- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by Janos Follath

Hi, There is no FIPS validated/certified version of Mbed TLS. In general most of the components should be very close to FIPS/NIST standards, but I don’t know of any that would have undergone a validation/certification process. Regards, Janos (Mbed TLS developer) From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Subramanian Gopi Krishnan via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Subramanian Gopi Krishnan <gopikrishnan.subramanian(a)kone.com> Date: Thursday, 1 October 2020 at 07:38 To: "mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] FIPS Hi, Do we have FIPS compliant for mbedtls; similar to openssl fips? Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

FIPS

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, Do we have FIPS compliant for mbedtls; similar to openssl fips? Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [mbed-tls] Building a collaborative Mbed TLS community

by Frank Bergmann

Hi Gilles, actually I meant that the creator of the PR tries to make a first estimation. Maybe even this could be helpful. :-) Frank On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 09:47:41AM +0000, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: > Hi Frank, > > Thanks for the suggestion. Sorry for not replying earlier. A time > estimate can help with scheduling, but our problem isn't so much > scheduling as a lack of bandwidth. Also we've found it very difficult to > estimate the time a review will take: some innocuous-looking patches end > up raising time-consuming questions about security or compatibility, > while some large patches turn out to be easy because they don't affect > risky areas much. > > The way we currently work is to schedule large contributions as part of > our sprint planning, but for most reviews we put them in a queue > (https://github.com/orgs/ARMmbed/projects/3). We've found that for our > team, having people pull from that queue works better than designating > reviewers a priori. > > -- > Gilles Peskine > Mbed TLS developer > > On 21/09/2020 07:35, Frank Bergmann via mbed-tls wrote: > > Hi Gilles, > > > > when I ask in our team to review a PR I usually provide an estimation about > > it. Of course a time base estimation and not an agile one in values of > > complexity. ;-) > > One could also provide an estimation about priority. > > Maybe these tiny rules may help somewhat. At least it can provide a better > > overview if you have tons of PRs. > > > > sincerely, > > Frank > > > > On Sun, Sep 20, 2020 at 10:27:44PM +0000, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: > >> Hello, > >> > >> Historically, Mbed TLS has been maintained by Arm as an open-source > >> project, accepting external contributions, but with with priorities and > >> plans mostly driven only by Arm. Since earlier this year, Mbed TLS is an > >> open governance project under the umbrella of TrustedFirmware, with the > >> objective of making it a community led project, allowing community to > >> contribute and collaborate on the design and development of the project. > >> In practice, however, the project effectively still has some barriers of > >> entry. We would like to lift these barriers. > >> > >> The Mbed TLS team at Arm have already identified some concrete actions, > >> filed on the Mbed TLS epic board > >> https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/projects/2#column-10667107 > >> under “Facilitating community contributions”. A few more should be up > >> soon as the result of some internal brainstorming. > >> > >> We've also identified some problem areas which we're tracking as > >> separate topics. > >> > >> * Probably the biggest topic: review was and is a bottleneck. We are > >> working to streamline the review process where possible, without > >> lowering the quality bar, and to prioritize reviews better over new > >> work. (Having personally often been on both sides of the coin, I can > >> confirm that having a pull request sit around for years without getting > >> reviews is frustrating, and so is seeing all these pull request and not > >> having the time to review them all.) We would also like to enable, > >> encourage and value reviews from people who are not project maintainers. > >> > >> * We will migrate the CI to a publicly available platform hosted by > >> TrustedFirmware. However this platform will not be available until 2021. > >> > >> * We are working on a new documentation platform, where we'll transfer > >> both the information available on the current website and information > >> that is currently recorded in an Arm internal wiki. > >> > >> To all of you who have contributed to Mbed TLS, who have tried, or who > >> are considering it, what difficulties have you encountered? What else > >> can we do to make contributing easier? > >> > >> Best regards, > >> > >> -- > >> Gilles Peskine > >> Mbed TLS developer > >> > >> > >> -- > >> mbed-tls mailing list > >> mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > >> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls > > > -- > mbed-tls mailing list > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls -- Frank Bergmann, Pödinghauser Str. 5, D-32051 Herford, Tel. +49-5221-9249753 SAP Hybris & Linux LPIC-3, E-Mail tx2014(a)tuxad.de, USt-IdNr DE237314606 http://tdyn.de/freel -- Redirect to profile at freelancermap http://www.gulp.de/freiberufler/2HNKY2YHW.html -- Profile at GULP

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [mbed-tls] Building a collaborative Mbed TLS community

by Gilles Peskine

Hi Frank, Thanks for the suggestion. Sorry for not replying earlier. A time estimate can help with scheduling, but our problem isn't so much scheduling as a lack of bandwidth. Also we've found it very difficult to estimate the time a review will take: some innocuous-looking patches end up raising time-consuming questions about security or compatibility, while some large patches turn out to be easy because they don't affect risky areas much. The way we currently work is to schedule large contributions as part of our sprint planning, but for most reviews we put them in a queue (https://github.com/orgs/ARMmbed/projects/3). We've found that for our team, having people pull from that queue works better than designating reviewers a priori. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 21/09/2020 07:35, Frank Bergmann via mbed-tls wrote: > Hi Gilles, > > when I ask in our team to review a PR I usually provide an estimation about > it. Of course a time base estimation and not an agile one in values of > complexity. ;-) > One could also provide an estimation about priority. > Maybe these tiny rules may help somewhat. At least it can provide a better > overview if you have tons of PRs. > > sincerely, > Frank > > On Sun, Sep 20, 2020 at 10:27:44PM +0000, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: >> Hello, >> >> Historically, Mbed TLS has been maintained by Arm as an open-source >> project, accepting external contributions, but with with priorities and >> plans mostly driven only by Arm. Since earlier this year, Mbed TLS is an >> open governance project under the umbrella of TrustedFirmware, with the >> objective of making it a community led project, allowing community to >> contribute and collaborate on the design and development of the project. >> In practice, however, the project effectively still has some barriers of >> entry. We would like to lift these barriers. >> >> The Mbed TLS team at Arm have already identified some concrete actions, >> filed on the Mbed TLS epic board >> https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/projects/2#column-10667107 >> under “Facilitating community contributions”. A few more should be up >> soon as the result of some internal brainstorming. >> >> We've also identified some problem areas which we're tracking as >> separate topics. >> >> * Probably the biggest topic: review was and is a bottleneck. We are >> working to streamline the review process where possible, without >> lowering the quality bar, and to prioritize reviews better over new >> work. (Having personally often been on both sides of the coin, I can >> confirm that having a pull request sit around for years without getting >> reviews is frustrating, and so is seeing all these pull request and not >> having the time to review them all.) We would also like to enable, >> encourage and value reviews from people who are not project maintainers. >> >> * We will migrate the CI to a publicly available platform hosted by >> TrustedFirmware. However this platform will not be available until 2021. >> >> * We are working on a new documentation platform, where we'll transfer >> both the information available on the current website and information >> that is currently recorded in an Arm internal wiki. >> >> To all of you who have contributed to Mbed TLS, who have tried, or who >> are considering it, what difficulties have you encountered? What else >> can we do to make contributing easier? >> >> Best regards, >> >> -- >> Gilles Peskine >> Mbed TLS developer >> >> >> -- >> mbed-tls mailing list >> mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [mbed-tls] Proposed change: no longer credit contributors in the ChangeLog file

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, We're going ahead with this new process. For changes made since the last release (2.24.0 and corresponding updates to long-time support branches), the ChangeLog file will only record user-visible changes, and entries will not be used to credit contributors. We're updating ChangeLog.d/00README.md accordingly (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/3726). -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 20/09/2020 23:41, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: > Hello, > > The Mbed TLS team is soliciting feedback on a proposed change of our > contributor acknowledgement policy. > > Background: our current policy is to acknowledge all contributors who > are not Arm employees in the ChangeLog files. This is a tradition that > dates back from when the version control history of Mbed TLS (then > PolarSSL) was not public. > > Proposed change: the ChangeLog file will no longer mention who > contributed a patch (“Contributed by …”). A patch will require a > ChangeLog entry only if it makes a user-visible changes, regardless of > who contributed it. We will still credit reporters in the ChangeLog > file, at least for security issues. > > Rationale: the ChangeLog file had a dual purpose: informing users, and > acknowledging contributors. It will now have the single purpose of > informing users. There are better ways of acknowledging contributors > nowadays: the Git history is public, and your contributions are visible > from your GitHub profile. (Note that we don't squash commits, and > attempt to preserve authorship as much as possible when we have to > rebase a patch.) Furthermore, writing a good ChangeLog entry often turns > out to require some back-and-forth, so lessening this requirement will > make it easier to accept contributions and to merge them faster (this is > in fact our primary motivation for the change). > > We are also thinking of creating an acknowledgement page out-of-tree. It > isn't clear yet what its scope would be, but it would include > acknowledging contributions in the form of reviews, which we wish to > encourage. (Please stay tuned for future announcements and discussions > regarding the Mbed TLS review process.) > > Question to potential contributors, or people who have participated in > other open-source projects: do you think that there is any value in > keeping acknowledgements in a file that is distributed with Mbed TLS? Is > there any value in maintaining an exhaustive list of contributors in a > form other than the Git history? > > Best regards, >

