand > > > > [image: facebook] > <https://www.facebook.com/ArrowheadAlarmProductsLtd/?hc_ref=ARTrnwMZmLZimX6K…> > > [image: linkedin] > <https://www.linkedin.com/company/arrowhead-alarm-products-ltd-/> > > [image: instagram] <https://instagram.com/aapltd?igshid=1356ehzmruf5r> > > > On 27/01/2026 12:19 am, Ben Taylor wrote: > > Hi Milo, > Thanks for reporting this issue. Is there any chance you could > share some example code that can reproduce the error, so we can investigate > it further? > > Many thanks > > Ben > > On Mon, 26 Jan 2026 at 10:28, Milorad Podoaba via mbed-tls < > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> Our devices are connecting to AWS IoT Core. >> Recently we had few customers with poor connection complaining that the >> device didn't reconnect. >> >> We are using ARM Keil MDK 8.1.0 + mbed TLS 3.6.4. >> >> On Wireshark logs we have identified 2 errors: >> >> 1. close notify from server after client hello >> 2. bad certificate or unknown CA from client after server hello >> >> The device was stuck on one of these errors and only a reboot would fix >> it. >> I think these 2 errors are not related. >> >> On detail analysis for the first error, we saw that the cipher suites >> list was missing and that was the reason for close notify from server. >> Looking at the TLS code saw that the list is being created only one time >> after reboot. >> So in ssl_ciphersuites.c just commented out supported_init = 1 and now >> seems to be good. >> I do not know the reason why the list was lost during runtime. >> >> For the second error, we were able to reproduce the problem quite >> consistently. >> Some logs at IoT client code showed that somehow the TLS lost the ability >> to parse properly the server certificates. >> I believe that this was some memory allocation problem, so I've >> configured the mbed TLS to get allocation from a separate buffer and that >> seems to fix the problem. >> This buffer has to be quite large, 56k size. Any smaller size would >> return memory allocation failure. >> Any reason why it has to be so big? >> >> Just want to know if someone had before these issues and if I can lower >> the buffer. >> Let me know if you need extra details about the problems. >> >> Thank you and regards, >> Milo >> >> >> -- >> Milorad Podoaba >> >> Firmware System Engineer >> >> Arrowhead Alarm Products Ltd. >> >> >> >> (09) 414 0085 <%2809%29%20414%200085%20%20%20> >> milo(a)aap.co.nz >> www.aap.co.nz <//www.aap.co.nz> >> 1A Emirali Road, Silverdale, Auckland, New Zealand >> >> >> >> [image: facebook] >> <https://www.facebook.com/ArrowheadAlarmProductsLtd/?hc_ref=ARTrnwMZmLZimX6K…> >> [image: linkedin] >> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/arrowhead-alarm-products-ltd-/> >> [image: instagram] <https://instagram.com/aapltd?igshid=1356ehzmruf5r> >> -- >> mbed-tls mailing list -- mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >> To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >> > >

2 months

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PSA Key derivation driver entry points

by Ruchika Gupta

Hi All, The PSA driver interface guide describes the driver entry points for key derivation. However the implementation seems to be missing from the psa crypto core layer. Can you help update if this is something which is being worked on ? I see a lot of tickets open related for key derivation interface dating back in 2022. Are these still relevant ? Regards, Ruchika

2 months, 2 weeks

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Canceled event: MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Mon 29 Dec 2025 10am - 10:50am (GMT) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Shaun Longhorn

This event has been canceled. MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia Monday 29 Dec 2025 ⋅ 10am – 10:50am United Kingdom Time Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Topic: MBed-TLS Technical Forum - AsiaTime: Jun 16, 2025 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 39 occurrence(s)Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system.Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJMqcuGuqDotGtIbACm498ytl0ZhydWKdu1b/ics… Zoom Meetinghttps://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/97758661706?pwd=baMjUvnWbY20z3ignQca7QVahhozkI.1Meeting ID: 977 5866 1706Passcode: 577208---One tap mobile+16892781000,,97758661706# US+17193594580,,97758661706# US---Dial by your location• +1 689 278 1000 US• +1 719 359 4580 US• +1 253 205 0468 US• +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma)• +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC)• +1 305 224 1968 US• +1 309 205 3325 US• +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago)• +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston)• +1 360 209 5623 US• +1 386 347 5053 US• +1 507 473 4847 US• +1 564 217 2000 US• +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)• +1 646 931 3860 US• +1 669 444 9171 US• +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)• 833 548 0282 US Toll-free• 833 928 4608 US Toll-free• 833 928 4609 US Toll-free• 833 928 4610 US Toll-free• 877 853 5247 US Toll-free• 888 788 0099 US Toll-free• 833 548 0276 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 977 5866 1706Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/acdtApJNbc Guests mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org ~~//~~ Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email because you are an attendee on the event. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer, be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or modify your RSVP. Learn more https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

3 months, 2 weeks

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Question about using hardware-backed parameters in ALT crypto implementations

by Massimiliano Cialdi

Hi, I’m working with Mbed TLS 2.28.x on a microcontroller that provides a built-in crypto engine. The existing *_ALT support works fine for performance, and higher-level modules correctly route their block operations through the accelerated backend. On this platform the crypto hardware can also use internal key material stored in dedicated slots. These values are not accessible as byte arrays and cannot be passed to the usual setkey_*() API. Question Is there a recommended way to configure an ALT implementation so that it can select an internal key slot instead of receiving a buffer? Or, more generally, how should an ALT backend represent a key that is not exposed to software? Any guidance on the intended design would be appreciated. Thanks! Massimiliano Cialdi FIRMWARE ENGINEERING PROFESSIONAL LEADER Powersoft S.p.A. Via E. Conti, 5 - Scandicci (Fi) 50018 - Italy OFFICE: +39 055 7350230 [cid:2_3b23bc2c-3db3-4330-b6f5-3fb62b89422a.png]<https://www.facebook.com/powersoft/>[cid:3_7da2eb67-7c7f-41e6-9598-128bdd52ec04.png]<https://www.instagram.com/powersoft.official/>[cid:4_a5d469e7-3228-4fb1-948d-4c3e879ea0da.png]<https://www.youtube.com/@powersoftaudio>[cid:5_e4390674-51fd-4219-9389-28ae9a12796d.png]<https://www.linkedin.com/company/powersoft>[cid:6_083a55f9-076c-4d52-9f93-69225b28cb32.png]<https://open.spotify.com/show/6lwXROYcCyrVnJi6J9fA42>[cid:7_7fd8585e-63fd-441a-95f3-6c0b23d059e1.png]<https://x.com/Powersoft_Japan>[cid:8_6308aaa9-b97d-405b-a86c-0300a381d13f.png]<https://space.bilibili.com/3546387314641333>[cid:9_9af1e42f-0019-42c4-8046-d6246e65ed9e.png]<https://teams.microsoft.com/l/chat/0/0?users=massimiliano.cialdi@powersoft.…> [cid:pwsrgbn_12214209-f50f-45fa-be18-2a4cf1a5818a.png]<https://www.powersoft.com/en>

