- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: [mbed-tls] Provide a crypto utility to verify mbedtls quickly

by Sawyer Liu

Hello everyone, Due to the pic link, cannot download the tool. I attach the link again. http://esctech.cn/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Crypto%20UtilityV2.0.zip Best Regards Sawyer Liu

5 years

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Provide a crypto utility to verify mbedtls quickly

by Sawyer Liu

Hello everyone, I found many people need to verify the result of mbedtls, so I can provide a tool to help more people to verify their own code quickly. See http://esctech.cn/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Crypto%20UtilityV2.0.zip<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fesctech.cn…>. [cid:image001.jpg@01D6C1C0.7C525360] Best Regards Sawyer Liu

5 years

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Re: [mbed-tls] Invalid ECDSA signature created

by Gilles Peskine

Hi Roshini, Mathematically, an ES256 (ECDSA over the curve P256R1) signature is a pair of numbers (r,s) between 1 and an upper bound which is very slightly less than 2^256. There are two common representations for this signature. JWA uses the “raw” representation: two big-endian numbers represented each with exactly 32 bytes, concatenated together. mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature uses the ASN.1 DER representation, which as you noticed represents each number in a type+length+value format. The DER format removes leading zeros from the number, then adds a leading 0 bit to each number which is a sign bit (the numbers in an ECDSA signature are always positive, but DER can also represent negative numbers). Therefore each number has a roughly 1/2 chance of using 33 value bytes with a leading 0 byte (1 sign bit + 7 value bits, all 0), a 63/128 chance of using 32 value bytes, and a 1/128 chance of using 31 value bytes or less because the 7 most significant bits of the number were 0. A shorter number in an ECDSA signature is not invalid, it's a 1/128 chance (independently for each of r and s). To get the signature in raw format with Mbed TLS, the easiest way is to use the PSA API, where the output of psa_sign_hash() for ECDSA is the raw format. With the classic Mbed TLS API, the easiest way is to call mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() or mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() to get r and s as bignums, then use mbedtls_mpi_write_binary() to write r and s with their exact size into the output buffer. You can find an example in the internal function psa_ecdsa_sign(): https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/mbedtls-2.24.0/library/psa_crypto.c… Hope this helps, -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 22/11/2020 10:12, ROSHINI DEVI via mbed-tls wrote: > Hello all, > > I need to sign the message using ES256 algorithm. After doing > necessary initializations, I called API > - mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() API and it gave me signature in ASN1 > encoded form and there was no error generated by this API. > After getting the signature, I need the r & s values to create JWT > Token. So, I wrote my custom function to parse the signature buffer > and get the R & S values of it. > It was working fine. Sometimes, I am getting an invalid signature as > shown below signature DER buffer - > > 30 43 02 1f 31 92 8d 22 10 41 86 25 68 7f 42 81 26 0f 37 bc 7f 38 b7 > d5 1a 6b 69 31 07 34 11 a6 04 e5 90 02 20 23 26 f8 b9 80 cf 2c 25 c8 > 04 b4 ac 43 51 6a 04 a6 af 8f 94 36 f8 cf 35 c2 94 cc df de db 92 b2 > > The reason for invalid is - > 1st byte represents ASN1 sequence, followed by length and 3rd byter > indicates it is an integer. > Ideally, 4th byte indicates length of r-value, it should have been 32 > or 33 bytes ( in case of padding with 00 ). You can see in the above > buffer it is 0x1F ( 31 bytes ). It is really weird how it is possible > to get the signature length of 31 bytes. > > It is blocking me for generation of JWT token, where in RFC 7518 > - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#page-9 , it says R & S must be > 32 bytes long. And, the generation is failing. > > It is of high priority for me. If anyone can provide your suggestions > on this issue, it would be really great. Thanks in advance > > Thanks, > Roshini >