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

Information about CI failures on pull requests to Mbed TLS

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, If you've made a pull request to Mbed TLS, you've noticed that some of the continuous integration happens on a private server run by Arm. For jobs that ran since yesterday, if there are failures, you can now see the name of the failed tasks next to “PR-NNN-head TLS Testing” or “PR-NNN-merge TLS Testing”. See https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/testing/ci/#identifying-je… for more details. If this isn't enough, an Arm employee can copy the logs from the server. Please ask in a comment. We hope to post logs automatically (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3633) but I can't give a due date for that. We are planning to move to a public server run by TrustedFirmware, but this can't happen until some time in 2021. Please bear with us in the meantime, and thank you for your contributions. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

MbedTLS Webserver

by Thomas Schwarz

Hello everyone, I want to set up a webserver on my ESP32 Dev Module based von MbedTLS. Therefore I view the ssl_server example on github. Now my question: How can I connect the ssl_server to my local WIFI-network. What extra code do I need? And where is the SSID and the password configurable? Thanks for your help! Best regards Thomas Tel.: +49833460134418 MULTIVAC Info Box MULTIVAC Sepp Haggenmüller SE & Co. KG - Bahnhofstr. 4 - D-87787 Wolfertschwenden - Germany Tel.: +49(0)8334/601-0 - Fax: +49(0)8334/601-199 - multivac(a)multivac.de Kommanditgesellschaft Sitz: 87787 Wolfertschwenden Amtsgericht: Memmingen HRA 8040 USt-IdNr.: DE 129082475 - Steuer-Nr.: 138/169/51105 - WEEE-Reg.-Nr.: DE 16576440 Persönlich haftende Gesellschafterin: MULTIVAC Sepp Haggenmüller Verwaltungs SE Sitz: 87787 Wolfertschwenden Amtsgericht: Memmingen HRB 16659 Geschäftsführende Direktoren: Guido Spix, Christian Traumann Verwaltungsratsvorsitzender: Elmar Fischer Bankverbindung: Deutsche Bank Memmingen . IBAN: DE 31 7337 0008 0123 6330 00 . BIC: DEUT DE MM 733 Banner

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

DTLS server

by Mehdi Karimi

I am using v16 of the mbedTLS library to setup DTLS server. However, I observe that the handshake does not work well and there are several issues starting with the cookie exchange. Do I necessarily have to update to the latest version of mbedTLS? Are there known issues with DTLS server setup using previous versions (as far as I could tell from the ChangeLog). Thanks Mehdi

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [mbed-tls] Proposed change: no longer credit contributors in the ChangeLog file

by Frank Bergmann

Hi Gilles, as you said: Git is public. As long as it is kept public there's no reason to "duplicate details". My 2 cents. sincerely, Frank On Sun, Sep 20, 2020 at 09:41:26PM +0000, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: > Hello, > > The Mbed TLS team is soliciting feedback on a proposed change of our > contributor acknowledgement policy. > > Background: our current policy is to acknowledge all contributors who > are not Arm employees in the ChangeLog files. This is a tradition that > dates back from when the version control history of Mbed TLS (then > PolarSSL) was not public. > > Proposed change: the ChangeLog file will no longer mention who > contributed a patch (“Contributed by …”). A patch will require a > ChangeLog entry only if it makes a user-visible changes, regardless of > who contributed it. We will still credit reporters in the ChangeLog > file, at least for security issues. > > Rationale: the ChangeLog file had a dual purpose: informing users, and > acknowledging contributors. It will now have the single purpose of > informing users. There are better ways of acknowledging contributors > nowadays: the Git history is public, and your contributions are visible > from your GitHub profile. (Note that we don't squash commits, and > attempt to preserve authorship as much as possible when we have to > rebase a patch.) Furthermore, writing a good ChangeLog entry often turns > out to require some back-and-forth, so lessening this requirement will > make it easier to accept contributions and to merge them faster (this is > in fact our primary motivation for the change). > > We are also thinking of creating an acknowledgement page out-of-tree. It > isn't clear yet what its scope would be, but it would include > acknowledging contributions in the form of reviews, which we wish to > encourage. (Please stay tuned for future announcements and discussions > regarding the Mbed TLS review process.) > > Question to potential contributors, or people who have participated in > other open-source projects: do you think that there is any value in > keeping acknowledgements in a file that is distributed with Mbed TLS? Is > there any value in maintaining an exhaustive list of contributors in a > form other than the Git history? > > Best regards, > > -- > Gilles Peskine > Mbed TLS developer > > -- > mbed-tls mailing list > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls -- Frank Bergmann, Pödinghauser Str. 5, D-32051 Herford, Tel. +49-5221-9249753 SAP Hybris & Linux LPIC-3, E-Mail tx2014(a)tuxad.de, USt-IdNr DE237314606 http://tdyn.de/freel -- Redirect to profile at freelancermap http://www.gulp.de/freiberufler/2HNKY2YHW.html -- Profile at GULP

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [mbed-tls] Building a collaborative Mbed TLS community

by Frank Bergmann

Hi Gilles, when I ask in our team to review a PR I usually provide an estimation about it. Of course a time base estimation and not an agile one in values of complexity. ;-) One could also provide an estimation about priority. Maybe these tiny rules may help somewhat. At least it can provide a better overview if you have tons of PRs. sincerely, Frank On Sun, Sep 20, 2020 at 10:27:44PM +0000, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: > Hello, > > Historically, Mbed TLS has been maintained by Arm as an open-source > project, accepting external contributions, but with with priorities and > plans mostly driven only by Arm. Since earlier this year, Mbed TLS is an > open governance project under the umbrella of TrustedFirmware, with the > objective of making it a community led project, allowing community to > contribute and collaborate on the design and development of the project. > In practice, however, the project effectively still has some barriers of > entry. We would like to lift these barriers. > > The Mbed TLS team at Arm have already identified some concrete actions, > filed on the Mbed TLS epic board > https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/projects/2#column-10667107 > under “Facilitating community contributions”. A few more should be up > soon as the result of some internal brainstorming. > > We've also identified some problem areas which we're tracking as > separate topics. > > * Probably the biggest topic: review was and is a bottleneck. We are > working to streamline the review process where possible, without > lowering the quality bar, and to prioritize reviews better over new > work. (Having personally often been on both sides of the coin, I can > confirm that having a pull request sit around for years without getting > reviews is frustrating, and so is seeing all these pull request and not > having the time to review them all.) We would also like to enable, > encourage and value reviews from people who are not project maintainers. > > * We will migrate the CI to a publicly available platform hosted by > TrustedFirmware. However this platform will not be available until 2021. > > * We are working on a new documentation platform, where we'll transfer > both the information available on the current website and information > that is currently recorded in an Arm internal wiki. > > To all of you who have contributed to Mbed TLS, who have tried, or who > are considering it, what difficulties have you encountered? What else > can we do to make contributing easier? > > Best regards, > > -- > Gilles Peskine > Mbed TLS developer > > > -- > mbed-tls mailing list > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls -- Frank Bergmann, Pödinghauser Str. 5, D-32051 Herford, Tel. +49-5221-9249753 SAP Hybris & Linux LPIC-3, E-Mail tx2014(a)tuxad.de, USt-IdNr DE237314606 http://tdyn.de/freel -- Redirect to profile at freelancermap http://www.gulp.de/freiberufler/2HNKY2YHW.html -- Profile at GULP

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

Building a collaborative Mbed TLS community

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, Historically, Mbed TLS has been maintained by Arm as an open-source project, accepting external contributions, but with with priorities and plans mostly driven only by Arm. Since earlier this year, Mbed TLS is an open governance project under the umbrella of TrustedFirmware, with the objective of making it a community led project, allowing community to contribute and collaborate on the design and development of the project. In practice, however, the project effectively still has some barriers of entry. We would like to lift these barriers. The Mbed TLS team at Arm have already identified some concrete actions, filed on the Mbed TLS epic board https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/projects/2#column-10667107 under “Facilitating community contributions”. A few more should be up soon as the result of some internal brainstorming. We've also identified some problem areas which we're tracking as separate topics. * Probably the biggest topic: review was and is a bottleneck. We are working to streamline the review process where possible, without lowering the quality bar, and to prioritize reviews better over new work. (Having personally often been on both sides of the coin, I can confirm that having a pull request sit around for years without getting reviews is frustrating, and so is seeing all these pull request and not having the time to review them all.) We would also like to enable, encourage and value reviews from people who are not project maintainers. * We will migrate the CI to a publicly available platform hosted by TrustedFirmware. However this platform will not be available until 2021. * We are working on a new documentation platform, where we'll transfer both the information available on the current website and information that is currently recorded in an Arm internal wiki. To all of you who have contributed to Mbed TLS, who have tried, or who are considering it, what difficulties have you encountered? What else can we do to make contributing easier? Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