4 months, 1 week

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Re: How can I read plain-text private key into rsa_context?

by Shannek Pierce

05 DC AD 24 F4 E4 B1 C4 39 15 62 45 02 DC 7B 4A C6 57 8F FC 40 5B 5E 6F 55 FB E1 F6 58 62 CB 57 05 Sent from my iPhone

4 months, 2 weeks

1
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AI Policy - Guidance on AI-assisted contributions

by Shaun Longhorn

All, Please be aware that today we have published our AI policy with Guidance on AI-assisted contributions. See the full details here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/aipolicy/ Should you have any questions feel free to raise them. Thanks, Shaun Community Manager

4 months, 2 weeks

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Re: [Hafnium] Re: Gerrit scheduled maintenance: 8th November 8-12 UTC

by Saheer Babu

Hi Jerome Could you try again please? Thanks, Saheer From: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier(a)linaro.org> Date: Monday, 10 November 2025 at 10:19 To: Saheer Babu <Saheer.Babu(a)arm.com>, tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, tf-rmm(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-rmm(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, olivier.deprez--- via Tf-openci <tf-openci(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [Hafnium] Re: Gerrit scheduled maintenance: 8th November 8-12 UTC Hi Saheer, On 11/9/25 00:19, Saheer Babu via Hafnium wrote: > Hi > > Just wanted to let you all know that maintenance was done in the morning and site is back to normal. I'm getting a 403 from here: $ curl --show-headers https://review.trustedfirmware.org/ HTTP/2 403 server: awselb/2.0 date: Mon, 10 Nov 2025 10:14:55 GMT content-type: text/html content-length: 118 <html> <head><title>403 Forbidden</title></head> <body> <center><h1>403 Forbidden</h1></center> </body> </html> Same for git.trustedfirmware.org which makes the OP-TEE CI fail: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/actions/runs/19226835413/job/54955917815… Regards, -- Jerome > > Thanks, > Saheer > > From: Saheer Babu <Saheer.Babu(a)arm.com> > Date: Thursday, 30 October 2025 at 16:13 > To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, tf-rmm(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-rmm(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, olivier.deprez--- via Tf-openci <tf-openci(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Subject: Gerrit scheduled maintenance: 8th November 8-12 UTC > Hi All, > > We will be performing maintenance activity on review.trustedfirmware.org and service will be unavailable on 8th November between 8 AM-11 AM UTC. > > Best regards, > > Saheer >

4 months, 2 weeks

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FW: CI infrastructure scheduled maintenance: 12th Sep 2025

by Joanna Farley

FYI From: Saheer Babu via Tf-openci <tf-openci(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Date: Wednesday, 10 September 2025 at 15:17 To: tf-openci(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-openci(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [Tf-openci] CI infrastructure scheduled maintenance: 12th Sep 2025 Hi all, We will be performing upgrade of the clusters hosting review.trustedfirmware.org and ci.trustedfirmware.org on Friday, 12th Sep 2025 at 16:00 GMT+1. During this maintenance window, both services will be unavailable for approximately 4 hours. A follow-up email will be sent once the services are fully restored. Best regards, Saheer IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- Tf-openci mailing list -- tf-openci(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to tf-openci-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

4 months, 3 weeks

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Security backports for v2.28

by Matt Bauman

Hello all, I know that v2.28.10 is EOL, but I've been working on bringing security bug fixes to our distribution of it as part of my work in shoring up the Julia package ecosystem. I've largely leaned on the Debian security team's work thus far; they have the much harder task of supporting 2.16.9 for bullseye (security) and have done great work in bringing that version up to date through CVE-2025-52497. I've re-landed their backport patches against v2.28.10; these can be found on our build tree [1] or my fork [2]: 1. https://github.com/JuliaPackaging/Yggdrasil/tree/54c5a3e8e72899a3a778d8617f… 2. https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/compare/v2.28.10...mbauman:mbedtls:v2.2… Now I'm faced with the daunting prospect of last week's CVE-2025-54764 and CVE-2025-59438. These are *much* larger changesets. Has anyone else begun tackling this? I very much appreciated the guidance that’s included in the advisory itself, but I'm guessing there may be others in our situation... and I came here looking to see if anyone had begun talking about this (or working on it) yet. Best, Matt

4 months, 3 weeks

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Question regarding mbedtls 3.6.0 conformance to IEC 62351-3:2023

by Tommaso Mancini

Hello, I am writing to you to ask if you have any available documentation you can share regarding mbedtls's conformance to IEC 62351-3:2023. For example: Do you know of any users which have implemented the library in systems that reached IEC 62351-3:2023 certification? Do you have a list of features mapped to the IEC 62351-3:2023 standard requirements? Perhaps a PICS template? Thank you in advance and apologies if this is the wrong channel for this kind of question. Kind Regards, Tommaso Mancini [1741361442716] <mailto:tommaso.mancini@sel-electric.it> Tommaso Mancini SEL S.p.A. R&D Software and Test Engineer Via Amendola 9,11,13,15,17 51035 Lamporecchio (PT) Tel. +39 0573 80051 Fax +39 0573 803110 website: www.sel-electric.com<http://www.sel-electric.com/> e-mail: tommaso.mancini(a)sel-electric.it<mailto:tommaso.mancini@sel-electric.it> <mailto:tommaso.mancini@sel-electric.it>Questo è un messaggio di posta elettronica proveniente da SEL s.p.a. Le informazioni contenut in questa comunicazione sono altamente riservate e possono essere utilizzate solo dalla persona o dall’ente cui sono destinate. La diffusione, distribuzione e/o copiatura del documento trasmesso da parte di qualsiasi soggetto diverso dal destinatario è proibita. Se avete ricevuto questo messaggio per errore, Vi preghiamo di contattarci immediatamente. Grazie. This communication is intended only for use by the addressee. It may contain confidential or privileged information. Transmission cannot be guaranteed to be secure or error-free. If you receive this communication unintentionally, please inform us immediately. Thank you. Per favore, pensa all’ambiente prima di stampare. Please, consider the environment before you print.