5 years

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Invalid ECDSA signature created

by ROSHINI DEVI

Hello all, I need to sign the message using ES256 algorithm. After doing necessary initializations, I called API - mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() API and it gave me signature in ASN1 encoded form and there was no error generated by this API. After getting the signature, I need the r & s values to create JWT Token. So, I wrote my custom function to parse the signature buffer and get the R & S values of it. It was working fine. Sometimes, I am getting an invalid signature as shown below signature DER buffer - 30 43 02 1f 31 92 8d 22 10 41 86 25 68 7f 42 81 26 0f 37 bc 7f 38 b7 d5 1a 6b 69 31 07 34 11 a6 04 e5 90 02 20 23 26 f8 b9 80 cf 2c 25 c8 04 b4 ac 43 51 6a 04 a6 af 8f 94 36 f8 cf 35 c2 94 cc df de db 92 b2 The reason for invalid is - 1st byte represents ASN1 sequence, followed by length and 3rd byter indicates it is an integer. Ideally, 4th byte indicates length of r-value, it should have been 32 or 33 bytes ( in case of padding with 00 ). You can see in the above buffer it is 0x1F ( 31 bytes ). It is really weird how it is possible to get the signature length of 31 bytes. It is blocking me for generation of JWT token, where in RFC 7518 - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#page-9 , it says R & S must be 32 bytes long. And, the generation is failing. It is of high priority for me. If anyone can provide your suggestions on this issue, it would be really great. Thanks in advance Thanks, Roshini

5 years

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-0x7180 - SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed

by Михаил Азанов

Clients connect to my server over SSL and an error "-0x7180 - SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" occurs when creating a secure connection. Linux commands give the following: uname -a Linux termv7 4.15.0-91-generic #92-Ubuntu SMP Fri Feb 28 11:09:48 UTC 2020 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux openssl s_server -key /etc/minpay/cert/TermV-terminals-server.key -cert /etc/minpay/cert/TermV-terminals-server.crt -accept 8080 -state Using default temp DH parameters ACCEPT SSL_accept:before SSL initialization SSL_accept:before SSL initialization SSL_accept:SSLv3/TLS read client hello SSL_accept:SSLv3/TLS write server hello SSL_accept:SSLv3/TLS write certificate SSL_accept:SSLv3/TLS write server done SSL_accept:SSLv3/TLS write server done SSL_accept:SSLv3/TLS read client key exchange SSL_accept:SSLv3/TLS read change cipher spec SSL_accept:SSLv3/TLS read finished SSL_accept:SSLv3/TLS write change cipher spec SSL_accept:SSLv3/TLS write finished -----BEGIN SSL SESSION PARAMETERS----- MHUCAQECAgMBBAIALwQgNbcRsh26hMujwXcoa5ZlBGihMY+GFhkTscR4Ds8fppwE MHAJs/h2ldK+C7Sm2fpNGbzYMycfUPGq4Ydg9PtnHPt1Mn9eH68tnQsT2nuTwGRq zqEGAgRftlMXogQCAhwgpAYEBAEAAAA= -----END SSL SESSION PARAMETERS----- Shared ciphers:AES128-SHA --- No server certificate CA names sent CIPHER is AES128-SHA Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported Source content: File contents TermV-terminals-server.key: subject=/C=RU/ST=Sample/L=Sample/O=Sample/OU=Sample/CN=localhost issuer=/C=RU/ST=Sample/L=Sample/O=Sample/OU=Sample/CN=Sample -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDTjCCAjYCFBhhDBE3BeiTMD0dzFYOGILO8yq0MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMGIx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlJVMQ8wDQYDVQQIDAZTYW1wbGUxDzANBgNVBAcMBlNhbXBsZTEP MA0GA1UECgwGU2FtcGxlMQ8wDQYDVQQLDAZTYW1wbGUxDzANBgNVBAMMBlNhbXBs ZTAeFw0yMDAxMTgxODA5MDlaFw0yNDAxMTcxODA5MDlaMGUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlJV MQ8wDQYDVQQIDAZTYW1wbGUxDzANBgNVBAcMBlNhbXBsZTEPMA0GA1UECgwGU2Ft cGxlMQ8wDQYDVQQLDAZTYW1wbGUxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJ KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALQSjObDf16fv02qH+3FtI4eX2tPfj+u XsSF8KK6OpcNNfHv17LB9NRUGbZdeikvL5mjB1qd8Qt5YBzSYvvNmuQqn/ZZhEhg 9zqDd+j6dsl03OSW42qSP59M22plqhHZv1ZpkbpHSnEbbwbIVhgx1GuJvMHbQKxw et3UobG9M7q0/6Z2hlvbiuQgZWpc6+vnGGFUzVFjJhsUMgewU1UwTtfahOVegv9v ocuj+AOHzzH2+l72ybpKIFKZ6eXjr3sVp1lIPXm+gUNLqkReNV2QVk4H/j2ow3xu hdHjiPQ+6o6dgbCHeCvbf7Qs35S8YlQH/Mn2bik2NIMKucdq7S35AEsCAwEAATAN BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAhANjStGtYfPJ2Ibkbn6ct4bWLPe6sFBvbwYow3Fd lBz0oxBukhJDOrPa4OqJDpnWenXkEcUrulI2JG5sIylOg3QlwlmgPoJU9fkpmr+u xNVlTxBSh1BVp0sccC+LxNRyDMl4C89R1TjPpPjoRU4cciY9N0oygPjTj0c26qBU iqwtyJTeeJYJUdplCMvXFOt8deqi/NBpBGnEfo8P/IeM/iCWLD5VtloHX/R0C+au q6803qd1/Gd0pIdsELQKrR6mBz6sWukg2f25GheLQVV7Wz/elZD8MwYwjYLoCtIP 65Ae3Eb6S2KlsVPzMj09u6kQ+KPfZtKu8tiUSc+11hurRw== -----END CERTIFICATE----- File contents TermV-terminals-server.crt: -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEvwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKkwggSlAgEAAoIBAQC0Eozmw39en79N qh/txbSOHl9rT34/rl7EhfCiujqXDTXx79eywfTUVBm2XXopLy+ZowdanfELeWAc 0mL7zZrkKp/2WYRIYPc6g3fo+nbJdNzkluNqkj+fTNtqZaoR2b9WaZG6R0pxG28G yFYYMdRribzB20CscHrd1KGxvTO6tP+mdoZb24rkIGVqXOvr5xhhVM1RYyYbFDIH sFNVME7X2oTlXoL/b6HLo/gDh88x9vpe9sm6SiBSmenl4697FadZSD15voFDS6pE XjVdkFZOB/49qMN8boXR44j0PuqOnYGwh3gr23+0LN+UvGJUB/zJ9m4pNjSDCrnH au0t+QBLAgMBAAECggEBAKWbKdpQkSME53sVqqeR26uYY0jdos4OHzm9tMDzZE7m 52XJniXYGsHrVnpRHbginTQ+qtS7zKMwzSO0mTPas0iDqvl0+iNWighWQEETl4tO 3peb7Spltf1bQa9oMDCagU2HaW5Xgi7jfAhQ1l0J9sGvutjOO3xbNaQtmUdNKfXa VRaof94/YKcbTPIn588orxfumgeiYwQ8exhA7yg1WLl2iSy9jj+8WrxaKvy4vR45 nXrb2tXletRoZZY/FC/NZNMgXsGTmYHl6blTEZVz7Zu0XPHKJo42tHnKHW46/ccJ vkXQNjUsu0JN95+lWBA5Yne8xddhiLNKv3DZ3iwXRAECgYEA17YaIbtlgSLd5hJJ OuS9n9XNUCEx1YLhDRzhHggPNTZkVxSnxnWVGpbubtWN/OggRtJyk+mLFV+aHLCa R224ofSPWWE1HtoSdtLcL5oLgp6RDoM61h1p1glFS7BpbYzBegAcbMJa1IvAMspx 5lsYowBUJLNHAEcqUrXzQ88gu2ECgYEA1bRugqLGXqz1E0z6o/MuGXfmJaGQEmJg 833As5jzsyd6pyznsB0TKUAJkcf0RmZrr1EDVigA9aLcwq4qThjGEL2FpGkOvXPC