Proposed change: no longer credit contributors in the ChangeLog file

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, The Mbed TLS team is soliciting feedback on a proposed change of our contributor acknowledgement policy. Background: our current policy is to acknowledge all contributors who are not Arm employees in the ChangeLog files. This is a tradition that dates back from when the version control history of Mbed TLS (then PolarSSL) was not public. Proposed change: the ChangeLog file will no longer mention who contributed a patch (“Contributed by …”). A patch will require a ChangeLog entry only if it makes a user-visible changes, regardless of who contributed it. We will still credit reporters in the ChangeLog file, at least for security issues. Rationale: the ChangeLog file had a dual purpose: informing users, and acknowledging contributors. It will now have the single purpose of informing users. There are better ways of acknowledging contributors nowadays: the Git history is public, and your contributions are visible from your GitHub profile. (Note that we don't squash commits, and attempt to preserve authorship as much as possible when we have to rebase a patch.) Furthermore, writing a good ChangeLog entry often turns out to require some back-and-forth, so lessening this requirement will make it easier to accept contributions and to merge them faster (this is in fact our primary motivation for the change). We are also thinking of creating an acknowledgement page out-of-tree. It isn't clear yet what its scope would be, but it would include acknowledging contributions in the form of reviews, which we wish to encourage. (Please stay tuned for future announcements and discussions regarding the Mbed TLS review process.) Question to potential contributors, or people who have participated in other open-source projects: do you think that there is any value in keeping acknowledgements in a file that is distributed with Mbed TLS? Is there any value in maintaining an exhaustive list of contributors in a form other than the Git history? Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

Parse RSA keyfile-Error

by youssouf sokhona

Good morning to all, I am currently trying to perform RSA encryption, so I am using a file containing a public key (generated by OpenSSL) to do this. So at the beginning I use the "mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile" function to read it, as you can see on the image below. Unfortunately, I find the following error : ERROR 3E00 : Read/write of file failed. Do someone have an idea of why I have this error ? Or should I change my way to read this file ? Thanks a lot, have a nice Weekend [cid:image002.png@01D68839.7B058100]

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [mbed-tls] Query related to ARM - MbedTLS

by Manu Abraham

Hi, Unrelated comment from my side, adding on to Manuel's comment: It appears that ST supplies a binary blob which does make use of their hardware crypto accelerator. https://www.st.com/en/embedded-software/x-cube-cryptolib.html Cheers, Manu On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 1:21 PM Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi, > > On those CPUs, the AES implementation in Mbed TLS is pure C, it doesn't use any hand-written assembly. The only platforms where it does so so far are x86-64 (to take advantage of the AES-NI extension if available), and some Via CPUs (x86) that have AES acceleration as well. > > Regards, > Manuel. > ________________________________ > From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Areeb Asad via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Sent: 09 September 2020 08:32 > To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Subject: [mbed-tls] Query related to ARM - MbedTLS > > Hi, > > I hope you are doing well. I am using the mbedTLS AES library in my projects, part of my master thesis at Uppsala University. > > I would like to know whether the mbedTLS AES library uses any assemble specific code for operations? I am using this library on Cortex-M23 and Cortex M0+. > > Looking forward to hearing from you. > > > Best regards, > Hafiz Areeb Asad > -- > mbed-tls mailing list > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls

4 years, 9 months

2
1
0 0

Re: [mbed-tls] Query related to ARM - MbedTLS

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi, On those CPUs, the AES implementation in Mbed TLS is pure C, it doesn't use any hand-written assembly. The only platforms where it does so so far are x86-64 (to take advantage of the AES-NI extension if available), and some Via CPUs (x86) that have AES acceleration as well. Regards, Manuel. ________________________________ From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Areeb Asad via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 09 September 2020 08:32 To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] Query related to ARM - MbedTLS Hi, I hope you are doing well. I am using the mbedTLS AES library in my projects, part of my master thesis at Uppsala University. I would like to know whether the mbedTLS AES library uses any assemble specific code for operations? I am using this library on Cortex-M23 and Cortex M0+. Looking forward to hearing from you. Best regards, Hafiz Areeb Asad

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

Query related to ARM - MbedTLS

by Areeb Asad

Hi, I hope you are doing well. I am using the mbedTLS AES library in my projects, part of my master thesis at Uppsala University. I would like to know whether the mbedTLS AES library uses any assemble specific code for operations? I am using this library on Cortex-M23 and Cortex M0+. Looking forward to hearing from you. Best regards, Hafiz Areeb Asad

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

A new configuration mechanism for PSA crypto in Mbed TLS

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, As you may be aware, there is work in progress to implement support for hardware drivers in Mbed TLS when using the PSA API. These are direct calls from the PSA frontend layer to driver code, without going through mbedtls_xxx APIs and the ALT implementations. The specifications are the psa-driver-*.md files in https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/development/docs/proposed and you can watch the work in progress in the “Unified driver interface: API design and prototype” epic https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/projects/2#column-8543266 . When an algorithm is implemented in hardware, in most cases, it is unnecessary to include a software implementation, and it should be possible to exclude the software implementation from the build to keep the code size down. Unfortunately the current Mbed TLS configuration mechanism does not support this, because it does not distinguish “I want AES” from “I want mbedtls_aes_xxx”. So we need new compile-time options to convey “I want PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES in my application but I don't care whether it's done in hardware or mbedtls_aes_xxx”. We are going to implement a configuration mechanism to select which cryptographic algorithms are included in the PSA interface in a build of Mbed TLS. It will rely on #define statements, like the existing config.h, but with different naming conventions for PSA. You can see the specification proposal at https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/3628 . Feedback is welcome. We're likely to merge this pull request soon, but even after it's merged I'll keep watching comments, or you can post feedback on the mailing list, or raise an issue on GitHub if you have a specific feature request. A major difference between the current MBEDTLS_xxx_C configuration and the new PSA_WANT_xxx configuration is that PSA_WANT_xxx is additive: if PSA_WANT_xxx depends on some other feature, enabling PSA_WANT_xxx will automatically enable that feature in most cases (the exception being when there's more than one way to enable the dependent feature, e.g. when a hash algorithm is needed but it doesn't matter which hash). This is in contrast with the current strict mechanism where enabling MBEDTLS_xxx_C is an error if it depends on some other feature that isn't enabled. We haven't decided yet, but we're thinking of changing to an additive mechanism for the whole Mbed TLS configuration in Mbed TLS 3.0. If you want to watch the implementation work in progress, it will be under the “Driver Interface: Removing unused code” epic https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/projects/2#column-9449707 . Note that the #define-based mechanism is somewhat experimental and we won't commit yet about its long-term stability in Mbed TLS. It is likely to be complemented by a JSON-based mechanism in the future. This JSON mechanism would be similar to the proposed mechanism for drivers and would allow finer granularity (for example, RSA verification without RSA signature). Arm is considering standardizing the (as yet non-existent) JSON mechanism as a PSA specification. Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer (and PSA crypto architect)

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

How can I encrypt RSA private key with AES?

by Shariful Alam

Hi, I hope everyone is doing well. I am a beginner on mbedtls and cryptography. I hope you will understand if there is a lack of understanding or a rookie mistake from my part. So, My goal is to do a key-encryption key. I have an *RSA* private key file "*private.pem*" generated by OpenSSL. I want to encrypt the content of this "private.pem" with *AES* *encryption* and followed by *AES decryption *on the encrypted data. To do that, I read the "private.pem" file into a buffer and perform AES encryption. The problem is when I perform the AES decryption operation I get something else instead of the original "private.pem" data. I have a working example of AES encryption/decryption working on plaintext perfectly. So, I guess there is a flaw in my understanding of encryption/decryption of byte64 encoded string. Can someone please suggests me how can I encrypt RSA private key with AES? Thanks, Shariful

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

[Mbed-tls-announce] Latest release link on github

by Janos Follath via Mbed-tls-announce

Mbed TLS version 2.24.0, 2.16.8 and 2.7.17 have been released recently. Version 2.7.17 is incorrectly marked as the latest release by github. Since this happens automatically based on the commit creation dates, this can’t be fixed until the next release. We have extended the release notes of 2.7.17 to warn about this and changed the download links on the website. We would like to confirm that version 2.24.0 is the latest release and the other two are the patch releases for the 2.16 and 2.7 long term support branches. My apologies for the inconvenience and thank you for your support! Best regards, Janos (On behalf of the Mbed TLS team) -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list Mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls-announce

4 years, 9 months

1
0
0 0

[Mbed-tls-announce] Mbed TLS: Security Advisory and Release of Mbed TLS 2.24.0, 2.16.8 and 2.7.17

by Janos Follath via Mbed-tls-announce

Mbed TLS Security Advisories have been issued to accompany the release of Mbed TLS versions 2.24.0, 2.16.8 and 2.7.17, which have just been released. These releases of Mbed TLS address several security issues, provide bug fixes, and bring other minor changes. Full details are available in the release notes (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-2.24.0, https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-2.16.8, https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-2.7.17) and in the 2020-07 security advisories (https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories) We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately. -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list Mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls-announce