5 months

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MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED

by Кристиян Ценов

5 months

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Re: TrustedFirmware.org - Check for MbedTLS License/Royality fee for commercial usage

by Carina Tsai

To whom it may concern, Our engineering team is using the Mbed TLS library in our wifi range extenders sold on markets and adhere to the licensing terms outlined in the sourcecode and docs. Thanks to Shaun’s guideline, it would be no royalty if we adhere to the licensing terms. Is there any other cost required for us to use the Mbed TLS library in our wifi range extenders, adhering to the licensing terms outlined in the sourcecode and docs? Thank you Carina From: Shaun Longhorn <shaun.longhorn(a)linaro.org<mailto:shaun.longhorn@linaro.org>> Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2025 7:08 PM To: Ken Chen <Ken.Chen(a)netgear.com<mailto:Ken.Chen@netgear.com>> Cc: enquiries(a)trustedfirmware.org<mailto:enquiries@trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: TrustedFirmware.org - Check for MbedTLS License/Royality fee for commercial usage External Email. Be cautious clicking attachments and links. Report suspicious to reportphishing(a)netgear.com<mailto:reportphishing@netgear.com>. Hi Ken, I'm the Community Manager at Trusted Firmware. I can't advise you directly on your licensing situation but I can point you towards the documentation. Mbed TLS is an open source community project and no royalty is required. You must adhere to the licensing terms outlined in the sourcecode and docs: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls?tab=readme-ov-file#license<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls?tab=readme-o…> https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/licensing/<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/lic…> You can also reach out to the Mbed-TLS community on the following public mailing list. https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman3/lists/mbed-tls.lists.trustedfirm…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman3/lists…> I should highlight our optional memberships for Trusted Firmware detailed on this page. https://www.trustedfirmware.org/join/<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.trustedfirmware.org/join/__;!!JNtdCR…> membership has a number of benefits detailed in the slides. It could be beneficial in terms of lab testing and project visibility. If you have an interest we can arrange a call with the Co-Chairs and discuss benefits in more detail. Thanks, Shaun Community Manager On Tue, 30 Sept 2025 at 09:20, 'Ken Chen' via TFenquiries <enquiries(a)trustedfirmware.org<mailto:enquiries@trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Dear Sir/Madam, I am reaching out to inquire about the licensing terms and any potential royalty fees associated with using the Mbed TLS library in our commercial products. I was unable to find a specific contact point for this type of query. Could you kindly forward this message to the appropriate person or team for further discussion? Thank you for your assistance. Best regards Ken This e-mail, including attachments, may include confidential and/or proprietary information, and may be used only by the person or entity to which it is addressed. If the reader of this e-mail is not the intended recipient or his or her authorized agent, the reader is hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail is prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by replying to this message and delete this e-mail immediately. This e-mail, including attachments, may include confidential and/or proprietary information, and may be used only by the person or entity to which it is addressed. If the reader of this e-mail is not the intended recipient or his or her authorized agent, the reader is hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail is prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender by replying to this message and delete this e-mail immediately.

5 months, 1 week

5
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Announcing the joint release of Mbed TLS 4.0.0 & TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0

by Minos Galanakis

Hi Mbed TLS users, We’re pleased to announce a major milestone: the joint release of Mbed TLS 4.0.0 and the first-ever TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0. Mbed TLS now uses PSA Crypto as the default cryptographic API, and these releases include significant API changes that break backward compatibility with previous versions These releases include significant API changes that break backward compatibility with previous versions, so please test your integration thoroughly and follow the migration guides to update your codebase: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/mbedtls-4.0.0/docs/4.0-migration-g… https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/blob/v1.0.0/docs/1.0-migration-gu… Full details are available in the release notes: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-4.0.0 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/releases/tag/tf-psa-crypto-1.0.0.

5 months, 2 weeks

1
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Mbed TLS 3.6.5 Released

by Minos Galanakis

Hi Mbed TLS users, We have released Mbed TLS version 3.6.5. These releases of Mbed TLS address several security issues, provide bug fixes, and bring other minor changes. Full details are available in the release notes https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.5. We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately.

5 months, 2 weeks

1
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Modernizing a ecdh exchange

by Dirk-Willem van Gulik

I am currently doing an ECDH exchange over MQTT (i.e. at the message layer; MQTT is fundamentally `untrusted') - with a bit of out of band work to confirm end to end integrity. That worked nicely (and interoperable with java-bouncy-castle and openssl, etc with: mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx_cli.grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 ) mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx_cli.grp, &ctx_cli.d, &ctx_cli.Q, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg) mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx_cli.Q.X, node_publicsession, 32 ) to create the keys and with mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx_cli.private_Qp.Z, 1 )) mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx_cli.private_Qp.X, pubencr_tmp, CURVE259919_KEYLEN)) mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &ctx_cli.grp, &ctx_cli.private_z, &ctx_cli.private_Qp, &ctx_cli.private_d, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ) mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx_cli.private_z, sessionkey, CURVE259919_KEYLEN) to calculate the emphemeral session key. With the mbedtls_ecdh_context going increasingly private; I assume I can change the latter with: mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ctx_cli, &len_sessionkey, sessionkey, sizeof(sessionkey), mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg) but am struggling to see how I an replace the key generation itself. Is there a similar option that does not look `into' ctx_cli ?? With kind regards, Dw. PS: actual code at https://github.com/MakerSpaceLeiden/AccesSystem/blob/master/lib-arduino/ACN…

