- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: [mbed-tls] PKCS7 Generation Contribution

by Gilles Peskine

Hi Nick, It would be great to have even partial support of PKCS#7 in Mbed TLS and we would welcome your contribution! You can find some guidance in CONTRIBUTING.md (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/development/CONTRIBUTING.md). Feel free to ask on the mailing list if anything is unclear. Note that there is a work in progress for adding PKCS#7 parsing: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/3431 . It may help to see what it does, but also note the review comments that point out some remaining issues. If you and naynajain work on parsing and generation at the same time, you'll need to synchronize since both sides will need to create pkcs7.[hc]. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 10/11/2020 17:28, Nick Child via mbed-tls wrote: > Hello, > > For one of my projects, I had to create a PKCS7 generation/builder. I > noticed mbedtls currently has no support for PKCS7. After much trial > and error, I was able to use mbedtls functions to create a PKCS7 > structure for Signed Data. I was wondering if this something that > might be useful in later versions of mbedtls? The code currently has a > long way to go until it meets mbedtls coding standards, but I figured > I would ask if it is even possible and worth the efforts before > getting into it. I am also a rookie when it comes to open source > contributions, so I was hoping for some guidance regarding merging > upstream. > > Thanks for your time, > > Nick Child >

5 years, 4 months

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PKCS7 Generation Contribution

by Nick Child

Hello, For one of my projects, I had to create a PKCS7 generation/builder. I noticed mbedtls currently has no support for PKCS7. After much trial and error, I was able to use mbedtls functions to create a PKCS7 structure for Signed Data. I was wondering if this something that might be useful in later versions of mbedtls? The code currently has a long way to go until it meets mbedtls coding standards, but I figured I would ask if it is even possible and worth the efforts before getting into it. I am also a rookie when it comes to open source contributions, so I was hoping for some guidance regarding merging upstream. Thanks for your time, Nick Child

5 years, 4 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] PKCS7 compliance

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, No, unfortunately Mbed TLS does not support the PKCS#7 CMS format. Contributions would be welcome. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 06/11/2020 13:50, Alvaro Gonzalez via mbed-tls wrote: > > Hello mbed-tls mailing list. > > ï¿½ > > Does mbed-tls comply PKCS7? Can handle .p7, .p7b and/or .p7a extension > files? > > ï¿½ > > Best Regards. > > ï¿½ > >

5 years, 4 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] TLS-SRP Support

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, Mbed TLS does not currently support SRP and it is not on our roadmap (https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/roadmap/). Arm does not intend to work on it, but support can be added if someone else contributes it. If you are interested in contributing SRP support, please discuss it on this list first to settle some potential issues: conflicts with other work (in particular TLS 1.3 preparation, which involves some refactoring of existing TLS code), review bandwidth schedule, test plan. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 09/11/2020 14:01, Gijs Peskens via mbed-tls wrote: > > For an Open Source project we started using Mbed-TLS to do AES > encryption and, in a future version, will use Mbed-TLS for DTLS. > Part of the protocol we support requires TLS-SRP (either via DTLS or > via EAP), I’m unable to find anything relating to TLS-SRP support. > > Does Mbed-TLS support TLS-SRP currently? And if not is there intention > to add it in a future release? > > Br, > > Gijs Peskens > >

5 years, 4 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] TLS-SRP Support

by Janos Follath

Hi Gijs, I am not sure what TLS-SRP support is, could you please point me to the standard defining it? Best regards, Janos From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Gijs Peskens via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Gijs Peskens <gijsje(a)heteigenwijsje.nl> Date: Monday, 9 November 2020 at 13:02 To: "mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] TLS-SRP Support For an Open Source project we started using Mbed-TLS to do AES encryption and, in a future version, will use Mbed-TLS for DTLS. Part of the protocol we support requires TLS-SRP (either via DTLS or via EAP), I’m unable to find anything relating to TLS-SRP support. Does Mbed-TLS support TLS-SRP currently? And if not is there intention to add it in a future release? Br, Gijs Peskens

5 years, 4 months

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TLS-SRP Support

by Gijs Peskens

For an Open Source project we started using Mbed-TLS to do AES encryption and, in a future version, will use Mbed-TLS for DTLS. Part of the protocol we support requires TLS-SRP (either via DTLS or via EAP), I’m unable to find anything relating to TLS-SRP support. Does Mbed-TLS support TLS-SRP currently? And if not is there intention to add it in a future release? Br, Gijs Peskens

5 years, 4 months

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PKCS7 compliance

by Alvaro Gonzalez

Hello mbed-tls mailing list. Does mbed-tls comply PKCS7? Can handle .p7, .p7b and/or .p7a extension files? Best Regards.

5 years, 4 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Chinese characters garbled after calling mbedtls_x509_crt_info() or mbedtls_x509_dn_gets()

by Janos Follath

Hi Newt, This is normal and happens not just to Chinese characters, but to all non-ASCII characters. This supposed to be a feature of Mbed TLS, to ensure that we return something printable whether the platform can handle the original encoding or not. Of course we can consider providing a way to add an option to disable this feature: if you would like to submit a PR, please let us discuss first what can be done. If you wouldn't like to submit a PR, then please raise an issue on github for this feature request. Until this feature is implemented, you can access the original encoding in the `val` field of the `mbedtls_x509_name` parameter you would be passing to `mbedtls_x509_dn_gets()`. Regards, Janos On 06/11/2020, 03:54, "mbed-tls on behalf of 马瑞宜 via mbed-tls" <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: Hello everyone, I have this certificate blob and I'm using mbedtls to read this, but after called mbedtls_x509_crt_info() or mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(), the chinese characters got garbled. I have googled this, read the mbedtls knowledge base and searched the issues and got no luck. The field i want to parse is the subject field and the issuer field. and currently I cannot provide the certificate blob due to security reasons. Any help would be much appreciated. Sincerely, Newt Ma -- mbed-tls mailing list mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls