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [mbed-tls] Print long MPI

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, 4096 bytes is a lot larger than a typical public key. 4096 *bits* is common for an RSA key. Are you sure you're using the correct units? By default the library doesn't support the creation of MPI that are larger than 1024 bytes. This is a configuration option (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE), although it's uncommon to change it (a larger value is hardly ever necessary, and a smaller value won't save memory except in RSA which needs at least 512 bytes for 4096-bit keys). However mbedtls_mpi_write_file itself doesn't have any size limit. Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 27/08/2020 13:27, youssouf sokhona via mbed-tls wrote: > > Hello everyone, I think you are fine during this crisis. > > > > I am working now with mbedtls modulee, and I wanted to print a > function « mbedtls_mpi_write_file » to print the value of an MPI. This > function works with common values. > > > > However, when I want to print an MPI which is very long (about 4096 > bytes, a public key), it doesn’t work. Someone knows how to solve this > problem ? > > > > Thanks a lot > > > > Best regards, YS > > > >

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Print long MPI

by youssouf sokhona

Hello everyone, I think you are fine during this crisis. I am working now with mbedtls modulee, and I wanted to print a function « mbedtls_mpi_write_file » to print the value of an MPI. This function works with common values. However, when I want to print an MPI which is very long (about 4096 bytes, a public key), it doesn’t work. Someone knows how to solve this problem ? Thanks a lot Best regards, YS

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [mbed-tls] mbedtls handshake failed