6 months

1
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DTLS handshake with and without hello verify request

by Ankita Hatmode

Hi Team, I am working on exploring DTLS handshake using the mbedtls-3.6.4 version on our embedded platform. I enabled the hello verify request feature and got stuck at hello verify request state on server side if I don't reset the ssl context and don't set the client transport ID. I want to know if there is any way to complete a handshake by bypassing the reset of ssl context and setting the client transport ID. Also, our environment only supports C89 constructs. I could not see inttypes.h in the mbedtls-3.6.4, is there any specific reason to remove this file? I am getting compilation errors without inttypes.h and stdint.h. Is there any macro to be enabled to support the c89 compilation in mbedtls stack? Looking forward to your response. Thanks and regards, Ankita Hatmode -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **Disclaimer:** This email message including any attachments is confidential, and may be privileged and proprietary to Agiliad. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify us immediately by replying to this message and destroy all copies of this message including any attachments. You are NOT authorized to read, print, retain, copy, disseminate, distribute, or use this message or any part thereof. Thank you. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6 months, 3 weeks

2
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TLS 1.3 and brainpool curves

by Maren Konrad

Dear MbedTLS maintainers, we are already using MBedTLS, however, we recently enabled TLS 1.3 and found that our certificates doesn't work anymore, because they are brainpoolP256r1 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8734). So the question would be, if I missed any configuration to enable the usage of brainpool curves (which are working for TLS 1.2) or if there are any plans, that these are getting supported by MBedTLS 3.6.x? Best regards, Maren Konrad

6 months, 3 weeks

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TLS handshake error : unexpected eof

by kavitha bk

Hi We migrated from mbedtls 2.28 to mbedtls 3.6.2 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/107ea89daaefb9867ea9121002fbbdf926… and we see TLS handshake fails when we use TLS 1.2 in mbedtls 3.6.2 instead of 1.3. We get below error 20E094B0FFFF0000:error:0A000126:SSL routines:ssl3_read_n:unexpected eof while reading:/usr/src/debug/openssl/3.1.0-r0/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c:303: # openssl s_client -connect 192.168.142.1:7001 -no_tls1_3 fails After seeing the trace we have enabled ciphers but still we see the issue. please advise, thanks. Thanks Kavitha

7 months

1
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psa crypto driver for imx-smw

by kavitha bk

Hi all, We are trying to write a psa crypto driver for imx-smw . They have exposed psa certified public apis https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw/tree/release/version_4.x/public/psa Is there any documentation to replace existing psa implementation to custom psa crypto implementation in mbedtls..Please advise on the approach to follow to call the custom apis to implement based on https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/mbedtls-3.6/docs/psa-driver-exampl… Thanks Kavitha

7 months, 3 weeks

1
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Mbed TLS 3.6.4 Released

by Minos Galanakis

Hi Mbed TLS users, We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.6.4. These releases of Mbed TLS address several security issues, provide bug fixes, and bring other minor changes. Full details are available in the release notes (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.4). We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately.

8 months

2
2
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Credential validation BEFORE first TLS handshake: the present and future of mbedtls_pk_sign/verify()

by Almut Herzog

Hi, Prior to the first TLS handshake our application is required to perform input validation of the provided credentials (from file or smart card) for this peer. One of those checks is to verify that private and public key match. We used to use mbedtls_pk_sign() with a custom mbedtls_pk_context for that. But in version 3.X mbedtls_pk_info_t was made private so mbedtls_pk_setup() with a custom mbedtls_pk_info_t whose sign_func would call into our smart card wrapper is no longer possible. Is there still a way to provide custom callback functions for signing in 3.6.4 somehow? Or any other workaround for early check of a key pair? Looking at 4.0.0-beta, also pk.h is no longer public. Will it still be possible to perform early validation of this peer's credentials prior to a first TLS handshake? How? While I am at it, it would be good to implement something that is future-proof. What else I have looked at: * mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque() might be the way to go but I do not find an example of how to link a key id to a custom signature function. * mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt() would be useful if our application was always using RSA. * Both functions are no longer public in 4.0 Related: Early validation of a CRL (whether it was signed by the expected CA) used to be possible with mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(). But to properly set the input parameters requires access to private members of mbedtls_x509_crl in 3.6.4 (maybe an acceptable move?) but in 4.0.0 mbedtls_pk_verify_ext() is no longer public. How perform explicit/"manual" CRL validation especially given the possibly skipped CRL validation in mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() as per the comment below? "It is your responsibility to provide up-to-date CRLs for all trusted CAs. If no CRL is provided for the CA that was used t sign the certificate, CRL verification is skipped silently..." Any future-proof ideas for this? Best regards, /Almut

8 months

2
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Re: MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, Due to holidays, Arm will be unable to host a meeting on 14 July 2025. Slides are available at https://github.com/TrustedFirmwareWebsite/website/pull/652/files#diff-ee947… and will be on the archive web site shortly. Short summary of the past 2 weeks: the 3.6.4 release is out. We are now focusing on the last tasks for the 1.0/4.0 big release at end of Q3. Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer and PSA Crypto architect ________________________________ From: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings Sent: 21 May 2025 14:56 To: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings <linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c(a)group.calendar.google.com>; mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia When: 14 July 2025 11:00-11:50. Where: Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Jun 16, 2025 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 39 occurrence(s) Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJMqcuGuqDotGtIbACm498ytl0ZhydWKdu1b/ics…<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fmeeting%2Ft…> Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/97758661706?pwd=baMjUvnWbY20z3ignQca7QVahhozkI…<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9775866…> Meeting ID: 977 5866 1706 Passcode: 577208 --- One tap mobile +16892781000,,97758661706# US +17193594580,,97758661706# US --- Dial by your location • +1 689 278 1000 US • +1 719 359 4580 US • +1 253 205 0468 US • +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) • +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) • +1 305 224 1968 US • +1 309 205 3325 US • +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) • +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) • +1 360 209 5623 US • +1 386 347 5053 US • +1 507 473 4847 US • +1 564 217 2000 US • +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) • +1 646 931 3860 US • +1 669 444 9171 US • +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) • 833 548 0282 US Toll-free • 833 928 4608 US Toll-free • 833 928 4609 US Toll-free • 833 928 4610 US Toll-free • 877 853 5247 US Toll-free • 888 788 0099 US Toll-free • 833 548 0276 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 977 5866 1706 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/acdtApJNbc<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fu%2FacdtApJ…> When Every 4 weeks from 10am to 10:50am on Monday (United Kingdom Time) Guests mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org> View all guest info<https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZHRh…> RSVP for psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org> for all events in this series Yes<https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZ…> No<https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZ…> Maybe<https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZ…> More options<https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZHRh…> Invitation from Google Calendar<https://calendar.google.com/calendar/> You are receiving this email because you are an attendee on the event. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer, be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or modify your RSVP. Learn more<https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding>