5 years, 4 months

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Chinese characters garbled after calling mbedtls_x509_crt_info() or mbedtls_x509_dn_gets()

by 马瑞宜

Hello everyone, I have this certificate blob and I'm using mbedtls to read this, but after called mbedtls_x509_crt_info() or mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(), the chinese characters got garbled. I have googled this, read the mbedtls knowledge base and searched the issues and got no luck. The field i want to parse is the subject field and the issuer field. and currently I cannot provide the certificate blob due to security reasons. Any help would be much appreciated. Sincerely, Newt Ma

5 years, 4 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] About mbedtls CVE

by Janos Follath

Hi Sawyer, After looking at the issues in more detail I would like to be more precise about CVE-2018-1000520: * It is not a security issue in the context of TLS 1.2 * It can be a security issue if TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 is used * The severity is so low that we decided not fixing it ourselves, but to open it up for community contributions * The corresponding issue has been closed down by mistake, I am reopening it now: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/1561 (Many thanks to Simon Butcher for noticing this and pointing it out.) Please let me know if I you would like to know more about this issue. Best regards, Janos (Mbed TLS developer) From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Janos Follath via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Janos Follath <Janos.Follath(a)arm.com> Date: Wednesday, 28 October 2020 at 09:42 To: Sawyer Liu <sawyer.liu(a)nxp.com> Cc: "mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [mbed-tls] About mbedtls CVE Hi Sawyer, Thank you for your interest in Mbed TLS. Currently the status of these CVE’s is: - CVE-2020-16150 has been fixed in the latest Mbed TLS release - CVE-2018-1000520 is not a security issue, it had been studied and rejected - CVE-2016-3739 is a vulnerability in an application using Mbed TLS but not in Mbed TLS itself, also it too had been fixed. Does this answer your question? (Also, I would like to make a minor clarification: we are not Arm Support. As far as I know Arm does not offer official support for Mbed TLS. Arm only contributes engineers to the Mbed TLS project, and at the moment these engineers are the maintainers of Mbed TLS. We are on this mailing list and try to answer questions, but we are not doing that as official support provided by Arm, but as members of the community. Mbed TLS is supported by the community and this mailing list is indeed the right place to get that support. I apologise for the nitpick, I just wanted to make sure that we are not giving the wrong impressions.) Best regards, Janos (Mbed TLS developer) From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Sawyer Liu via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Sawyer Liu <sawyer.liu(a)nxp.com> Date: Wednesday, 28 October 2020 at 01:59 To: "mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] About mbedtls CVE Hello ARM Support, About below CVEs, any update? Thanks. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-16150<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcve.mitre…> https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-1000520 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-3739 Best Regards Sawyer Liu Microcontrollers, NXP Semiconductors

5 years, 4 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Questions about PSA Crypto API and mbed TLS