by Hannes Tschofenig

Hi Manu, It looks like you made a mistake on the client side configuring the certificate/private key. The client does not send the certificate and that corresponds to the error message on the server-side ("peer did not return a certificate"). Ciao Hannes -----Original Message----- From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Manu Abraham via mbed-tls Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2020 5:20 PM To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [mbed-tls] mbedtls handshake failed Greetings, I am trying to connect from a STM32H7 MCU to a mosquitto peer, Can someone please help me to fix this issue that I have ? I have used the DES3 cipher to create the keys .. openssl genrsa -des3 -out test_ca.key 2048 .. Fiddled quite a bit with buffers, stack, heap and mbedtls config, eventually the communication appears to be working, but the handshake appears to fail. At the client MCU side, I see the mbedtls_ssl_handshake failed message with a return value of 0x7780 Additionally, I do see this message too: ssl_tls.c:5169: got an alert message, type: [2:40] ssl_tls.c:5177: is a fatal alert message (msg 40) But unfortunately, I am unable to make out what the error message means. At the peer, this is what i do see: 1598367067: New connection from 192.168.1.33 on port 8883. 1598367074: OpenSSL Error: error:1417C0C7:SSL routines:tls_process_client_certif icate:peer did not return a certificate 1598367074: Socket error on client <unknown>, disconnecting. 1598368366: mosquitto version 1.6.7 terminating Someone, Please help ! Thanks, Manu ssl_tls.c:8084: => handshake ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 0 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 1 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:0774: => write client hello ssl_cli.c:0811: client hello, max version: [3:3] ssl_cli.c:0821: dumping 'client hello, random bytes' (32 bytes) ssl_cli.c:0821: 0000: 3c ce d6 f9 48 cc 7d 5d 77 24 74 f2 1d 9f 8b aa <...H.}]w$t..... ssl_cli.c:0821: 0010: 4b 0c 20 64 d3 22 d0 ee 5e 3b 83 24 a7 01 ec d9 K. d."..^;.$.... ssl_cli.c:0874: client hello, session id len.: 0 ssl_cli.c:0875: dumping 'client hello, session id' (0 bytes) ssl_cli.c:0921: client hello, add ciphersuite: c02c ssl_cli.c:0921: client hello, add ciphersuite: c02b ssl_cli.c:0921: client hello, add ciphersuite: c030 ssl_cli.c:0921: client hello, add ciphersuite: c02f ssl_cli.c:0934: client hello, got 4 ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs) ssl_cli.c:0943: adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV ssl_cli.c:0992: client hello, compress len.: 1 ssl_cli.c:0993: client hello, compress alg.: 0 ssl_cli.c:0186: client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension ssl_cli.c:0271: client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension ssl_cli.c:0336: client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension ssl_cli.c:1070: client hello, total extension length: 38 ssl_tls.c:3184: => write handshake message ssl_tls.c:3343: => write record ssl_tls.c:3420: output record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 93 ssl_tls.c:3425: dumping 'output record sent to network' (98 bytes) ssl_tls.c:3425: 0000: 16 03 03 00 5d 01 00 00 59 03 03 3c ce d6 f9 48 ....]...Y..<...H .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:3425: 0050: 03 01 00 0a 00 06 00 04 00 18 00 17 00 0b 00 02 ................ ssl_tls.c:3425: 0060: 01 00 .. ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2773: message length: 98, out_left: 98 ssl_tls.c:2779: ssl->f_send() returned 98 (-0xffffff9e) ssl_tls.c:2807: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:3476: <= write record ssl_tls.c:3320: <= write handshake message ssl_cli.c:1106: <= write client hello ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 2 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:1499: => parse server hello ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:8094: <= handshake ssl_tls.c:8084: => handshake ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 2 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:1499: => parse server hello ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 00 59 ....Y ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 89 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 94 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 94 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 89 (-0xffffffa7) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (94 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 16 03 03 00 59 02 00 00 55 03 03 d1 64 6e e1 0c ....Y...U...dn.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:4232: 0050: 0d ff 01 00 01 00 00 0b 00 04 03 00 01 02 .............. ssl_tls.c:3624: handshake message: msglen = 89, type = 2, hslen = 89 ssl_tls.c:4385: <= read record ssl_cli.c:1579: dumping 'server hello, version' (2 bytes) ssl_cli.c:1579: 0000: 03 03 .. ssl_cli.c:1600: server hello, current time: 3513020129 ssl_cli.c:1610: dumping 'server hello, random bytes' (32 bytes) ssl_cli.c:1610: 0000: d1 64 6e e1 0c 1f ac 75 77 eb d7 02 24 dd a7 da .dn....uw...$... ssl_cli.c:1610: 0010: 48 f3 50 43 34 10 d8 d9 44 4f 57 4e 47 52 44 01 H.PC4...DOWNGRD. ssl_cli.c:1690: server hello, session id len.: 32 ssl_cli.c:1691: dumping 'server hello, session id' (32 bytes) ssl_cli.c:1691: 0000: 90 8f cc f8 31 63 81 ae aa bf a9 b9 61 1e 78 f6 ....1c......a.x. ssl_cli.c:1691: 0010: 79 b8 26 66 51 99 f4 50 45 d4 21 9b 22 24 4c 63 y.&fQ..PE.!."$Lc ssl_cli.c:1728: no session has been resumed ssl_cli.c:1731: server hello, chosen ciphersuite: c030 ssl_cli.c:1732: server hello, compress alg.: 0 ssl_cli.c:1764: server hello, chosen ciphersuite: TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 ssl_cli.c:1789: server hello, total extension length: 13 ssl_cli.c:1809: found renegotiation extension ssl_cli.c:1888: found supported_point_formats extension ssl_cli.c:1292: point format selected: 0 ssl_cli.c:1978: <= parse server hello ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 3 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5655: => parse certificate ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 07 80 ..... ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 1920 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 1925 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 1925 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 1361 (-0xfffffaaf) ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 1366, nb_want: 1925 ssl_tls.c:8094: <= handshake ssl_tls.c:8084: => handshake ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 3 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5655: => parse certificate ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 1366, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 07 80 ..... ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 1920 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 1366, nb_want: 1925 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 1366, nb_want: 1925 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 559 (-0xfffffdd1) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (1925 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 16 03 03 07 80 0b 00 07 7c 00 07 79 00 03 90 30 ........|..y...0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:4232: 0770: df d8 30 17 65 70 2a 02 54 9a 4c cf b1 51 04 25 ..0.ep*.T.L..Q.% ssl_tls.c:4232: 0780: 83 2c ab dd 46 .,..F ssl_tls.c:3624: handshake message: msglen = 1920, type = 11, hslen = 1920 ssl_tls.c:4385: <= read record ssl_tls.c:5606: peer certificate #1: ssl_tls.c:5606: cert. version : 1 ssl_tls.c:5606: serial number : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: issuer name : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: subject name : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: issued on : 2020-08-15 09:12:30 ssl_tls.c:5606: expires on : 2030-08-13 09:12:30 ssl_tls.c:5606: signed using : RSA with SHA-256 ssl_tls.c:5606: RSA key size : 2048 bits ssl_tls.c:5606: value of 'crt->rsa.N' (2048 bits) is: ssl_tls.c:5606: c9 93 0d f4 7b 93 95 8f 4d ec bb 77 46 82 48 6d .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:5606: 0f 00 85 cf c9 40 b0 f8 b2 df 1b 75 bd 2e 95 43 ssl_tls.c:5606: value of 'crt->rsa.E' (17 bits) is: ssl_tls.c:5606: 01 00 01 ssl_tls.c:5606: peer certificate #2: ssl_tls.c:5606: cert. version : 3 ssl_tls.c:5606: serial number : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: issuer name : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: subject name : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: issued on : 2020-08-15 08:54:30 ssl_tls.c:5606: expires on : 2030-08-13 08:54:30 ssl_tls.c:5606: signed using : RSA with SHA-256 ssl_tls.c:5606: RSA key size : 2048 bits ssl_tls.c:5606: basic constraints : CA=true ssl_tls.c:5606: value of 'crt->rsa.N' (2048 bits) is: ssl_tls.c:5606: c4 e2 4b 37 45 4a 36 e5 b0 14 f7 fa 76 1d c4 29 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:5606: 43 7c 19 f2 b0 dc ef 69 cf 13 c4 cb fa 80 92 f1 ssl_tls.c:5606: value of 'crt->rsa.E' (17 bits) is: ssl_tls.c:5606: 01 00 01 ssl_tls.c:5856: Certificate verification flags clear ssl_tls.c:5863: <= parse certificate ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 4 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:2336: => parse server key exchange ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 01 4d ....M ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 333 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 338 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 338 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 333 (-0xfffffeb3) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (338 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 16 03 03 01 4d 0c 00 01 49 03 00 17 41 04 6e 49 ....M...I...A.nI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:4232: 0140: c4 4b 34 2f 83 5f 98 17 39 5e 6e 4d 56 f4 c1 4c .K4/._..9^nMV..L ssl_tls.c:4232: 0150: 39 0f 9. ssl_tls.c:3624: handshake message: msglen = 333, type = 12, hslen = 333 ssl_tls.c:4385: <= read record ssl_cli.c:2424: dumping 'server key exchange' (329 bytes) ssl_cli.c:2424: 0000: 03 00 17 41 04 6e 49 4b 1c 4e 7b 2b ff c3 c9 9b ...A.nIK.N{+.... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_cli.c:2424: 0130: d9 33 d2 6e a7 05 ca c4 4b 34 2f 83 5f 98 17 39 .3.n....K4/._..9 ssl_cli.c:2424: 0140: 5e 6e 4d 56 f4 c1 4c 39 0f ^nMV..L9. ssl_cli.c:2044: ECDH curve: secp256r1 ssl_cli.c:2054: value of 'ECDH: Qp(X)' (255 bits) is: ssl_cli.c:2054: 6e 49 4b 1c 4e 7b 2b ff c3 c9 9b 81 29 4d a8 92 ssl_cli.c:2054: af c2 77 2b 3b c6 26 ba d4 c7 a2 2d 83 78 e3 54 ssl_cli.c:2054: value of 'ECDH: Qp(Y)' (256 bits) is: ssl_cli.c:2054: d6 91 fe 18 70 fb bc b6 c7 aa 67 1c 08 8b 4d 58 ssl_cli.c:2054: a4 70 59 97 90 23 8d 4b b6 24 4e 1a 7e 13 f2 d1 ssl_cli.c:2278: Server used SignatureAlgorithm 1 ssl_cli.c:2279: Server used HashAlgorithm 4 ssl_cli.c:2580: dumping 'signature' (256 bytes) ssl_cli.c:2580: 0000: b3 88 25 7f 3f 6b cf 7e 03 de 11 5b 4f 47 e9 6e ..%.?k.~...