8 months, 3 weeks

1
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Strategic Financing & Brokerage Collaboration Opportunity

by LIAM GILL

We are pleased to introduce Velositi Consultancy Group, a Finnish-owned brokerage and consultancy firm headquartered in Ontario, Canada. As the exclusive representative of leading financial institutions across Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Dubai, we offer customized financing solutions globally. Through our partners, we provide loan facilities at a competitive 3% annual interest, featuring a 2-year grace period and no physical collateral—a unique offer tailored for today’s business environment. This opportunity is extended especially to recognized business leaders like yourself. Your recent listing by your country’s Chamber of Commerce as “Reliable to do business with” during the Saudi Business Summit highlights the potential for meaningful collaboration. Beyond direct financing, we also welcome broker partnerships for referring businesses in need of funding. We would be pleased to discuss how we can support your growth and financial objectives. Warm regards, Liam Gill Chairman, Business Development Velositi Consultancy Group 300 John Street, Suite 506, Thornhill, ON L3T 6M8, Canada LIAM GILL 300 John Street, Suite 506 , ON , Thornhill , L3T 6M8 Unsubscribe ( https://u45460243.ct.sendgrid.net/wf/unsubscribe?upn=u001.AzuRT3u7SiTsBx5mQ… ) - Unsubscribe Preferences ( https://u45460243.ct.sendgrid.net/wf/unsubscribe?upn=u001.AzuRT3u7SiTsBx5mQ… )

8 months, 3 weeks

1
0
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Mbed TLS 4.0.0-beta & TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0-beta releases.

by Minos Galanakis

I am happy to announce the joint-release of Mbed TLS 4.0.0-beta & TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0-beta PSA-Crypto now lives in its own repository while TLS and X.509 remain in Mbed TLS. This beta release breaks compatibility with earlier versions of Mbed TLS. Please do not use it in production. It’s intended for the community to verify codebase integrations against the split and API changes, and for early adopters to experiment and provide feedback. For full details, please see the release pages: Mbed TLS 4.0.0-beta: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-4.0.0-beta TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0-beta: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/releases/tag/tf-psa-crypto-1.0.0-…

8 months, 4 weeks

1
0
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[Mbed-tls-announce] Mbed TLS 4.0.0-beta & TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0-beta

by Minos Galanakis via Mbed-tls-announce

I am happy to announce the joint-release of Mbed TLS 4.0.0-beta & TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0-beta PSA-Crypto now lives in its own repository while TLS and X.509 remain in Mbed TLS. This beta release breaks compatibility with earlier versions of Mbed TLS. Please do not use it in production. It’s intended for the community to verify codebase integrations against the split and API changes, and for early adopters to experiment and provide feedback. For full details, please see the release pages: Mbed TLS 4.0.0-beta: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-4.0.0-beta TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0-beta: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/releases/tag/tf-psa-crypto-1.0.0-… IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

8 months, 4 weeks

1
0
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[Mbed-tls-announce] Mbed TLS 3.6.4 Released

by Minos Galanakis via Mbed-tls-announce

Hi Mbed TLS users, We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.6.4. These releases of Mbed TLS address several security issues, provide bug fixes, and bring other minor changes. Full details are available in the release notes (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.4). We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

9 months

1
0
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imx-secure-enclave with mbedtls 2.28.9

by kavitha bk

Hi We are using mbedtls 2.28.9 and want to offload crypto operations to HSM from NXP imx-secure-enclave. is the below approach correct or please suggest alternate approaches if any? 1.Transition all apis from traditional apis to psa in modules Use PSA crypto module https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/psa-transition.md 2. Integrate PSA module with imx-secure-enclave in our custom mbedtls 3. All modules will use custom mbedtls which will internally offload crypto operations to HSM or Do you recommend to use MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT? and implement the key creation/signing/export of public key operations ? Thanks, Kavitha

9 months, 2 weeks

2
2
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Mbed TLS information request

by Solis, Hector

Hi! We are working with Mbed TLS 3.6.0 library and need the following information: 1. Is there any End-Of-Life date planned for this library? 2. What is the current version? 3. How can we obtain support for the library enquiries? Does this support has a cost? 4. How is the library update? Does this update has a cost? 5. Are this library Open Source? Thanks in advance for your help! 🙂 Have a great day! Héctor J. Solís Castillo Embedded Engr I Honeywell | HTS Building Automation 990, Av. Eje 5 Norte, Mexico City CDMX hectorjose.solis(a)honeywell.com<mailto:hectorjose.solis@honeywell.com> honeywell.com<http://www.honeywell.com/> Pronouns: He/Him<https://www.mypronouns.org/what-and-why>

9 months, 3 weeks

2
1
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Question about partial certificate chains

by Roman Janota

Hello, I have the following two certificate chains: server <- intermediateCA <- rootCA and client <- intermediateCA <- rootCA. Currently there are two ways the client is authenticated by the server: both the intermediateCA and rootCA certificates are configured as CAs on the server or if only intermediateCA is configured. I am using a custom verify callback set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(). I would like to achieve two separate cases: 1) Make the MbedTLS' built-in pre-verify be successful, even when only the rootCA certificate is set as the server's CA. 2) Always obtain the whole certificate chain up to the root in the verify callback. For case 1) this is how our OpenSSL TLS implementation works, it is discussed here <https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/7871>. From my understanding the server should be able to build the certificate chain by inquiring the client about its certificate's issuer, etc. For case 2), whenever both rootCA and intermediateCA are configured on the server, only the chain client <- intermediateCA is received by the callback. I would like to be able to receive the chain client <- intermediateCA <- rootCA. Are these two cases achievable with mbedTLS? For reference I am using mbedTLS 3.5.2. For my server I would like to utilize both cases 1) and 2) and for the client only the case 1). Kind regards, Roman Janota