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, On 05/11/2020 17:49, François Beerten via mbed-tls wrote: > Hi, > > Thank you Gilles for the detailed reply. > > Do you prefer that discussion about PSA Crypto API spec go on mailing > list instead of here ? Is there some room for evolution or is the spec > already in a frozen released state ? Please use the psa-crypto list since there may be participants there who don't care about Mbed TLS. Version 1.0 of the PSA Crypto API is official so we won't make incompatible changes unless there is a compelling reason. We can, and will, add features in 1.x versions of the specification. Among planned features are: more algorithm declarations, key wrapping, key stretching, and a better treatment of key establishment (including password-based key establishment). > > For new algorithms, it's of course preferable that they're defined in > the spec itself. But does the mbedtls project want to supports all > algorithms that will be used with PSA Crypto API ? Mbed TLS intends to be a reference implementation of the PSA crypto API. However it isn't clear whether this means that Mbed TLS will eventually support all algorithms that the API declares: we intend to support all methods, but not necessarily all algorithms. A conforming implementation of the API is allowed to support any subset of the algorithms. We (here meaning Arm, not Mbed TLS) don't have a formal policy to decide whether to include a declaration for an algorithm, but here are some criteria that we're likely to follow: * There should be a public specification. (This can be a document that's only for purchase, such as an ISO standard.) * The algorithm should either be in good standing, or in current use in legacy protocols. * The bar is low for adding an algorithm that just requires a #define. It's a lot higher if a new function is needed. * Availability in Mbed TLS is not required. > > For pure ED25519 and ED448 with scattered data, there's one big > gotcha. You need to generate twice a hash that includes the message. > Thus the implementation needs to be able to access the buffers of the > message twice. With a piece of the message given only once as in the > init-update-finish scheme, that does not work well. > > From reading the document on the PSA Crypto driver API, a transparent > driver benefits from the management of keys done by the mbedtls > implementation. But what benefit is there for a driver working with > opaque keys which has to fully handle the protections and restrictions > of keys internally ? > One of the driving goals of PSA is to make security unobtrusive, and to facilitate security improvements. A unified interface to key management makes it easy to upgrade from having all keys inside, to using a single-chip application separation technology (MMU, MPU, secure enclave, …), to wrapping keys in a secure element and storing the wrapped key externally, to storing keys in a secure element (which protects against undeletion). When an application uses a key, it doesn't need to care where the key is stored. Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine > Best, > > François. > > > On 11/2/20 11:01 PM, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: >> Hello, >> >> Thank you for your interest in the PSA crypto API. >> >> On 28/10/2020 15:20, François Beerten via mbed-tls wrote: >>> Hi everybody, >>> >>> After reading the PSA Crypto API specs (as on >>> https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/overview/functionality.html) >>> and looking at the mbed TLS library, a few questions came up. >>> >>> Is there some repository with the sources of the PSA Crypto API specs >>> where one can follow the evolution and eventually send proposals and >>> patches ? >>> >> The PSA specification drafts are not public. You can send feedback about >> the PSA Crypto application and driver interfaces on the psa-crypto >> mailing list (psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org, >> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/psa-crypto). If you >> prefer to send confidential feedback, you can email mbed-crypto(a)arm.com >> (feedback at this address will only be discussed inside Arm). An issue >> in the Mbed TLS repository will also reach PSA Crypto architects. >> >>> A note says "Hash suspend and resume is not defined for the SHA3 >>> family of hash algorithms". Why are they not defined for SHA3 ? >>> >> The hash suspend/resume operations marshall the internal state of the >> hash operation. They mimic an existing JavaCard API >> (https://docs.oracle.com/javacard/3.0.5/api/javacard/security/InitializedMes…). >> >> There is a de facto standard representation of the internal state for >> common Merkle-Damgård constructions, which covers all the currently >> defined hash algorithms except SHA3. If there's interest in this >> functionality, we could standardize a representation for SHA3. >> >>> How can or should one add support in PSA Crypto AP for not yet defined >>> algorithms (for example a KDF) ? >>> >> Answer from a PSA Crypto architect: preferably by requesting an encoding >> for this KDF as a PSA_ALG_xxx value (as well as new >> PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx values if applicable). If you can't do >> that, use an encoding in the vendor range (most significant bit set). >> >> The world of key derivation functions is unfortunately messy: there are >> many similar, but not functionally equivalent constructions (such as >> hashing a secret together with a nonce, formatted in all kinds of >> different ways). The set of KDF in PSA Crypto 1.0.0 was the minimum set >> required for the TLS protocol. We expect 1.0.x updates to define more >> KDF algorithms. >> >> Answer from an Mbed TLS maintainer: contributing an implementation would >> be appreciated (but not required). >> >>> In multipart operations, can the user reuse the input buffers >>> immediately after doing an 'update' (for example after >>> psa_hash_update()) ? And can he reuse the input buffers immediately >>> after some "setup" functions like psa_cipher_set_iv() or >>> psa_aead_set_nonce() ? >>> >> Yes. PSA crypto API functions that take a buffer as a parameter never >> take ownership of that buffer. Once the function returns, you can do >> whatever you want with the buffer. >> >> The PSA specification even guarantees that you can use the same buffer, >> or overlapping buffers, as inputs and outputs to the same function call. >> However beware that the Mbed TLS implementation does not always support >> such overlap (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3266). >> >>> Do you plan to support (pure) ED25519 and ED448 only via >>> psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message() ? What about messages in >>> multiple chunks ? >>> >> We plan to add a multi-part message signature interface, both for the >> sake of pureEdDSA and suitable for Mbed TLS's restartable ECDSA. I >> expect the design to be “what you'd expect” but I haven't yet verified >> that there aren't any gotchas. >> >>> In psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), why is the salt provided explicitely. >>> Shouldn't it be generated randomly internally when needed ? >>> >> Some applications use a fixed or deterministic salt which they check on >> decryption. Note that this parameter is what PKCS#1 calls “label”. >> >>> With PSA Crypto API, you define a flexible API for cryptographic >>> operations. Apparently, other providers could make their own >>> implementation of PSA Crypto API. Will mbed TLS then be able to use >>> those alternate PSA Crypto API implementations ? How would that work >>> practically ? >>> >> The X.509 and TLS layer of Mbed TLS are currently designed to use the >> mbedtls_xxx crypto API. We have already added partial support for the >> psa_xxx crypto API (with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO), however it is not yet >> possible to fully decouple the X.509/TLS layers from the Mbed TLS crypto >> implementation. (I think this is already possible for a small set of >> cipher suites, but it isn't something that we've tried or currently >> actively support.) Before this can happen, some Mbed TLS APIs need to >> change, which will happen in 2021 with Mbed TLS 3.0. After that, we plan >> to decouple the PSA crypto reference implementation (Mbed TLS's current >> crypto implementation) from the X.509/TLS layer (which will remain “Mbed >> TLS”). Our plans >> (https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/roadmap/) that far >> into the future are still vague and may change. >> >> Note that for the most common case of wanting a different implementation >> of cryptography, which is to leverage hardware such as accelerators and >> secure elements, PSA is defining a driver interface which is currently >> being implemented in Mbed TLS >> (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/proposed/psa-drive…). >> >> The driver interface lets you combine mechanisms supported by your >> hardware with Mbed TLS's implementation for mechanisms without hardware >> support. >>