[OG.n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_cli.c:2580: 00f0: 34 2f 83 5f 98 17 39 5e 6e 4d 56 f4 c1 4c 39 0f 4/._..9^nMV..L9. ssl_cli.c:2616: dumping 'parameters hash' (32 bytes) ssl_cli.c:2616: 0000: bc 4e 7e a6 a6 02 76 66 2c da 19 6c ea 5a aa df .N~...vf,..l.Z.. ssl_cli.c:2616: 0010: ae 3a ff e9 34 c6 d1 72 98 b4 f3 7d b8 71 11 65 .:..4..r...}.q.e ssl_cli.c:2664: <= parse server key exchange ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 5 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:2697: => parse certificate request ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 00 3a ....: ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 58 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 63 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 63 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 58 (-0xffffffc6) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (63 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 16 03 03 00 3a 0d 00 00 36 03 01 02 40 00 2e 04 ....:...6...@... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:4232: 0030: 01 02 01 03 02 02 02 04 02 05 02 06 02 00 00 ............... ssl_tls.c:3624: handshake message: msglen = 58, type = 13, hslen = 58 ssl_tls.c:4385: <= read record ssl_cli.c:2723: got a certificate request ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4,3 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5,3 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 6,3 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,7 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,8 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,9 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,10 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,11 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,4 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,5 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,6 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4,1 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5,1 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 6,1 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 3,3 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 2,3 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 3,1 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 2,1 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 3,2 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 2,2 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4,2 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5,2 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 6,2 ssl_cli.c:2846: <= parse certificate request ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 6 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:2856: => parse server hello done ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 00 04 ..... ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 4 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 9 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 9 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 4 (-0xfffffffc) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (9 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 16 03 03 00 04 0e 00 00 00 ......... ssl_tls.c:3624: handshake message: msglen = 4, type = 14, hslen = 4 ssl_tls.c:4385: <= read record ssl_cli.c:2886: <= parse server hello done ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 7 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5329: => write certificate ssl_tls.c:3184: => write handshake message ssl_tls.c:3343: => write record ssl_tls.c:3420: output record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 7 ssl_tls.c:3425: dumping 'output record sent to network' (12 bytes) ssl_tls.c:3425: 0000: 16 03 03 00 07 0b 00 00 03 00 00 00 ............ ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2773: message length: 12, out_left: 12 ssl_tls.c:2779: ssl->f_send() returned 12 (-0xfffffff4) ssl_tls.c:2807: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:3476: <= write record ssl_tls.c:3320: <= write handshake message ssl_tls.c:5433: <= write certificate ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 8 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:2898: => write client key exchange ssl_cli.c:2977: value of 'ECDH: Q(X)' (256 bits) is: ssl_cli.c:2977: e8 dd a7 e4 3d f4 43 c0 1f 42 67 99 2f 1b bd a8 ssl_cli.c:2977: 10 03 3d 45 5f 3b f8 46 ff d6 b8 65 3c 13 6a 3b ssl_cli.c:2977: value of 'ECDH: Q(Y)' (256 bits) is: ssl_cli.c:2977: 9a f8 36 4d 19 01 01 02 d6 bb 51 4a 1d ec f1 7f ssl_cli.c:2977: 28 70 31 95 65 62 1e d6 8d 97 b6 cc 3f b4 9a 8e ssl_cli.c:3005: value of 'ECDH: z' (253 bits) is: ssl_cli.c:3005: 14 06 75 26 fd 2c 2e 3f ad cf 0c fe 6b df 66 7c ssl_cli.c:3005: c2 b7 54 7e 62 ea 4e 0b 93 d0 62 22 15 e6 db 43 ssl_tls.c:3184: => write handshake message ssl_tls.c:3343: => write record ssl_tls.c:3420: output record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 70 ssl_tls.c:3425: dumping 'output record sent to network' (75 bytes) ssl_tls.c:3425: 0000: 16 03 03 00 46 10 00 00 42 41 04 e8 dd a7 e4 3d ....F...BA.....= .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:3425: 0040: 62 1e d6 8d 97 b6 cc 3f b4 9a 8e b......?... ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2773: message length: 75, out_left: 75 ssl_tls.c:2779: ssl->f_send() returned 75 (-0xffffffb5) ssl_tls.c:2807: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:3476: <= write record ssl_tls.c:3320: <= write handshake message ssl_cli.c:3172: <= write client key exchange ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 9 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:3224: => write certificate verify ssl_tls.c:0628: => derive keys ssl_tls.c:0705: dumping 'premaster secret' (32 bytes) ssl_tls.c:0705: 0000: 14 06 75 26 fd 2c 2e 3f ad cf 0c fe 6b df 66 7c ..u&.,.?....k.f| ssl_tls.c:0705: 0010: c2 b7 54 7e 62 ea 4e 0b 93 d0 62 22 15 e6 db 43 ..T~b.N...b"...C ssl_tls.c:0794: ciphersuite = TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 ssl_tls.c:0796: dumping 'master secret' (48 bytes) ssl_tls.c:0796: 0000: 5a 15 26 c7 71 73 1a 2e 8c 0d 0e 55 d7 6f 7f b5 Z.&.qs.....U.o.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:0796: 0020: 24 bf 3f 51 ca e9 7b 66 99 61 cf a9 fb 61 e2 2f $.?Q..{f.a...a./ ssl_tls.c:0797: dumping 'random bytes' (64 bytes) ssl_tls.c:0797: 0000: d1 64 6e e1 0c 1f ac 75 77 eb d7 02 24 dd a7 da .dn....uw...$... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:0797: 0030: 4b 0c 20 64 d3 22 d0 ee 5e 3b 83 24 a7 01 ec d9 K. d."..^;.$.... ssl_tls.c:0798: dumping 'key block' (256 bytes) ssl_tls.c:0798: 0000: 5d b4 7a 60 2e 5b f8 fb 8f e4 75 22 9a b4 8c 04 ].z`.[....u".... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:0798: 00f0: 53 af 8e 78 d0 03 ca 26 b7 43 ee c6 aa 0e 71 88 S..x...&.C....q. ssl_tls.c:0919: keylen: 32, minlen: 24, ivlen: 12, maclen: 0 ssl_tls.c:1116: <= derive keys ssl_cli.c:3253: <= skip write certificate verify ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 10 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5879: => write change cipher spec ssl_tls.c:3184: => write handshake message ssl_tls.c:3343: => write record ssl_tls.c:3420: output record: msgtype = 20, version = [3:3], msglen = 1 ssl_tls.c:3425: dumping 'output record sent to network' (6 bytes) ssl_tls.c:3425: 0000: 14 03 03 00 01 01 ...... ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2773: message length: 6, out_left: 6 ssl_tls.c:2779: ssl->f_send() returned 6 (-0xfffffffa) ssl_tls.c:2807: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:3476: <= write record ssl_tls.c:3320: <= write handshake message ssl_tls.c:5893: <= write change cipher spec ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 11 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:6398: => write finished ssl_tls.c:6272: => calc finished tls sha384 ssl_tls.c:6283: dumping 'finished sha512 state' (64 bytes) ssl_tls.c:6283: 0000: e2 6c 37 56 90 66 0a f8 1c c7 26 d0 49 a9 87 52 .l7V.f....&.I..R .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:6283: 0030: 85 b3 04 84 77 e5 02 b0 53 d7 31 b4 c4 e4 08 c0 ....w...S.1..... ssl_tls.c:6296: dumping 'calc finished result' (12 bytes) ssl_tls.c:6296: 0000: c4 6a dd c2 9b a7 75 28 ff 53 5a 3f .j....u(.SZ? ssl_tls.c:6302: <= calc finished ssl_tls.c:6443: switching to new transform spec for outbound data ssl_tls.c:3184: => write handshake message ssl_tls.c:3343: => write record ssl_tls.c:1445: => encrypt buf ssl_tls.c:1455: dumping 'before encrypt: output payload' (16 bytes) ssl_tls.c:1455: 0000: 14 00 00 0c c4 6a dd c2 9b a7 75 28 ff 53 5a 3f .....j....u(.SZ? ssl_tls.c:1574: dumping 'additional data for AEAD' (13 bytes) ssl_tls.c:1574: 0000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 16 03 03 00 10 ............. ssl_tls.c:1604: dumping 'IV used (internal)' (12 bytes) ssl_tls.c:1604: 0000: a0 9a 1f cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ ssl_tls.c:1606: dumping 'IV used (transmitted)' (8 bytes) ssl_tls.c:1606: 0000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........ ssl_tls.c:1616: before encrypt: msglen = 24, including 0 bytes of padding ssl_tls.c:1643: dumping 'after encrypt: tag' (16 bytes) ssl_tls.c:1643: 0000: e7 10 1d 99 f6 b6 a5 40 de e8 c0 d5 ec 48 de 6e .......@.....H.n ssl_tls.c:1781: <= encrypt buf ssl_tls.c:3420: output record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 40 ssl_tls.c:3425: dumping 'output record sent to network' (45 bytes) ssl_tls.c:3425: 0000: 16 03 03 00 28 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 73 7e ....(.........s~ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:3425: 0020: 99 f6 b6 a5 40 de e8 c0 d5 ec 48 de 6e ....@.....H.n ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2773: message length: 45, out_left: 45 ssl_tls.c:2779: ssl->f_send() returned 45 (-0xffffffd3) ssl_tls.c:2807: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:3476: <= write record ssl_tls.c:3320: <= write handshake message ssl_tls.c:6507: <= write finished ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 12 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5902: => parse change cipher spec ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:8094: <= handshake ssl_tls.c:8084: => handshake ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 12 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5902: => parse change cipher spec ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 15 03 03 00 02 ..... ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 21, version = [3:3], msglen = 2 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 7 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 7 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 2 (-0xfffffffe) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (7 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 15 03 03 00 02 02 28 ......( ssl_tls.c:5169: got an alert message, type: [2:40] ssl_tls.c:5177: is a fatal alert message (msg 40) ssl_tls.c:4369: mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type() returned -30592 (-0x7780) ssl_tls.c:5906: mbedtls_ssl_read_record() returned -30592 (-0x7780) ssl_tls.c:8094: <= handshake mbedtls_ssl_handshake failed: -30592 -- mbed-tls mailing list mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls

4 years, 10 months

2
1
0 0

Re: [mbed-tls] Set an MPI and print it

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi Youssouf, I think you're looking for mbedtls_mpi_write_file() - just pass NULL as the file argument to write to stdout. You can use the radix argument to print out hex or decimal. Regards, Manuel. ________________________________ From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of youssouf sokhona via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 25 August 2020 15:40 To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] Set an MPI and print it Hi everyone, I think you all are fine. I am a beginner on mbedtls, and I wanted to set a dhm context. So, at first, I just want to set the value of the prime P, and the generator G. So to that I wrote the function below : [cid:image001.png@01D67AF5.D43FDE60] To check if it is correctly set, I wanted to print it to see. However, it is not the case. Do you know how to set and print the value ? Thanks, and have a good day Best regards, YS

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

mbedtls handshake failed

by Manu Abraham

Greetings, I am trying to connect from a STM32H7 MCU to a mosquitto peer, Can someone please help me to fix this issue that I have ? I have used the DES3 cipher to create the keys .. openssl genrsa -des3 -out test_ca.key 2048 .. Fiddled quite a bit with buffers, stack, heap and mbedtls config, eventually the communication appears to be working, but the handshake appears to fail. At the client MCU side, I see the mbedtls_ssl_handshake failed message with a return value of 0x7780 Additionally, I do see this message too: ssl_tls.c:5169: got an alert message, type: [2:40] ssl_tls.c:5177: is a fatal alert message (msg 40) But unfortunately, I am unable to make out what the error message means. At the peer, this is what i do see: 1598367067: New connection from 192.168.1.33 on port 8883. 1598367074: OpenSSL Error: error:1417C0C7:SSL routines:tls_process_client_certif icate:peer did not return a certificate 1598367074: Socket error on client <unknown>, disconnecting. 1598368366: mosquitto version 1.6.7 terminating Someone, Please help ! Thanks, Manu ssl_tls.c:8084: => handshake ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 0 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 1 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:0774: => write client hello ssl_cli.c:0811: client hello, max version: [3:3] ssl_cli.c:0821: dumping 'client hello, random bytes' (32 bytes) ssl_cli.c:0821: 0000: 3c ce d6 f9 48 cc 7d 5d 77 24 74 f2 1d 9f 8b aa <...H.}]w$t..... ssl_cli.c:0821: 0010: 4b 0c 20 64 d3 22 d0 ee 5e 3b 83 24 a7 01 ec d9 K. d."..^;.$.... ssl_cli.c:0874: client hello, session id len.: 0 ssl_cli.c:0875: dumping 'client hello, session id' (0 bytes) ssl_cli.c:0921: client hello, add ciphersuite: c02c ssl_cli.c:0921: client hello, add ciphersuite: c02b ssl_cli.c:0921: client hello, add ciphersuite: c030 ssl_cli.c:0921: client hello, add ciphersuite: c02f ssl_cli.c:0934: client hello, got 4 ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs) ssl_cli.c:0943: adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV ssl_cli.c:0992: client hello, compress len.: 1 ssl_cli.c:0993: client hello, compress alg.: 0 ssl_cli.c:0186: client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension ssl_cli.c:0271: client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension ssl_cli.c:0336: client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension ssl_cli.c:1070: client hello, total extension length: 38 ssl_tls.c:3184: => write handshake message ssl_tls.c:3343: => write record ssl_tls.c:3420: output record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 93 ssl_tls.c:3425: dumping 'output record sent to network' (98 bytes) ssl_tls.c:3425: 0000: 16 03 03 00 5d 01 00 00 59 03 03 3c ce d6 f9 48 ....]...Y..<...H .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:3425: 0050: 03 01 00 0a 00 06 00 04 00 18 00 17 00 0b 00 02 ................ ssl_tls.c:3425: 0060: 01 00 .. ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2773: message length: 98, out_left: 98 ssl_tls.c:2779: ssl->f_send() returned 98 (-0xffffff9e) ssl_tls.c:2807: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:3476: <= write record ssl_tls.c:3320: <= write handshake message ssl_cli.c:1106: <= write client hello ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 2 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:1499: => parse server hello ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:8094: <= handshake ssl_tls.c:8084: => handshake ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 2 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:1499: => parse server hello ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 00 59 ....Y ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 89 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 94 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 94 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 89 (-0xffffffa7) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (94 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 16 03 03 00 59 02 00 00 55 03 03 d1 64 6e e1 0c ....Y...U...dn.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:4232: 0050: 0d ff 01 00 01 00 00 0b 00 04 03 00 01 02 .............. ssl_tls.c:3624: handshake message: msglen = 89, type = 2, hslen = 89 ssl_tls.c:4385: <= read record ssl_cli.c:1579: dumping 'server hello, version' (2 bytes) ssl_cli.c:1579: 0000: 03 03 .. ssl_cli.c:1600: server hello, current time: 3513020129 ssl_cli.c:1610: dumping 'server hello, random bytes' (32 bytes) ssl_cli.c:1610: 0000: d1 64 6e e1 0c 1f ac 75 77 eb d7 02 24 dd a7 da .dn....uw...$... ssl_cli.c:1610: 0010: 48 f3 50 43 34 10 d8 d9 44 4f 57 4e 47 52 44 01 H.PC4...DOWNGRD. ssl_cli.c:1690: server hello, session id len.: 32 ssl_cli.c:1691: dumping 'server hello, session id' (32 bytes) ssl_cli.c:1691: 0000: 90 8f cc f8 31 63 81 ae aa bf a9 b9 61 1e 78 f6 ....1c......a.x. ssl_cli.c:1691: 0010: 79 b8 26 66 51 99 f4 50 45 d4 21 9b 22 24 4c 63 y.&fQ..PE.!."$Lc ssl_cli.c:1728: no session has been resumed ssl_cli.c:1731: server hello, chosen ciphersuite: c030 ssl_cli.c:1732: server hello, compress alg.: 0 ssl_cli.c:1764: server hello, chosen ciphersuite: TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 ssl_cli.c:1789: server hello, total extension length: 13 ssl_cli.c:1809: found renegotiation extension ssl_cli.c:1888: found supported_point_formats extension ssl_cli.c:1292: point format selected: 0 ssl_cli.c:1978: <= parse server hello ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 3 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5655: => parse certificate ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 07 80 ..... ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 1920 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 1925 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 1925 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 1361 (-0xfffffaaf) ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 1366, nb_want: 1925 ssl_tls.c:8094: <= handshake ssl_tls.c:8084: => handshake ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 3 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5655: => parse certificate ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 1366, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 07 80 ..... ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 1920 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 1366, nb_want: 1925 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 1366, nb_want: 1925 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 559 (-0xfffffdd1) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (1925 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 16 03 03 07 80 0b 00 07 7c 00 07 79 00 03 90 30 ........|..y...0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:4232: 0770: df d8 30 17 65 70 2a 02 54 9a 4c cf b1 51 04 25 ..0.ep*.T.L..Q.% ssl_tls.c:4232: 0780: 83 2c ab dd 46 .,..F ssl_tls.c:3624: handshake message: msglen = 1920, type = 11, hslen = 1920 ssl_tls.c:4385: <= read record ssl_tls.c:5606: peer certificate #1: ssl_tls.c:5606: cert. version : 1 ssl_tls.c:5606: serial number : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: issuer name : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: subject name : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: issued on : 2020-08-15 09:12:30 ssl_tls.c:5606: expires on : 2030-08-13 09:12:30 ssl_tls.c:5606: signed using : RSA with SHA-256 ssl_tls.c:5606: RSA key size : 2048 bits ssl_tls.c:5606: value of 'crt->rsa.N' (2048 bits) is: ssl_tls.c:5606: c9 93 0d f4 7b 93 95 8f 4d ec bb 77 46 82 48 6d .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:5606: 0f 00 85 cf c9 40 b0 f8 b2 df 1b 75 bd 2e 95 43 ssl_tls.c:5606: value of 'crt->rsa.E' (17 bits) is: ssl_tls.c:5606: 01 00 01 ssl_tls.c:5606: peer certificate #2: ssl_tls.c:5606: cert. version : 3 ssl_tls.c:5606: serial number : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: issuer name : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: subject name : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ssl_tls.c:5606: issued on : 2020-08-15 08:54:30 ssl_tls.c:5606: expires on : 2030-08-13 08:54:30 ssl_tls.c:5606: signed using : RSA with SHA-256 ssl_tls.c:5606: RSA key size : 2048 bits ssl_tls.c:5606: basic constraints : CA=true ssl_tls.c:5606: value of 'crt->rsa.N' (2048 bits) is: ssl_tls.c:5606: c4 e2 4b 37 45 4a 36 e5 b0 14 f7 fa 76 1d c4 29 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:5606: 43 7c 19 f2 b0 dc ef 69 cf 13 c4 cb fa 80 92 f1 ssl_tls.c:5606: value of 'crt->rsa.E' (17 bits) is: ssl_tls.c:5606: 01 00 01 ssl_tls.c:5856: Certificate verification flags clear ssl_tls.c:5863: <= parse certificate ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 4 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:2336: => parse server key exchange ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 01 4d ....M ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 333 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 338 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 338 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 333 (-0xfffffeb3) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (338 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 16 03 03 01 4d 0c 00 01 49 03 00 17 41 04 6e 49 ....M...I...A.nI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:4232: 0140: c4 4b 34 2f 83 5f 98 17 39 5e 6e 4d 56 f4 c1 4c .K4/._..9^nMV..L ssl_tls.c:4232: 0150: 39 0f 9. ssl_tls.c:3624: handshake message: msglen = 333, type = 12, hslen = 333 ssl_tls.c:4385: <= read record ssl_cli.c:2424: dumping 'server key exchange' (329 bytes) ssl_cli.c:2424: 0000: 03 00 17 41 04 6e 49 4b 1c 4e 7b 2b ff c3 c9 9b ...A.nIK.N{+.... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_cli.c:2424: 0130: d9 33 d2 6e a7 05 ca c4 4b 34 2f 83 5f 98 17 39 .3.n....K4/._..9 ssl_cli.c:2424: 0140: 5e 6e 4d 56 f4 c1 4c 39 0f ^nMV..L9. ssl_cli.c:2044: ECDH curve: secp256r1 ssl_cli.c:2054: value of 'ECDH: Qp(X)' (255 bits) is: ssl_cli.c:2054: 6e 49 4b 1c 4e 7b 2b ff c3 c9 9b 81 29 4d a8 92 ssl_cli.c:2054: af c2 77 2b 3b c6 26 ba d4 c7 a2 2d 83 78 e3 54 ssl_cli.c:2054: value of 'ECDH: Qp(Y)' (256 bits) is: ssl_cli.c:2054: d6 91 fe 18 70 fb bc b6 c7 aa 67 1c 08 8b 4d 58 ssl_cli.c:2054: a4 70 59 97 90 23 8d 4b b6 24 4e 1a 7e 13 f2 d1 ssl_cli.c:2278: Server used SignatureAlgorithm 1 ssl_cli.c:2279: Server used HashAlgorithm 4 ssl_cli.c:2580: dumping 'signature' (256 bytes) ssl_cli.c:2580: 0000: b3 88 25 7f 3f 6b cf 7e 03 de 11 5b 4f 47 e9 6e ..