9 months, 3 weeks

1
0
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PSA Crypto API version compliance

by Zak, Kevin

Hello, I notice in 'crypto.h' of mbedTLS 3.6.3, PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR & PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR show the version implemented as v1.0. Per the github page of TF-PSA-Crypto (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/blob/development/README.md), the implementation is of v1.1. I verified that this mismatch between the README and crypto.h exists on the development branch of TF-PSA-Crypto as well. What is the correct version implemented, as of mbedTLS 3.6.3? Regards, Kevin

10 months

1
0
0 0

(no subject)

by Steve Glass

Hi, I'm trying to build the mbedtls v3.6.3 for an embedded 386 device. The build is configured as `crypto_baremetal`. In the snippet below I use the make build process with a GCC 11.2 cross toolchain that's installed in `/opt/x-tools/i386-elf but the build process ends with an error: ``` (venv) dev [ /workspaces/mbedtls ]$ make CC=/opt/x-tools/i386-elf/bin/i386-elf-gcc AR=/opt/x-tools/i386-elf/bin/i386-elf-ar make[1]: Entering directory '/workspaces/mbedtls/library' CC aes.c CC aesni.c CC aesce.c ... CC src/certs.c CC src/psa_test_wrappers.c CC src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c make[1]: Leaving directory '/workspaces/mbedtls/tests' make[1]: Entering directory '/workspaces/mbedtls/programs' CC aes/crypt_and_hash.c /opt/x-tools/i386-elf/lib/gcc/i386-elf/11.2.0/../../../../i386-elf/bin/ld: cannot find crt0.o: No such file or directory collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status make[1]: *** [Makefile:160: aes/crypt_and_hash] Error 1 make[1]: Leaving directory '/workspaces/mbedtls/programs' make: *** [Makefile:34: programs] Error 2 (venv) dev [ /workspaces/mbedtls ]$ ``` So I have two questions: This error says it fails to link find crt0.o but the output (library/libmbedcrypto.a) exists and looks ok (altho I've yet to try linking against it). Is the error message spurious or is the library it produced unusable? Do I really need a version of crt0.o to link successfully? (The same configuration builds with no errors using the host's x64 compiler toolchain - and that toolchain also doesn't have a crt0.o file). Thanks in advance!

10 months

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Any plan for a Java Binding ?

by Simon Bernard

Hi, I'm the main developer of Leshan Library. This is a Java open source implementation of LWM2M protocol hosted at Eclipse Foundation. We currently use Scandium (from Californium Project) as DTLS library. This library fits our needs until now but we have some concerns about future-proofness of it (Especially, there is no plan for DTLS 1.3) and there is no support of TLS. So we explore some other way for the future. I had consider to use OpenJdk but there is a lot of missing IoT Features. I contact OpenJdk security dev and they makes me understand politely that IoT is not the priority (at least this is my understanding) Another solution we explore would be to use an mbedtls Java binding. (as mbedtls is well supported and focus IoT) There is a not official one at : https://github.com/open-coap/kotlin-mbedtls *Questions : * 1. Is there any official java binding ? 2. If no, is there any plan for that kind of binding ? 3. If no, if there is a community initiative could it be hosted by you ? Thx, Simon

10 months, 1 week

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Invitation: MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 10am to 10:50am on Monday (GMT) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Shaun Longhorn

MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia Every 4 weeks from 10am to 10:50am on Monday United Kingdom Time Location https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99853938085?pwd=D3au597hb9J1veo1W74pIqkvY6VaDI… https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9985393… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99853938085?pwd=D3au597hb9J1veo1W74pIqkvY6VaDI… Join by phone (US) +1 833-548-0282 passcode: 12278212 Joining instructions https://www.google.com/url?q=https://applications.zoom.us/addon/invitation/… Joining notes Meeting host: shaun.longhorn(a)linaro.org Join Zoom Meeting: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99853938085?pwd=D3au597hb9J1veo1W74pIqkvY6VaDI… ──────────https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99853938085?pwd=D3au597hb9J1veo1W74pIqkvY6VaDI.1&jst=2Joining Instructions────────── Guests mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org View all guest info https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZHRh… Reply for mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org and view more details https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZHRh… Your attendance is optional. ~~//~~ Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email because you are an attendee on the event. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer, be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or modify your RSVP. Learn more https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

10 months, 1 week

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Invitation: MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 10am to 10:50am on Monday (BST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Shaun Longhorn

MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia Every 4 weeks from 10am to 10:50am on Monday United Kingdom Time Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Topic: MBed-TLS Technical Forum - AsiaTime: Jun 16, 2025 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 39 occurrence(s)Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system.Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJMqcuGuqDotGtIbACm498ytl0ZhydWKdu1b/ics… Zoom Meetinghttps://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/97758661706?pwd=baMjUvnWbY20z3ignQca7QVahhozkI.1Meeting ID: 977 5866 1706Passcode: 577208---One tap mobile+16892781000,,97758661706# US+17193594580,,97758661706# US---Dial by your location• +1 689 278 1000 US• +1 719 359 4580 US• +1 253 205 0468 US• +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma)• +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC)• +1 305 224 1968 US• +1 309 205 3325 US• +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago)• +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston)• +1 360 209 5623 US• +1 386 347 5053 US• +1 507 473 4847 US• +1 564 217 2000 US• +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)• +1 646 931 3860 US• +1 669 444 9171 US• +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)• 833 548 0282 US Toll-free• 833 928 4608 US Toll-free• 833 928 4609 US Toll-free• 833 928 4610 US Toll-free• 877 853 5247 US Toll-free• 888 788 0099 US Toll-free• 833 548 0276 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 977 5866 1706Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/acdtApJNbc Guests mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org View all guest info https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZHRh… Reply for mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org and view more details https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZHRh… Your attendance is optional. ~~//~~ Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email because you are an attendee on the event. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer, be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or modify your RSVP. Learn more https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