bY0c2pLnsZJetNmXnky/w+W127V+LbDjjQaYl/7c9Fp4hoomoykt7d1YW7lRZ2Le wo8muiGF5ysCgYEAlYHahMysop926tJ7vPzzTMfT4JjRQGnQ79S3VqhBWiFT1GM1 kcDHUkGQCnOrUMHWNSABV/FDe9HiL8Zbd+xdTqsBe/J67eI5b+/fuoJrPeIHKebc rbB/PWD5jWc8+zfWlWdkTCE88RnXYZyc6wryfW9p4nH7YP7yH5eKftIdnqECgYBl aWY33/661uDF8/XM742k0F0K5oxz7PONGNPlZmPfVJDD3G9mB6YcISNpZrXo4pmf bJZkwD8UUeDpEbVJsj/rmcRdrO0twk01p41Vu/jvL0J6F/f3SvyFffC6/nmOPS7+ sW6gUnWQD466abzEGLqO8kcH3/1dTnHfagc6tMXSWQKBgQCZjWzyLtEUxvWI2PSe B6/osxlYDyCkXrJDIT1LuepM/54Kre9YMUy2UZBVC42DR6paEbkAAqHdTsLNlKhV s+6/JGnEDR1e/L7ks0dBY8jow04r0mKG1M91SMLr5OeBTk6SRMnR7GAKewjeLmJD ULgsqyHSTh/4r6tDQ7Gayci2vQ== -----END PRIVATE KEY----- File contents ssl_server.h: #ifndef SSL_SERVER_H #define SSL_SERVER_H #define DEBUG_LEVEL 5 #if DEBUG_LEVEL > 0 #include "mbedtls/debug.h" #endif //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" #include "mbedtls/certs.h" #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" #include "packet_handler/packet_handler.h" #include "thread_pool_ssl.h" #include "queue_ssl.h" extern pthread_mutex_t listen_fd1_mutex; extern mbedtls_net_context listen_fd1; extern void* runSSLServer(void *arg); #endif // SSL_SERVER_H File contents ssl_server.c: #include "ssl_server.h" mbedtls_net_context listen_fd1; pthread_mutex_t listen_fd1_mutex=PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER; static mbedtls_ssl_config *config; #if DEBUG_LEVEL > 0 static void my_debug( void *ctx, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *str ) { ((void) level); char s[1000]; snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"%s:%04d: %s", file, line, str ); trace(s); } #endif void * runSSLServer(void *arg) { (void)(arg); int ret; char s[100]; int n = atoi(config_list[SSL_SERVER_NUM_THREADS].value); createThreadPoolSSLArray(n); mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_socket_ssl; const char pers[] = "ssl_pthread_server"; mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; mbedtls_ssl_config conf; mbedtls_x509_crt srvcert; mbedtls_x509_crt cachain; mbedtls_pk_context pkey; mbedtls_ssl_cache_context cache; mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( &cache ); mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &srvcert ); mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cachain ); mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf ); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg ); mbedtls_net_init( &listen_fd ); mbedtls_net_init( &client_socket_ssl ); config = &conf; /* * We use only a single entropy source that is used in all the threads. */ mbedtls_entropy_init( &entropy ); #if DEBUG_LEVEL > 0 mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(DEBUG_LEVEL); #endif /* * 1. Load the certificates and private RSA key */ trace( "[SSL Server] Loading the server cert. and key..." ); ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &srvcert,"/etc/minpay/cert/TermV-terminals-server.crt"); if( ret != 0 ) { snprintf(s,sizeof(s), "[SSL Server] failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file returned %d\n\n", ret ); trace(s); goto thread_exit; } mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey ); ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey,"/etc/minpay/cert/TermV-terminals-server.key" , NULL ); if( ret != 0 ) { snprintf(s,sizeof(s), "[SSL Server] failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned %d\n\n", ret ); trace(s); goto thread_exit; } trace( "[SSL Server] ok\n" ); /* * 1b. Seed the random number generator */ trace( "Seeding the random number generator..." ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( &ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers, strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 ) { snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"[SSL Server] failed: mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%04x\n", -ret ); trace(s); goto thread_exit; } trace( "[SSL Server] ok\n" ); /* * 1c. Prepare SSL configuration */ trace( "[SSL Server] Setting up the SSL data...." ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 ) { snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"[SSL Server] failed: mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned -0x%04x\n", -ret ); trace(s); goto thread_exit; } mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); #if DEBUG_LEVEL > 0 mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, NULL ); #endif /* mbedtls_ssl_cache_get() and mbedtls_ssl_cache_set() are thread-safe if * MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is set. */ mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( &conf, &cache, mbedtls_ssl_cache_get, mbedtls_ssl_cache_set ); mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cachain, NULL ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &srvcert, &pkey ) ) != 0 ) { snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"[SSL Server] failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret ); trace(s); goto thread_exit; } trace( "[SSL Server] ok\n" ); /* * 2. Setup the listening TCP socket */ snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"[SSL Server] Bind on localhost: %s ...","8080"); trace(s); fflush( stdout ); if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_bind( &listen_fd, NULL, "8080", MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP ) ) != 0 ) { snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"[SSL Server] failed\n ! mbedtls_net_bind returned %d\n\n", ret ); trace(s); goto thread_exit; } trace( "[SSL Server] ok\n" ); pthread_mutex_lock(&listen_fd1_mutex); listen_fd1 = listen_fd; pthread_mutex_unlock(&listen_fd1_mutex); while(true) { //reset: if(ret!=0) { char error_buf[100]; mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"[SSL Server] Last error was: -0x%04x - %s\n", -ret, error_buf ); trace(s); } /* * 3. Wait until a client connects */ trace( "[SSL Server] Waiting for a remote connection\n" ); int ret =mbedtls_net_accept(&listen_fd,&client_socket_ssl,NULL,0,NULL); if(ret != 0) { snprintf(s,sizeof(s), "[SSL Server] failed: mbedtls_net_accept returned -0x%04x\n", ret); trace(s); break; } trace( "[SSL Server] ok\n" ); //do whatever we do with connections. //put the connection somewhere so that an available thread //can find it. mbedtls_net_context *pclient = malloc(sizeof(mbedtls_net_context)); *pclient = client_socket_ssl; pthread_mutex_lock(&client_socket_ssl_mutex); enqueue_ssl(pclient); pthread_cond_signal(&condition_var_ssl); pthread_mutex_unlock(&client_socket_ssl_mutex); ret = 0; } thread_exit: mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &srvcert ); mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey ); mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( &cache ); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( &ctr_drbg ); mbedtls_entropy_free( &entropy ); mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf ); mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd ); deleteThreadPoolSSLArray(); return NULL; } static void *handleConnectionSSL(mbedtls_net_context *p_net_context) { int ret, len; char s[100]; struct packet_handler handler={}; handler.net_context = *p_net_context; free(p_net_context);// we really don't need this anymore unsigned char buf[1024]; /* Make sure memory references are valid */ mbedtls_ssl_init( &handler.ssl ); snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"[SSL client_socket=%d] Setting up SSL/TLS data\n", handler.net_context.fd ); trace(s); /* * 4. Get the SSL context ready */ if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &handler.ssl, config ) ) != 0 ) { snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"[SSL client_socket=%d] failed: mbedtls_ssl_setup returned -0x%04x\n",handler.net_context.fd, -ret ); trace(s); goto thread_exit; } mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &handler.ssl, (mbedtls_net_context*)&handler.net_context, mbedtls_net_send, mbedtls_net_recv, NULL ); /* * 5. Handshake */ snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"[SSL client_socket=%d] Performing the SSL/TLS handshake\n", handler.net_context.fd); trace(s); while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &handler.ssl ) ) != 0 ) { if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) { snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"[SSL