5 years, 4 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Tomorrow

by Shebu Varghese Kuriakose

Hi Francois, The workshop slides and recordings are now available here - https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/ Regards, Shebu From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of François Beerten via mbed-tls Sent: Thursday, November 5, 2020 4:52 PM To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [mbed-tls] Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Tomorrow Hi Shebu, Will you post the slides of the presentations of the workshop ? Thanks, François. On 11/2/20 9:01 PM, Shebu Varghese Kuriakose via mbed-tls wrote: Hi All, Gentle reminder about the Mbed TLS workshop tomorrow (Tuesday, November 3rd) from 2 to 6pm GMT. See agenda and zoom link here - https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/ Thanks, Shebu -----Original Appointment----- From: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings <linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c(a)group.calendar.google.com><mailto:linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c@group.calendar.google.com> Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 12:32 AM To: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose; mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Don Harbin; psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Dave Rodgman Subject: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 2:00 PM-6:00 PM (UTC+00:00) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London. Where: Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… You have been invited to the following event. Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When Tue Nov 3, 2020 7am – 11am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Where Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… (map<https://www.google.com/maps/search/Zoom:+https:%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj…>) Calendar shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> Who • Don Harbin - creator • shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> • mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • dave.rodgman(a)arm.com<mailto:dave.rodgman@arm.com> more details »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Hi, Trustedfirmware.org community project would like to invite you to the Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop. The purpose of the workshop is to bring together the Mbed TLS community including maintainers, contributors and users to discuss * The future direction of the project and * Ways to improve community collaboration Here is the agenda for the workshop. Topic Time (in GMT) Welcome 2.00 - 2.10pm Constant-time code 2.10 – 2.30pm Processes - how does work get scheduled? 2.30 – 2.50pm PSA Crypto APIs 2.50 – 3.20pm PSA Crypto for Silicon Labs Wireless MCUs - Why, What, Where and When 3.20 – 3.50pm Break Roadmap, TLS1.3 Update 4.10 – 4.30pm Mbed TLS 3.0 Plans, Scope 4.30 – 5.00pm How do I contribute my first review and be an effective Mbed TLS reviewer 5.00 – 5.30pm Regards, Don Harbin Trusted Firmware Community Manager ==============Zoom details below:==================== Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Time: Nov 3, 2020 02:00 PM Greenwich Mean Time Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT…<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9531520…> Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Passcode: 143755 One tap mobile +16699009128,,95315200315# US (San Jose) +12532158782,,95315200315# US (Tacoma) Dial by your location +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/apL3hgti4<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fu%2FapL3hgt…> Going (shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com>)? 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5 years, 4 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Tomorrow

by François Beerten

Hi Shebu, Will you post the slides of the presentations of the workshop ? Thanks, François. On 11/2/20 9:01 PM, Shebu Varghese Kuriakose via mbed-tls wrote: > > Hi All, > > Gentle reminder about the Mbed TLS workshop tomorrow (Tuesday, > November 3^rd ) from 2 to 6pm GMT. > > See agenda and zoom link here - > https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/ > <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/> > > Thanks, > > Shebu > > -----Original Appointment----- > *From:* Trusted Firmware Public Meetings > <linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c(a)group.calendar.google.com> > *Sent:* Friday, October 23, 2020 12:32 AM > *To:* Trusted Firmware Public Meetings; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose; > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Don Harbin; > psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Dave Rodgman > *Subject:* Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop > *When:* Tuesday, November 3, 2020 2:00 PM-6:00 PM (UTC+00:00) Dublin, > Edinburgh, Lisbon, London. > *Where:* Zoom: > https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… > > > *You have been invited to the following event.* > > > Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop > > When > > > > Tue Nov 3, 2020 7am – 11am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix > > Where > > > > Zoom: > https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… > (map > <https://www.google.com/maps/search/Zoom:+https:%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj…>) > > Calendar > > > > shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com <mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> > > Who > > > > • > > > > Don Harbin- creator > > • > > > > shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com <mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> > > • > > > > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > <mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > > • > > > > psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > <mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > > • > > > > dave.rodgman(a)arm.com <mailto:dave.rodgman@arm.com> > > *more details » > <https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…>*** > > Hi, > Trustedfirmware.org community project would like to invite you to the > Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop. > > The purpose of the workshop is to bring together the Mbed TLS > community including maintainers, contributors and users to discuss > > * The future direction of the project and > * Ways to improve community collaboration > > Here is the agenda for the workshop. > > *Topic Time (in GMT)* > Welcome 2.00 - 2.10pm > Constant-time code 2.10 – 2.30pm > Processes - how does work get scheduled? 2.30 – 2.50pm > PSA Crypto APIs 2.50 – 3.20pm > PSA Crypto for Silicon Labs Wireless > MCUs - Why, What, Where and When 3.20 – 3.50pm > > *Break * > > Roadmap, TLS1.3 Update 4.10 – 4.30pm > Mbed TLS 3.0 Plans, Scope 4.30 – 5.00pm > How do I contribute my first review > and be an effective Mbed TLS reviewer 5.00 – 5.30pm > > Regards, > > Don Harbin > Trusted Firmware Community Manager > > > ==============Zoom details below:==================== > Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. > > Topic: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop > Time: Nov 3, 2020 02:00 PM Greenwich Mean Time > > Join Zoom Meeting > https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… > <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9531520…> > > Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 > Passcode: 143755 > One tap mobile > +16699009128,,95315200315# US (San Jose) > +12532158782,,95315200315# US (Tacoma) > > Dial by your location > +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) > +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) > +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) > +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) > +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) > +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) > 888 788 0099 US Toll-free > 877 853 5247 US Toll-free > Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 > Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/apL3hgti4 > <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fu%2FapL3hgt…> > > Going (shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com > <mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com>)? *Yes > <https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…>**- > **Maybe > <https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…>**- > **No > <https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…>*more > options » > <https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> > > Invitation from Google Calendar <https://www.google.com/calendar/> > > You are receiving this courtesy email at the account > shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com > <mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> because you are an attendee > of this event. > > To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. > Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at > https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification > settings for your entire calendar. > > Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a > response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite > others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your > RSVP. Learn More > <https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding>. > >