10 months, 1 week

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Invitation: MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 10am to 10:50am on Monday from Mon 21 Apr to Sun 18 May (BST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Shaun Longhorn

MBed-TLS Technical Forum - Asia Every 4 weeks from 10am to 10:50am on Monday from Monday 21 Apr to Sunday 18 May United Kingdom Time Location https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99853938085?pwd=D3au597hb9J1veo1W74pIqkvY6VaDI… https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9985393… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99853938085?pwd=D3au597hb9J1veo1W74pIqkvY6VaDI… Join by phone (US) +1 833-548-0282 passcode: 12278212 Joining instructions https://www.google.com/url?q=https://applications.zoom.us/addon/invitation/… Joining notes Meeting host: shaun.longhorn(a)linaro.org Join Zoom Meeting: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99853938085?pwd=D3au597hb9J1veo1W74pIqkvY6VaDI… ──────────https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99853938085?pwd=D3au597hb9J1veo1W74pIqkvY6VaDI.1&jst=2Joining Instructions────────── Guests mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org View all guest info https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZHRh… Reply for mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org and view more details https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjI4c3NnYjFoZHRh… Your attendance is optional. ~~//~~ Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email because you are an attendee on the event. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer, be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or modify your RSVP. Learn more https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

10 months, 1 week

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PQC code from European Project QUBIP - Security Pattern

by Alberto Battistello

Hi all, I am writing in behalf of Security Pattern, a security firm specialized in embedded systems. We are a member of the QUBIP European Funded Project (https://qubip.eu), which aims at transitioning protocols, networks, and systems to Post Quantum algorithms. As a result of the project, we have integrated a set of Post Quantum algorithms in the TLS1.3 stack of the MbedTLS code (see here https://github.com/QUBIP/pq-mqtt-client-mbedtls). We have code running on STM32 Nucleo board in two versions: the former is a full software, by leveraging the crypto primitives provided in a library developed by another partner, the latter using a Secure Element emulated by FPGA connected via I2C (also developed by another partner of QUBIP). Our main work has beed dedicated to integrating the new hybrid KEM and signatures (MLKEM768-x25519 and MLDSA44-Ed25519) into the TLS stack, in order to demonstrate communication with an MQTT broker running OpenSSL. At the current stage we are about to publish the code on github with MIT license (here https://github.com/QUBIP/pq-mqtt-client-mbedtls). Meanwhile, we think the effort we made could be of help for MBedTLS development/developers. So I would like to ask if you can address me to some contact that is responsible in MbedTLS or ARM about the PQC transition or the best way to facilitate the use/integration of our work. Best Regards, Alberto -- Security Pattern <https://www.securitypattern.com/> Alberto Battistello Senior Security Engineer M. +39 333 3239810 Via G. Boccaccio, 58 | 25080 Mazzano (BS) | Italy | P.I. 03943650980 www.securitypattern.com <https://www.securitypattern.com/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm…> | Follow Linkedin <https://www.linkedin.com/company/securitypattern/> | We value your privacy <https://www.iubenda.com/privacy-policy/40319464/legal>

10 months, 3 weeks

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handshake fail with "Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version)"

by 扶柏成

Hi all, We have encountered a challenge while using mbedTLS 3.5.1 and would greatly appreciate the assistance of the experts. Thank you in advance for your support. I used mbedTLS 3.5.1 to connect to the server acc.connect.cpms.milence.com, and the TLS handshake failed with an Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version) error. Detailed information is described at this GitHub issue<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/10141>. * We attempted to connect with the Windows EDGE browser and found through packet capture that the handshake was successful. * We were also able to successfully handshake using TLS 1.2. * When we limited the supported group to only: MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 and used TLS 1.3, the handshake was also successful. For more details, please refer to the discussion on GitHub: Handshake fail with "Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version)" ・ Issue #10141 ・ Mbed-TLS/mbedtls<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/10141>. Best Regards, Fu Baicheng

11 months, 1 week

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Mbed TLS 3.6.3 and 2.28.10

by Minos Galanakis

Dear Mbed TLS users, We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.6.3 and 2.28.10. These releases provide bugfixes, security fixes and minor improvements. This release of Mbed TLS provides the fix for the TLS compatibility issue of handling fragmented handshake messages. This release includes fixes for security issues. Full details are available in the release notes: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-2.28.10 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.3 We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately. Many thanks, Minos Galanakis Mbed TLS developer

1 year

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[Mbed-tls-announce] Mbed TLS 3.6.3 and 2.28.10

by Minos Galanakis via Mbed-tls-announce

Dear Mbed TLS users, We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.6.3 and 2.28.10. These releases provide bugfixes, security fixes and minor improvements. This release of Mbed TLS provides the fix for the TLS compatibility issue of handling fragmented handshake messages. This release includes fixes for security issues. Full details are available in the release notes: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-2.28.10 https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.3 We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately. Many thanks, Minos Galanakis Mbed TLS developer IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

1 year

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[Mbed-tls-announce] Announcing Mbed TLS 3.6.3 and 2.28.10

by Gilles Peskine via Mbed-tls-announce

Dear Mbed TLS users, The next release of Mbed TLS (3.6.3 and 2.28.10) is scheduled on Monday 2025-03-24. It will include a security fix for a vulnerability with a high impact to affected applications. Due to the nature of the vulnerability, which involves an insecure default in current versions of Mbed TLS, fixing it may require a small change in application code. We will provide instructions in the release notes. Without this change, affected applications will fail at runtime with Mbed TLS 3.6.3 or 2.28.10. Applications that are currently secure will generally not require any change. We apologize for the inconvenience. Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine On behalf of the Mbed TLS security team IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