client_socket=%d] failed: mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%04x\n", handler.net_context.fd, -ret ); trace(s); goto thread_exit; } } snprintf(s,sizeof(s),"[SSL client_socket=%d] ok\n", handler.net_context.fd ); trace(s); ret = runPacketHandler(&handler); snprintf(s,sizeof(s), "[SSL client_socket=%d] . Closing the connection...", handler.net_context.fd ); trace(s); while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &handler.ssl ) ) < 0 ) { if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ) { snprintf(s,sizeof(s), "[SSL client_socket=%d] failed: mbedtls_ssl_close_notify returned -0x%04x\n", handler.net_context.fd, ret); trace(s); goto thread_exit; } } trace( " ok\n" ); ret = 0; thread_exit: if( ret != 0 ) { char error_buf[100]; mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 ); snprintf(s,sizeof(s), "[SSL client_socket=%d] Last error was: -0x%04x - %s\n\n", handler.net_context.fd, -ret, error_buf ); trace(s); } mbedtls_net_free((mbedtls_net_context*)&handler.net_context); mbedtls_ssl_free(&handler.ssl); return NULL; } void *threadFunctionSSL(void *arg) { (void)(arg); while(true) { mbedtls_net_context *pclient; pthread_mutex_lock(&client_socket_ssl_mutex); if((pclient=dequeue_ssl())==NULL) { pthread_cond_wait((pthread_cond_t *)&pclient,&client_socket_ssl_mutex); //try again pclient = dequeue_ssl(); } pthread_mutex_unlock(&client_socket_ssl_mutex); if(pclient!=NULL) { //we have a connection handleConnectionSSL(pclient); } } } File contents thread_pool_ssl.h: #ifndef SSL_THREAD_POOL_H #define SSL_THREAD_POOL_H #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdbool.h> #include <pthread.h> #include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" extern pthread_t *thread_pool_ssl; extern pthread_mutex_t client_socket_ssl_mutex; extern pthread_cond_t condition_var_ssl; void createThreadPoolSSLArray(int n); void deleteThreadPoolSSLArray(); extern void *handleSSLConnection(int* p_client_socket); extern void *threadFunctionSSL(void *arg); #endif // SSL_THREAD_POOL_H File contents thread_pool_ssl.c: #include "thread_pool_ssl.h" pthread_t *thread_pool_ssl=NULL; pthread_mutex_t client_socket_ssl_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER; pthread_cond_t condition_var_ssl = PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER; void *threadFunctionSSL(void *arg); void createThreadPoolSSLArray(int n) { thread_pool_ssl = (pthread_t*)malloc(n); //first off create a bunch of threads to handle future connections for(int i=0; i<n;i++) { pthread_create(&thread_pool_ssl[i],NULL,threadFunctionSSL,NULL); } } void deleteThreadPoolSSLArray() { free(thread_pool_ssl); } File contents main.c: #include <stdio.h> #include "log.h" #include "ssl_server.h" #include <signal.h> void catchSigterm(); void catchSigint(); void runPortListening(); int main() { catchSigterm(); catchSigint(); runPortListening(); return 0; } void runPortListening() { trace("Starting port listening..."); pthread_t handleID; pthread_create(&handleID,NULL,runSSLServer,NULL); trace("Port listening started."); pthread_join(handleID,NULL); trace("Port listening complete."); } void closeServer() { trace("Shutdown SSL Server..."); pthread_mutex_lock(&listen_fd1_mutex); mbedtls_net_free(&listen_fd1); pthread_mutex_unlock(&listen_fd1_mutex); } void sigTermHandler(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *ptr) { (void)signum; (void)info; (void)ptr; closeServer(); } void catchSigterm() { static struct sigaction _sigact; memset(&_sigact, 0, sizeof(_sigact)); _sigact.sa_sigaction = sigTermHandler; _sigact.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; sigaction(SIGTERM, &_sigact, NULL); } void sigIntHandler(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *ptr) { (void)signum; (void)info; (void)ptr; closeServer(); } void catchSigint() { static struct sigaction _sigact; memset(&_sigact, 0, sizeof(_sigact)); _sigact.sa_sigaction = sigIntHandler; _sigact.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; sigaction(SIGINT, &_sigact, NULL); } Log files attached to the email. Regards, Michael.