5 years, 4 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Questions about PSA Crypto API and mbed TLS

by François Beerten

Hi, Thank you Gilles for the detailed reply. Do you prefer that discussion about PSA Crypto API spec go on mailing list instead of here ? Is there some room for evolution or is the spec already in a frozen released state ? For new algorithms, it's of course preferable that they're defined in the spec itself. But does the mbedtls project want to supports all algorithms that will be used with PSA Crypto API ? For pure ED25519 and ED448 with scattered data, there's one big gotcha. You need to generate twice a hash that includes the message. Thus the implementation needs to be able to access the buffers of the message twice. With a piece of the message given only once as in the init-update-finish scheme, that does not work well. From reading the document on the PSA Crypto driver API, a transparent driver benefits from the management of keys done by the mbedtls implementation. But what benefit is there for a driver working with opaque keys which has to fully handle the protections and restrictions of keys internally ? Best, François. On 11/2/20 11:01 PM, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: > Hello, > > Thank you for your interest in the PSA crypto API. > > On 28/10/2020 15:20, François Beerten via mbed-tls wrote: >> Hi everybody, >> >> After reading the PSA Crypto API specs (as on >> https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/overview/functionality.html) >> and looking at the mbed TLS library, a few questions came up. >> >> Is there some repository with the sources of the PSA Crypto API specs >> where one can follow the evolution and eventually send proposals and >> patches ? >> > The PSA specification drafts are not public. You can send feedback about > the PSA Crypto application and driver interfaces on the psa-crypto > mailing list (psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org, > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/psa-crypto). If you > prefer to send confidential feedback, you can email mbed-crypto(a)arm.com > (feedback at this address will only be discussed inside Arm). An issue > in the Mbed TLS repository will also reach PSA Crypto architects. > >> A note says "Hash suspend and resume is not defined for the SHA3 >> family of hash algorithms". Why are they not defined for SHA3 ? >> > The hash suspend/resume operations marshall the internal state of the > hash operation. They mimic an existing JavaCard API > (https://docs.oracle.com/javacard/3.0.5/api/javacard/security/InitializedMes…). > There is a de facto standard representation of the internal state for > common Merkle-Damgård constructions, which covers all the currently > defined hash algorithms except SHA3. If there's interest in this > functionality, we could standardize a representation for SHA3. > >> How can or should one add support in PSA Crypto AP for not yet defined >> algorithms (for example a KDF) ? >> > Answer from a PSA Crypto architect: preferably by requesting an encoding > for this KDF as a PSA_ALG_xxx value (as well as new > PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx values if applicable). If you can't do > that, use an encoding in the vendor range (most significant bit set). > > The world of key derivation functions is unfortunately messy: there are > many similar, but not functionally equivalent constructions (such as > hashing a secret together with a nonce, formatted in all kinds of > different ways). The set of KDF in PSA Crypto 1.0.0 was the minimum set > required for the TLS protocol. We expect 1.0.x updates to define more > KDF algorithms. > > Answer from an Mbed TLS maintainer: contributing an implementation would > be appreciated (but not required). > >> In multipart operations, can the user reuse the input buffers >> immediately after doing an 'update' (for example after >> psa_hash_update()) ? And can he reuse the input buffers immediately >> after some "setup" functions like psa_cipher_set_iv() or >> psa_aead_set_nonce() ? >> > Yes. PSA crypto API functions that take a buffer as a parameter never > take ownership of that buffer. Once the function returns, you can do > whatever you want with the buffer. > > The PSA specification even guarantees that you can use the same buffer, > or overlapping buffers, as inputs and outputs to the same function call. > However beware that the Mbed TLS implementation does not always support > such overlap (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3266). > >> Do you plan to support (pure) ED25519 and ED448 only via >> psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message() ? What about messages in >> multiple chunks ? >> > We plan to add a multi-part message signature interface, both for the > sake of pureEdDSA and suitable for Mbed TLS's restartable ECDSA. I > expect the design to be “what you'd expect” but I haven't yet verified > that there aren't any gotchas. > >> In psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), why is the salt provided explicitely. >> Shouldn't it be generated randomly internally when needed ? >> > Some applications use a fixed or deterministic salt which they check on > decryption. Note that this parameter is what PKCS#1 calls “label”. > >> With PSA Crypto API, you define a flexible API for cryptographic >> operations. Apparently, other providers could make their own >> implementation of PSA Crypto API. Will mbed TLS then be able to use >> those alternate PSA Crypto API implementations ? How would that work >> practically ? >> > The X.509 and TLS layer of Mbed TLS are currently designed to use the > mbedtls_xxx crypto API. We have already added partial support for the > psa_xxx crypto API (with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO), however it is not yet > possible to fully decouple the X.509/TLS layers from the Mbed TLS crypto > implementation. (I think this is already possible for a small set of > cipher suites, but it isn't something that we've tried or currently > actively support.) Before this can happen, some Mbed TLS APIs need to > change, which will happen in 2021 with Mbed TLS 3.0. After that, we plan > to decouple the PSA crypto reference implementation (Mbed TLS's current > crypto implementation) from the X.509/TLS layer (which will remain “Mbed > TLS”). Our plans > (https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/roadmap/) that far > into the future are still vague and may change. > > Note that for the most common case of wanting a different implementation > of cryptography, which is to leverage hardware such as accelerators and > secure elements, PSA is defining a driver interface which is currently > being implemented in Mbed TLS > (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/proposed/psa-drive…). > The driver interface lets you combine mechanisms supported by your > hardware with Mbed TLS's implementation for mechanisms without hardware > support. >

5 years, 4 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Write private key into buffer using encrypted PEM format

by Janos Follath

Hi Mate, I had a look and I couldn’t find such a feature implemented either. I don’t think that Mbed TLS supports that at the moment. Best regards, Janos From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of "Z.Máté via mbed-tls" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: "Z.Máté" <enleszekakalozkiraly(a)gmail.com> Date: Monday, 2 November 2020 at 21:01 To: "mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] Write private key into buffer using encrypted PEM format Dear mbedtls list members! Sorry if this is the second time I ask, I'm not sure the previous question is still on the list. I'm asking if there's a way to export a private key into a buffer in an encrypted format. So that mbedtls_pk_parse_key() has to be called with a password. In the example program key_app.c (I hope that's how it's called) I can see there are password encrypted PEM formatted keys. But how to generate one? For clarity, this is the type of header I'm looking for. —–BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY—– Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,AB8E2B5B2D989271273F6730B6F9C687 ………………………………………………. ………………………………………………. ……………………………………… —–END RSA PRIVATE KEY—– I was only able to generate something like this by, using command line openssl. But I'd like a better solution, in code, using mbedtls. Yours Zombor Máté