1 year

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Inquiry about the ECC-160 bit size support in MbedTLS

by Ankita Hatmode

Hi Team, I am working on an embedded security project and exploring ECC support in MbedTLS 3.6.2. I would like to confirm whether the MbedTLS supports ECC-160 i.e. Elliptic Curve Cryptography with a 160 bit key size, in the latest version or any earlier versions. Looking forward to your response. Thanks and regards, Ankita Hatmode -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **Disclaimer:** This email message including any attachments is confidential, and may be privileged and proprietary to Agiliad. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify us immediately by replying to this message and destroy all copies of this message including any attachments. You are NOT authorized to read, print, retain, copy, disseminate, distribute, or use this message or any part thereof. Thank you. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 year

3
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Problem during test_suite generation while cross-compiling on version 3.6.2

by Francois Mace

Hello Everybody, I am trying to migrate my cross-compilation setup from version 2.28.9 to version 3.6.2. I use a Makefile based approach for compilation. Everything seems to work fine up to the point where the compilation process reaches the test_suite data generation Gen suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_generate_key.generated.data suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_low_hash.generated.data suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_not_supported.generated.data suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_op_fail.generated.data suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.current.data suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.v0.data At that point it seems that the python based tools attempts to execute a temp executable (generated for my cross-compilation target ?) which fails. The traceback obtained is the following: Traceback (most recent call last): File "../framework/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py", line 849, in <module> test_data_generation.main(sys.argv[1:], __doc__, PSATestGenerator) File "/home/dev/test/mbed-TLS_3.6.2/framework/scripts/mbedtls_framework/test_data_generation.py", line 224, in main generator.generate_target(target) File "../framework/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py", line 845, in generate_target super().generate_target(name, self.info) File "/home/dev/test/mbed-TLS_3.6.2/framework/scripts/mbedtls_framework/test_data_generation.py", line 177, in generate_target self.write_test_data_file(name, test_cases) File "/home/dev/test/mbed-TLS_3.6.2/framework/scripts/mbedtls_framework/test_data_generation.py", line 164, in write_test_data_file test_case.write_data_file(filename, test_cases) File "/home/dev/test/mbed-TLS_3.6.2/framework/scripts/mbedtls_framework/test_case.py", line 88, in write_data_file for tc in test_cases: File "../framework/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py", line 694, in all_test_cases if key.location_value() != 0: File "/home/dev/test/mbed-TLS_3.6.2/framework/scripts/mbedtls_framework/psa_storage.py", line 186, in location_value return self.lifetime.value() >> 8 File "/home/dev/test/mbed-TLS_3.6.2/framework/scripts/mbedtls_framework/psa_storage.py", line 89, in value self.update_cache() File "/home/dev/test/mbed-TLS_3.6.2/framework/scripts/mbedtls_framework/psa_storage.py", line 67, in update_cache include_path=includes) #type: List[str] File "/home/dev/test/mbed-TLS_3.6.2/framework/scripts/mbedtls_framework/c_build_helper.py", line 158, in get_c_expression_values output = subprocess.check_output([exe_name]) File "/usr/lib/python3.7/subprocess.py", line 395, in check_output **kwargs).stdout File "/usr/lib/python3.7/subprocess.py", line 472, in run with Popen(*popenargs, **kwargs) as process: File "/usr/lib/python3.7/subprocess.py", line 775, in __init__ restore_signals, start_new_session) File "/usr/lib/python3.7/subprocess.py", line 1522, in _execute_child raise child_exception_type(errno_num, err_msg, err_filename) OSError: [Errno 8] Exec format error: '/tmp/tmp--m95sjmdw' make[2]: *** [Makefile:127: generated_psa_test_data] Error 1 make[2] : on quitte le répertoire « /home/dev/test/mbed-TLS_3.6.2/tests » make[1]: *** [Makefile:35: tests] Error 2 make[1] : on quitte le répertoire « /home/dev/test/mbed-TLS_3.6.2 » make: *** [test.make:152: all] Error 2 Looking at the format of the generated tmp executable, it seems it is generated for my cross-compilation target, it therefore cannot be executed in my compilation environment. I would like to be able to generate the test and test data in order to be able to execute them on my compilation target, which is what I used to do with the previously integrated version of the library. Is there something I am missing in my compilation? am I missing a specific setup variable in my Makefile? Thanks for your feedback. Best regards, Francois

1 year, 1 month

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Different performance from 2.6.2 to 3.6.2 for https file upload

by Stefano Tebaldi

Hello, I recently updated mbedTLS library version 2.6.2 to 3.6.2. I am using the library to add https to Mongoose web server on a STM32H753 with FreeRTOS + LWIP. 2.6.2 was generated in a IAR project using STMCubeMX. What I am noticing is that file transfer performance has gotten much worse. With version 2.6.2 it took a few minutes to transfer a file of around 33 MB, now with version 3.6.2 it takes around 15 min. What could this depend on? Attached is the configuration used for the two versions. The certificate for https is EC curve secp256r1. Thank you

1 year, 1 month

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[Mbed-tls-announce] Mbed TLS 4.0/TF-PSA Crypto 1.0 release timeline

by Janos Follath via Mbed-tls-announce

Dear Mbed TLS and PSA Crypto users, We would like to update you on the release timeline for Mbed TLS 4.0/TF-PSACrypto1.0 release. As a reminder, the key objectives of the release are a separate TF-PSA Crypto repo., PSA Crypto becoming the de facto Crypto API and Mbed TLS using PSA Crypto APIs as the crypto API by default. While TF-PSA Crypto repository is now available, the remaining effort to be ready for the release is more than we originally planned for. Based on remaining effort estimates, we plan to make Mbed TLS 4.0-Beta and TF-PSA Crypto 1.0-Beta release around end of June. The Mbed TLS 4.0, and TF-PSA Crypto 1.0 release is expected around end of September. We don’t expect users to integrate the Beta release. Beta is aimed to pipeclean the separate Mbed TLS and TF-PSA Crypto release process and get any early feedback. The release in September is expected to be integrated by users to their projects. We wanted to provide these revised release dates so that the users can plan accordingly. In the meantime, bug fixes and security fixes will continue to be provided via. Mbed TLS 3.6.x LTS releases. Thanks, Mbed TLS/PSA Crypto Maintainers. -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

1 year, 1 month

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