5 years

1
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Info regarding Mbedtls architecture

by Eikansh Gupta

Hi everyone, I am a Mtech student from Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore(India). Currently, I am crediting computer security course. As the course project, the professor has asked us to rewrite Mbedtls using Rust language. The entire class will work on the single project with each person working on a single module. I am having trouble finding information regarding Mbedtls architecture, its modules and their working. I don't even know all the right resources I need to work on the project. It would save a lot of time if someone could point me to the right resources regarding Mbedtls needed for this project. Sincerely, Eikansh Gupta

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] PKCS7 compliance

by Gilles Peskine

I forgot to mention that there is a work in progress to add PKCS#7 parsing: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/3431 This is an external contribution so its addition to Mbed TLS depends not only on us maintainers' review bandwidth, but also on the availability of the kind contributor. I'm not familiar with .p7* formats so I don't know whether the support added by this pull request is sufficient to cover all of those. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 06/11/2020 13:50, Alvaro Gonzalez via mbed-tls wrote: > > Hello mbed-tls mailing list. > > ï¿½ > > Does mbed-tls comply PKCS7? Can handle .p7, .p7b and/or .p7a extension > files? > > ï¿½ > > Best Regards. > > ï¿½ > >

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] PKCS7 Generation Contribution

by Gilles Peskine

Hi Nick, It would be great to have even partial support of PKCS#7 in Mbed TLS and we would welcome your contribution! You can find some guidance in CONTRIBUTING.md (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/development/CONTRIBUTING.md). Feel free to ask on the mailing list if anything is unclear. Note that there is a work in progress for adding PKCS#7 parsing: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/3431 . It may help to see what it does, but also note the review comments that point out some remaining issues. If you and naynajain work on parsing and generation at the same time, you'll need to synchronize since both sides will need to create pkcs7.[hc]. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 10/11/2020 17:28, Nick Child via mbed-tls wrote: > Hello, > > For one of my projects, I had to create a PKCS7 generation/builder. I > noticed mbedtls currently has no support for PKCS7. After much trial > and error, I was able to use mbedtls functions to create a PKCS7 > structure for Signed Data. I was wondering if this something that > might be useful in later versions of mbedtls? The code currently has a > long way to go until it meets mbedtls coding standards, but I figured > I would ask if it is even possible and worth the efforts before > getting into it. I am also a rookie when it comes to open source > contributions, so I was hoping for some guidance regarding merging > upstream. > > Thanks for your time, > > Nick Child >

5 years, 1 month

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PKCS7 Generation Contribution

by Nick Child

Hello, For one of my projects, I had to create a PKCS7 generation/builder. I noticed mbedtls currently has no support for PKCS7. After much trial and error, I was able to use mbedtls functions to create a PKCS7 structure for Signed Data. I was wondering if this something that might be useful in later versions of mbedtls? The code currently has a long way to go until it meets mbedtls coding standards, but I figured I would ask if it is even possible and worth the efforts before getting into it. I am also a rookie when it comes to open source contributions, so I was hoping for some guidance regarding merging upstream. Thanks for your time, Nick Child

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] PKCS7 compliance

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, No, unfortunately Mbed TLS does not support the PKCS#7 CMS format. Contributions would be welcome. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 06/11/2020 13:50, Alvaro Gonzalez via mbed-tls wrote: > > Hello mbed-tls mailing list. > > ï¿½ > > Does mbed-tls comply PKCS7? Can handle .p7, .p7b and/or .p7a extension > files? > > ï¿½ > > Best Regards. > > ï¿½ > >

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] TLS-SRP Support

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, Mbed TLS does not currently support SRP and it is not on our roadmap (https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/roadmap/). Arm does not intend to work on it, but support can be added if someone else contributes it. If you are interested in contributing SRP support, please discuss it on this list first to settle some potential issues: conflicts with other work (in particular TLS 1.3 preparation, which involves some refactoring of existing TLS code), review bandwidth schedule, test plan. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 09/11/2020 14:01, Gijs Peskens via mbed-tls wrote: > > For an Open Source project we started using Mbed-TLS to do AES > encryption and, in a future version, will use Mbed-TLS for DTLS. > Part of the protocol we support requires TLS-SRP (either via DTLS or > via EAP), I’m unable to find anything relating to TLS-SRP support. > > Does Mbed-TLS support TLS-SRP currently? And if not is there intention > to add it in a future release? > > Br, > > Gijs Peskens > >

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] TLS-SRP Support

by Janos Follath

Hi Gijs, I am not sure what TLS-SRP support is, could you please point me to the standard defining it? Best regards, Janos From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Gijs Peskens via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Gijs Peskens <gijsje(a)heteigenwijsje.nl> Date: Monday, 9 November 2020 at 13:02 To: "mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] TLS-SRP Support For an Open Source project we started using Mbed-TLS to do AES encryption and, in a future version, will use Mbed-TLS for DTLS. Part of the protocol we support requires TLS-SRP (either via DTLS or via EAP), I’m unable to find anything relating to TLS-SRP support. Does Mbed-TLS support TLS-SRP currently? And if not is there intention to add it in a future release? Br, Gijs Peskens