5 years, 5 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Questions about PSA Crypto API and mbed TLS

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, Thank you for your interest in the PSA crypto API. On 28/10/2020 15:20, François Beerten via mbed-tls wrote: > > Hi everybody, > > After reading the PSA Crypto API specs (as on > https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/overview/functionality.html) > and looking at the mbed TLS library, a few questions came up. > > Is there some repository with the sources of the PSA Crypto API specs > where one can follow the evolution and eventually send proposals and > patches ? > The PSA specification drafts are not public. You can send feedback about the PSA Crypto application and driver interfaces on the psa-crypto mailing list (psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org, https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/psa-crypto). If you prefer to send confidential feedback, you can email mbed-crypto(a)arm.com (feedback at this address will only be discussed inside Arm). An issue in the Mbed TLS repository will also reach PSA Crypto architects. > A note says "Hash suspend and resume is not defined for the SHA3 > family of hash algorithms". Why are they not defined for SHA3 ? > The hash suspend/resume operations marshall the internal state of the hash operation. They mimic an existing JavaCard API (https://docs.oracle.com/javacard/3.0.5/api/javacard/security/InitializedMes…). There is a de facto standard representation of the internal state for common Merkle-Damgård constructions, which covers all the currently defined hash algorithms except SHA3. If there's interest in this functionality, we could standardize a representation for SHA3. > How can or should one add support in PSA Crypto AP for not yet defined > algorithms (for example a KDF) ? > Answer from a PSA Crypto architect: preferably by requesting an encoding for this KDF as a PSA_ALG_xxx value (as well as new PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx values if applicable). If you can't do that, use an encoding in the vendor range (most significant bit set). The world of key derivation functions is unfortunately messy: there are many similar, but not functionally equivalent constructions (such as hashing a secret together with a nonce, formatted in all kinds of different ways). The set of KDF in PSA Crypto 1.0.0 was the minimum set required for the TLS protocol. We expect 1.0.x updates to define more KDF algorithms. Answer from an Mbed TLS maintainer: contributing an implementation would be appreciated (but not required). > In multipart operations, can the user reuse the input buffers > immediately after doing an 'update' (for example after > psa_hash_update()) ? And can he reuse the input buffers immediately > after some "setup" functions like psa_cipher_set_iv() or > psa_aead_set_nonce() ? > Yes. PSA crypto API functions that take a buffer as a parameter never take ownership of that buffer. Once the function returns, you can do whatever you want with the buffer. The PSA specification even guarantees that you can use the same buffer, or overlapping buffers, as inputs and outputs to the same function call. However beware that the Mbed TLS implementation does not always support such overlap (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3266). > Do you plan to support (pure) ED25519 and ED448 only via > psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message() ? What about messages in > multiple chunks ? > We plan to add a multi-part message signature interface, both for the sake of pureEdDSA and suitable for Mbed TLS's restartable ECDSA. I expect the design to be “what you'd expect” but I haven't yet verified that there aren't any gotchas. > In psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), why is the salt provided explicitely. > Shouldn't it be generated randomly internally when needed ? > Some applications use a fixed or deterministic salt which they check on decryption. Note that this parameter is what PKCS#1 calls “label”. > With PSA Crypto API, you define a flexible API for cryptographic > operations. Apparently, other providers could make their own > implementation of PSA Crypto API. Will mbed TLS then be able to use > those alternate PSA Crypto API implementations ? How would that work > practically ? > The X.509 and TLS layer of Mbed TLS are currently designed to use the mbedtls_xxx crypto API. We have already added partial support for the psa_xxx crypto API (with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO), however it is not yet possible to fully decouple the X.509/TLS layers from the Mbed TLS crypto implementation. (I think this is already possible for a small set of cipher suites, but it isn't something that we've tried or currently actively support.) Before this can happen, some Mbed TLS APIs need to change, which will happen in 2021 with Mbed TLS 3.0. After that, we plan to decouple the PSA crypto reference implementation (Mbed TLS's current crypto implementation) from the X.509/TLS layer (which will remain “Mbed TLS”). Our plans (https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/roadmap/) that far into the future are still vague and may change. Note that for the most common case of wanting a different implementation of cryptography, which is to leverage hardware such as accelerators and secure elements, PSA is defining a driver interface which is currently being implemented in Mbed TLS (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/proposed/psa-drive…). The driver interface lets you combine mechanisms supported by your hardware with Mbed TLS's implementation for mechanisms without hardware support. -- Gilles Peskine PSA Cryptography architect and Mbed TLS developer > Thank you for your attention, > > François. > > >

5 years, 5 months

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Write private key into buffer using encrypted PEM format

by Z.Máté

Dear mbedtls list members! Sorry if this is the second time I ask, I'm not sure the previous question is still on the list. I'm asking if there's a way to export a private key into a buffer in an encrypted format. So that mbedtls_pk_parse_key() has to be called with a password. In the example program key_app.c (I hope that's how it's called) I can see there are password encrypted PEM formatted keys. But how to generate one? For clarity, this is the type of header I'm looking for. —–BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY—– Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,AB8E2B5B2D989271273F6730B6F9C687 ………………………………………………. ………………………………………………. ……………………………………… —–END RSA PRIVATE KEY—– I was only able to generate something like this by, using command line openssl. But I'd like a better solution, in code, using mbedtls. Yours Zombor Máté