%.?k.~...[OG.n .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_cli.c:2580: 00f0: 34 2f 83 5f 98 17 39 5e 6e 4d 56 f4 c1 4c 39 0f 4/._..9^nMV..L9. ssl_cli.c:2616: dumping 'parameters hash' (32 bytes) ssl_cli.c:2616: 0000: bc 4e 7e a6 a6 02 76 66 2c da 19 6c ea 5a aa df .N~...vf,..l.Z.. ssl_cli.c:2616: 0010: ae 3a ff e9 34 c6 d1 72 98 b4 f3 7d b8 71 11 65 .:..4..r...}.q.e ssl_cli.c:2664: <= parse server key exchange ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 5 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:2697: => parse certificate request ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 00 3a ....: ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 58 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 63 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 63 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 58 (-0xffffffc6) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (63 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 16 03 03 00 3a 0d 00 00 36 03 01 02 40 00 2e 04 ....:...6...@... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:4232: 0030: 01 02 01 03 02 02 02 04 02 05 02 06 02 00 00 ............... ssl_tls.c:3624: handshake message: msglen = 58, type = 13, hslen = 58 ssl_tls.c:4385: <= read record ssl_cli.c:2723: got a certificate request ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4,3 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5,3 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 6,3 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,7 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,8 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,9 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,10 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,11 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,4 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,5 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 8,6 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4,1 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5,1 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 6,1 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 3,3 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 2,3 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 3,1 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 2,1 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 3,2 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 2,2 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 4,2 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 5,2 ssl_cli.c:2823: Supported Signature Algorithm found: 6,2 ssl_cli.c:2846: <= parse certificate request ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 6 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:2856: => parse server hello done ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 16 03 03 00 04 ..... ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 4 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 9 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 9 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 4 (-0xfffffffc) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (9 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 16 03 03 00 04 0e 00 00 00 ......... ssl_tls.c:3624: handshake message: msglen = 4, type = 14, hslen = 4 ssl_tls.c:4385: <= read record ssl_cli.c:2886: <= parse server hello done ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 7 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5329: => write certificate ssl_tls.c:3184: => write handshake message ssl_tls.c:3343: => write record ssl_tls.c:3420: output record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 7 ssl_tls.c:3425: dumping 'output record sent to network' (12 bytes) ssl_tls.c:3425: 0000: 16 03 03 00 07 0b 00 00 03 00 00 00 ............ ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2773: message length: 12, out_left: 12 ssl_tls.c:2779: ssl->f_send() returned 12 (-0xfffffff4) ssl_tls.c:2807: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:3476: <= write record ssl_tls.c:3320: <= write handshake message ssl_tls.c:5433: <= write certificate ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 8 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:2898: => write client key exchange ssl_cli.c:2977: value of 'ECDH: Q(X)' (256 bits) is: ssl_cli.c:2977: e8 dd a7 e4 3d f4 43 c0 1f 42 67 99 2f 1b bd a8 ssl_cli.c:2977: 10 03 3d 45 5f 3b f8 46 ff d6 b8 65 3c 13 6a 3b ssl_cli.c:2977: value of 'ECDH: Q(Y)' (256 bits) is: ssl_cli.c:2977: 9a f8 36 4d 19 01 01 02 d6 bb 51 4a 1d ec f1 7f ssl_cli.c:2977: 28 70 31 95 65 62 1e d6 8d 97 b6 cc 3f b4 9a 8e ssl_cli.c:3005: value of 'ECDH: z' (253 bits) is: ssl_cli.c:3005: 14 06 75 26 fd 2c 2e 3f ad cf 0c fe 6b df 66 7c ssl_cli.c:3005: c2 b7 54 7e 62 ea 4e 0b 93 d0 62 22 15 e6 db 43 ssl_tls.c:3184: => write handshake message ssl_tls.c:3343: => write record ssl_tls.c:3420: output record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 70 ssl_tls.c:3425: dumping 'output record sent to network' (75 bytes) ssl_tls.c:3425: 0000: 16 03 03 00 46 10 00 00 42 41 04 e8 dd a7 e4 3d ....F...BA.....= .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:3425: 0040: 62 1e d6 8d 97 b6 cc 3f b4 9a 8e b......?... ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2773: message length: 75, out_left: 75 ssl_tls.c:2779: ssl->f_send() returned 75 (-0xffffffb5) ssl_tls.c:2807: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:3476: <= write record ssl_tls.c:3320: <= write handshake message ssl_cli.c:3172: <= write client key exchange ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 9 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_cli.c:3224: => write certificate verify ssl_tls.c:0628: => derive keys ssl_tls.c:0705: dumping 'premaster secret' (32 bytes) ssl_tls.c:0705: 0000: 14 06 75 26 fd 2c 2e 3f ad cf 0c fe 6b df 66 7c ..u&.,.?....k.f| ssl_tls.c:0705: 0010: c2 b7 54 7e 62 ea 4e 0b 93 d0 62 22 15 e6 db 43 ..T~b.N...b"...C ssl_tls.c:0794: ciphersuite = TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 ssl_tls.c:0796: dumping 'master secret' (48 bytes) ssl_tls.c:0796: 0000: 5a 15 26 c7 71 73 1a 2e 8c 0d 0e 55 d7 6f 7f b5 Z.&.qs.....U.o.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:0796: 0020: 24 bf 3f 51 ca e9 7b 66 99 61 cf a9 fb 61 e2 2f $.?Q..{f.a...a./ ssl_tls.c:0797: dumping 'random bytes' (64 bytes) ssl_tls.c:0797: 0000: d1 64 6e e1 0c 1f ac 75 77 eb d7 02 24 dd a7 da .dn....uw...$... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:0797: 0030: 4b 0c 20 64 d3 22 d0 ee 5e 3b 83 24 a7 01 ec d9 K. d."..^;.$.... ssl_tls.c:0798: dumping 'key block' (256 bytes) ssl_tls.c:0798: 0000: 5d b4 7a 60 2e 5b f8 fb 8f e4 75 22 9a b4 8c 04 ].z`.[....u".... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:0798: 00f0: 53 af 8e 78 d0 03 ca 26 b7 43 ee c6 aa 0e 71 88 S..x...&.C....q. ssl_tls.c:0919: keylen: 32, minlen: 24, ivlen: 12, maclen: 0 ssl_tls.c:1116: <= derive keys ssl_cli.c:3253: <= skip write certificate verify ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 10 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5879: => write change cipher spec ssl_tls.c:3184: => write handshake message ssl_tls.c:3343: => write record ssl_tls.c:3420: output record: msgtype = 20, version = [3:3], msglen = 1 ssl_tls.c:3425: dumping 'output record sent to network' (6 bytes) ssl_tls.c:3425: 0000: 14 03 03 00 01 01 ...... ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2773: message length: 6, out_left: 6 ssl_tls.c:2779: ssl->f_send() returned 6 (-0xfffffffa) ssl_tls.c:2807: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:3476: <= write record ssl_tls.c:3320: <= write handshake message ssl_tls.c:5893: <= write change cipher spec ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 11 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:6398: => write finished ssl_tls.c:6272: => calc finished tls sha384 ssl_tls.c:6283: dumping 'finished sha512 state' (64 bytes) ssl_tls.c:6283: 0000: e2 6c 37 56 90 66 0a f8 1c c7 26 d0 49 a9 87 52 .l7V.f....&.I..R .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:6283: 0030: 85 b3 04 84 77 e5 02 b0 53 d7 31 b4 c4 e4 08 c0 ....w...S.1..... ssl_tls.c:6296: dumping 'calc finished result' (12 bytes) ssl_tls.c:6296: 0000: c4 6a dd c2 9b a7 75 28 ff 53 5a 3f .j....u(.SZ? ssl_tls.c:6302: <= calc finished ssl_tls.c:6443: switching to new transform spec for outbound data ssl_tls.c:3184: => write handshake message ssl_tls.c:3343: => write record ssl_tls.c:1445: => encrypt buf ssl_tls.c:1455: dumping 'before encrypt: output payload' (16 bytes) ssl_tls.c:1455: 0000: 14 00 00 0c c4 6a dd c2 9b a7 75 28 ff 53 5a 3f .....j....u(.SZ? ssl_tls.c:1574: dumping 'additional data for AEAD' (13 bytes) ssl_tls.c:1574: 0000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 16 03 03 00 10 ............. ssl_tls.c:1604: dumping 'IV used (internal)' (12 bytes) ssl_tls.c:1604: 0000: a0 9a 1f cb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ ssl_tls.c:1606: dumping 'IV used (transmitted)' (8 bytes) ssl_tls.c:1606: 0000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........ ssl_tls.c:1616: before encrypt: msglen = 24, including 0 bytes of padding ssl_tls.c:1643: dumping 'after encrypt: tag' (16 bytes) ssl_tls.c:1643: 0000: e7 10 1d 99 f6 b6 a5 40 de e8 c0 d5 ec 48 de 6e .......@.....H.n ssl_tls.c:1781: <= encrypt buf ssl_tls.c:3420: output record: msgtype = 22, version = [3:3], msglen = 40 ssl_tls.c:3425: dumping 'output record sent to network' (45 bytes) ssl_tls.c:3425: 0000: 16 03 03 00 28 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 73 7e ....(.........s~ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ssl_tls.c:3425: 0020: 99 f6 b6 a5 40 de e8 c0 d5 ec 48 de 6e ....@.....H.n ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2773: message length: 45, out_left: 45 ssl_tls.c:2779: ssl->f_send() returned 45 (-0xffffffd3) ssl_tls.c:2807: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:3476: <= write record ssl_tls.c:3320: <= write handshake message ssl_tls.c:6507: <= write finished ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 12 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5902: => parse change cipher spec ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:8094: <= handshake ssl_tls.c:8084: => handshake ssl_cli.c:3510: client state: 12 ssl_tls.c:2755: => flush output ssl_tls.c:2767: <= flush output ssl_tls.c:5902: => parse change cipher spec ssl_tls.c:4311: => read record ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 0, nb_want: 5 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 5 (-0xfffffffb) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4047: dumping 'input record header' (5 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4047: 0000: 15 03 03 00 02 ..... ssl_tls.c:4053: input record: msgtype = 21, version = [3:3], msglen = 2 ssl_tls.c:2536: => fetch input ssl_tls.c:2696: in_left: 5, nb_want: 7 ssl_tls.c:2720: in_left: 5, nb_want: 7 ssl_tls.c:2722: ssl->f_recv(_timeout)() returned 2 (-0xfffffffe) ssl_tls.c:2742: <= fetch input ssl_tls.c:4232: dumping 'input record from network' (7 bytes) ssl_tls.c:4232: 0000: 15 03 03 00 02 02 28 ......( ssl_tls.c:5169: got an alert message, type: [2:40] ssl_tls.c:5177: is a fatal alert message (msg 40) ssl_tls.c:4369: mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type() returned -30592 (-0x7780) ssl_tls.c:5906: mbedtls_ssl_read_record() returned -30592 (-0x7780) ssl_tls.c:8094: <= handshake mbedtls_ssl_handshake failed: -30592

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

mbed-tls