5 years, 5 months

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Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Tomorrow

by Shebu Varghese Kuriakose

Hi All, Gentle reminder about the Mbed TLS workshop tomorrow (Tuesday, November 3rd) from 2 to 6pm GMT. See agenda and zoom link here - https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/ Thanks, Shebu -----Original Appointment----- From: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings <linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c(a)group.calendar.google.com> Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 12:32 AM To: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose; mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Don Harbin; psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Dave Rodgman Subject: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 2:00 PM-6:00 PM (UTC+00:00) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London. Where: Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… You have been invited to the following event. Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When Tue Nov 3, 2020 7am – 11am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Where Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… (map<https://www.google.com/maps/search/Zoom:+https:%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj…>) Calendar shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> Who • Don Harbin - creator • shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> • mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • dave.rodgman(a)arm.com<mailto:dave.rodgman@arm.com> more details »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Hi, Trustedfirmware.org community project would like to invite you to the Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop. The purpose of the workshop is to bring together the Mbed TLS community including maintainers, contributors and users to discuss * The future direction of the project and * Ways to improve community collaboration Here is the agenda for the workshop. Topic Time (in GMT) Welcome 2.00 - 2.10pm Constant-time code 2.10 – 2.30pm Processes - how does work get scheduled? 2.30 – 2.50pm PSA Crypto APIs 2.50 – 3.20pm PSA Crypto for Silicon Labs Wireless MCUs - Why, What, Where and When 3.20 – 3.50pm Break Roadmap, TLS1.3 Update 4.10 – 4.30pm Mbed TLS 3.0 Plans, Scope 4.30 – 5.00pm How do I contribute my first review and be an effective Mbed TLS reviewer 5.00 – 5.30pm Regards, Don Harbin Trusted Firmware Community Manager ==============Zoom details below:==================== Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Time: Nov 3, 2020 02:00 PM Greenwich Mean Time Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT…<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9531520…> Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Passcode: 143755 One tap mobile +16699009128,,95315200315# US (San Jose) +12532158782,,95315200315# US (Tacoma) Dial by your location +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/apL3hgti4<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fu%2FapL3hgt…> Going (shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com>)? Yes<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> - Maybe<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> - No<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> more options »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Invitation from Google Calendar<https://www.google.com/calendar/> You are receiving this courtesy email at the account shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn More<https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding>.

5 years, 5 months

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Exporting private key in encrypted PEM format

by Z.Máté

Dear mbedtls list members! Is there a way to write a private key into a buffer, in PEM format, by using a password for encryption? Mbedtls is able to parse encrypted PEM files so can I write one? I couldn't really find any info regarding it, only an older, unfinished github issue ... Yours Zombor Máté

5 years, 5 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Questions about PSA Crypto API and mbed TLS

by Levi Schuck

Hello François, The following is my understanding, I am not a maintainer but a user of mbedtls. My response below only addresses a few of your questions. PSA appears to be bound to what mbedtls currently supports, this does not include Ed25519 or Ed448 at this time. A pull request is currently open for this feature development https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/3245 Further development may be necessary to include those in PSA. The only implementation of PSA that I know of is one that wraps around mbedtls. Best, Levi On Wed, Oct 28, 2020 at 9:20 AM François Beerten via mbed-tls < mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi everybody, > > After reading the PSA Crypto API specs (as on > https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/overview/functionality.html) > and looking at the mbed TLS library, a few questions came up. > > Is there some repository with the sources of the PSA Crypto API specs > where one can follow the evolution and eventually send proposals and > patches ? > > A note says "Hash suspend and resume is not defined for the SHA3 family of > hash algorithms". Why are they not defined for SHA3 ? > > How can or should one add support in PSA Crypto AP for not yet defined > algorithms (for example a KDF) ? > > In multipart operations, can the user reuse the input buffers immediately > after doing an 'update' (for example after psa_hash_update()) ? And can > he reuse the input buffers immediately after some "setup" functions like > psa_cipher_set_iv() or psa_aead_set_nonce() ? > > Do you plan to support (pure) ED25519 and ED448 only via > psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message() ? What about messages in > multiple chunks ? > > In psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), why is the salt provided explicitely. > Shouldn't it be generated randomly internally when needed ? > > With PSA Crypto API, you define a flexible API for cryptographic > operations. Apparently, other providers could make their own implementation > of PSA Crypto API. Will mbed TLS then be able to use those alternate PSA > Crypto API implementations ? How would that work practically ? > > Thank you for your attention, > > François. > > > -- > mbed-tls mailing list > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls >

5 years, 5 months

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JITR is not working in case CA is created using BouncyCastle in mbedtls

by 박현웅

I make a CA certificate for JITR using BouncyCastle lib in the android app as the below example And a device certificate is generated by this certificate in mbed_tls. At this time, JITR is not working. Namely, a device certificate is not registered in AWS. But In the case of making a ca certificate using OPENSSL, JITR works normally. Below is CA certificate based BouncyCastle lib. -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIB8jCCAZegAwIBAgIVAK0ct2HFXVdS/k2NblxYGoxyuabfMAoGCCqGSM49BAMC MDIxCzAJBgNVBAYTAktSMRAwDgYDVQQKDAdUcnVzdEZpMREwDwYDVQQDDAhtZWdh em9uZTAeFw0yMDEwMjcwMDAwMDBaFw0zNTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMDIxCzAJBgNVBAYT AktSMRAwDgYDVQQKDAdUcnVzdEZpMREwDwYDVQQDDAhtZWdhem9uZTBZMBMGByqG SM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABEknYdqI3CdVlmMkTmqKS63HnHc5PbyBff1RokGG 6NE6z31ilA8Yt2fGFHIln1kQtx//6stBA1bIqiqsSo8wad6jgYkwgYYwHQYDVR0O BBYEFBHaQtHvagaDPkpWxQurErTekm2cMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBHaQtHvagaDPkpW xQurErTekm2cMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wEQYJYIZIAYb4QgEBBAQDAgAHMAsG A1UdDwQEAwIBBjATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNJADBG AiEA9HSXn3FpGUYLagsI3qaHz3VicMSuADUz/QBYEKN9STkCIQC+8BX/TPADpPOy ClmBIkjxdDt0Fh7HTDn9UwBUxYA3/g== -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- MIGTAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBHkwdwIBAQQgU9pUZUfplZyhC+mH Pt8pthLItdpbJ+Qy47r7gJKTNvCgCgYIKoZIzj0DAQehRANCAARJJ2HaiNwnVZZj JE5qikutx5x3OT28gX39UaJBhujROs99YpQPGLdnxhRyJZ9ZELcf/+rLQQNWyKoq rEqPMGne -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- BRs. Hyunung Park

5 years, 5 months

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Questions about PSA Crypto API and mbed TLS

by François Beerten

Hi everybody, After reading the PSA Crypto API specs (as on https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/overview/functionality.html) and looking at the mbed TLS library, a few questions came up. Is there some repository with the sources of the PSA Crypto API specs where one can follow the evolution and eventually send proposals and patches ? A note says "Hash suspend and resume is not defined for the SHA3 family of hash algorithms". Why are they not defined for SHA3 ? How can or should one add support in PSA Crypto AP for not yet defined algorithms (for example a KDF) ? In multipart operations, can the user reuse the input buffers immediately after doing an 'update' (for example after psa_hash_update()) ? And can he reuse the input buffers immediately after some "setup" functions like psa_cipher_set_iv() or psa_aead_set_nonce() ? Do you plan to support (pure) ED25519 and ED448 only via psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message() ? What about messages in multiple chunks ? In psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), why is the salt provided explicitely. Shouldn't it be generated randomly internally when needed ? With PSA Crypto API, you define a flexible API for cryptographic operations. Apparently, other providers could make their own implementation of PSA Crypto API. Will mbed TLS then be able to use those alternate PSA Crypto API implementations ? How would that work practically ? Thank you for your attention, François.

5 years, 5 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Availability of 2.16.7 in download archive

by Janos Follath

Hi Frank, The issue exists because you are downloading a tag and not the release. The 2.16.8 release is available here: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/archive/v2.16.8.tar.gz Best regards, Janos On 28/10/2020, 12:15, "mbed-tls on behalf of Frank Bergmann via mbed-tls" <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: Hi Gilles, I noticed that the "double name" does still exist in some archive files: $ wget -q -O - https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/archive/mbedtls-2.16.8.tar.gz|tar tzf -|head mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/ mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.github/ mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.github/issue_template.md mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.github/pull_request_template.md mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.gitignore mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.globalrc mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.pylintrc mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.travis.yml mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/CMakeLists.txt mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/CONTRIBUTING.md cheers, Frank On Tue, Aug 04, 2020 at 09:18:56PM +0000, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: [...] > The naming with mbedtls-mbedtls- must be a bug in our release script. [...] -- Frank Bergmann, Pödinghauser Str. 5, D-32051 Herford, Tel. +49-5221-9249753 SAP Hybris & Linux LPIC-3, E-Mail tx2014(a)tuxad.de, USt-IdNr DE237314606 http://tdyn.de/freel -- Redirect to profile at freelancermap http://www.gulp.de/freiberufler/2HNKY2YHW.html -- Profile at GULP -- mbed-tls mailing list mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls

5 years, 5 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] Availability of 2.16.7 in download archive

by Frank Bergmann

Hi Gilles, I noticed that the "double name" does still exist in some archive files: $ wget -q -O - https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/archive/mbedtls-2.16.8.tar.gz|tar tzf -|head mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/ mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.github/ mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.github/issue_template.md mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.github/pull_request_template.md mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.gitignore mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.globalrc mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.pylintrc mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/.travis.yml mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/CMakeLists.txt mbedtls-mbedtls-2.16.8/CONTRIBUTING.md cheers, Frank On Tue, Aug 04, 2020 at 09:18:56PM +0000, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: [...] > The naming with mbedtls-mbedtls- must be a bug in our release script. [...] -- Frank Bergmann, Pödinghauser Str. 5, D-32051 Herford, Tel. +49-5221-9249753 SAP Hybris & Linux LPIC-3, E-Mail tx2014(a)tuxad.de, USt-IdNr DE237314606 http://tdyn.de/freel -- Redirect to profile at freelancermap http://www.gulp.de/freiberufler/2HNKY2YHW.html -- Profile at GULP

5 years, 5 months

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Re: [mbed-tls] About mbedtls CVE

by Janos Follath

Hi Sawyer, Thank you for your interest in Mbed TLS. Currently the status of these CVE’s is: - CVE-2020-16150 has been fixed in the latest Mbed TLS release - CVE-2018-1000520 is not a security issue, it had been studied and rejected - CVE-2016-3739 is a vulnerability in an application using Mbed TLS but not in Mbed TLS itself, also it too had been fixed. Does this answer your question? (Also, I would like to make a minor clarification: we are not Arm Support. As far as I know Arm does not offer official support for Mbed TLS. Arm only contributes engineers to the Mbed TLS project, and at the moment these engineers are the maintainers of Mbed TLS. We are on this mailing list and try to answer questions, but we are not doing that as official support provided by Arm, but as members of the community. Mbed TLS is supported by the community and this mailing list is indeed the right place to get that support. I apologise for the nitpick, I just wanted to make sure that we are not giving the wrong impressions.) Best regards, Janos (Mbed TLS developer) From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Sawyer Liu via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Sawyer Liu <sawyer.liu(a)nxp.com> Date: Wednesday, 28 October 2020 at 01:59 To: "mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] About mbedtls CVE Hello ARM Support, About below CVEs, any update? Thanks. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-16150<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcve.mitre…> https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-1000520 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-3739 Best Regards Sawyer Liu Microcontrollers, NXP Semiconductors

5 years, 5 months

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