5 years, 1 month

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TLS-SRP Support

by Gijs Peskens

For an Open Source project we started using Mbed-TLS to do AES encryption and, in a future version, will use Mbed-TLS for DTLS. Part of the protocol we support requires TLS-SRP (either via DTLS or via EAP), I’m unable to find anything relating to TLS-SRP support. Does Mbed-TLS support TLS-SRP currently? And if not is there intention to add it in a future release? Br, Gijs Peskens

5 years, 1 month

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PKCS7 compliance

by Alvaro Gonzalez

Hello mbed-tls mailing list. Does mbed-tls comply PKCS7? Can handle .p7, .p7b and/or .p7a extension files? Best Regards.

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] Chinese characters garbled after calling mbedtls_x509_crt_info() or mbedtls_x509_dn_gets()

by Janos Follath

Hi Newt, This is normal and happens not just to Chinese characters, but to all non-ASCII characters. This supposed to be a feature of Mbed TLS, to ensure that we return something printable whether the platform can handle the original encoding or not. Of course we can consider providing a way to add an option to disable this feature: if you would like to submit a PR, please let us discuss first what can be done. If you wouldn't like to submit a PR, then please raise an issue on github for this feature request. Until this feature is implemented, you can access the original encoding in the `val` field of the `mbedtls_x509_name` parameter you would be passing to `mbedtls_x509_dn_gets()`. Regards, Janos On 06/11/2020, 03:54, "mbed-tls on behalf of 马瑞宜 via mbed-tls" <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: Hello everyone, I have this certificate blob and I'm using mbedtls to read this, but after called mbedtls_x509_crt_info() or mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(), the chinese characters got garbled. I have googled this, read the mbedtls knowledge base and searched the issues and got no luck. The field i want to parse is the subject field and the issuer field. and currently I cannot provide the certificate blob due to security reasons. Any help would be much appreciated. Sincerely, Newt Ma -- mbed-tls mailing list mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls

5 years, 1 month

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Chinese characters garbled after calling mbedtls_x509_crt_info() or mbedtls_x509_dn_gets()

by 马瑞宜

Hello everyone, I have this certificate blob and I'm using mbedtls to read this, but after called mbedtls_x509_crt_info() or mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(), the chinese characters got garbled. I have googled this, read the mbedtls knowledge base and searched the issues and got no luck. The field i want to parse is the subject field and the issuer field. and currently I cannot provide the certificate blob due to security reasons. Any help would be much appreciated. Sincerely, Newt Ma

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] About mbedtls CVE

by Janos Follath

Hi Sawyer, After looking at the issues in more detail I would like to be more precise about CVE-2018-1000520: * It is not a security issue in the context of TLS 1.2 * It can be a security issue if TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 is used * The severity is so low that we decided not fixing it ourselves, but to open it up for community contributions * The corresponding issue has been closed down by mistake, I am reopening it now: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/1561 (Many thanks to Simon Butcher for noticing this and pointing it out.) Please let me know if I you would like to know more about this issue. Best regards, Janos (Mbed TLS developer) From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Janos Follath via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Janos Follath <Janos.Follath(a)arm.com> Date: Wednesday, 28 October 2020 at 09:42 To: Sawyer Liu <sawyer.liu(a)nxp.com> Cc: "mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [mbed-tls] About mbedtls CVE Hi Sawyer, Thank you for your interest in Mbed TLS. Currently the status of these CVE’s is: - CVE-2020-16150 has been fixed in the latest Mbed TLS release - CVE-2018-1000520 is not a security issue, it had been studied and rejected - CVE-2016-3739 is a vulnerability in an application using Mbed TLS but not in Mbed TLS itself, also it too had been fixed. Does this answer your question? (Also, I would like to make a minor clarification: we are not Arm Support. As far as I know Arm does not offer official support for Mbed TLS. Arm only contributes engineers to the Mbed TLS project, and at the moment these engineers are the maintainers of Mbed TLS. We are on this mailing list and try to answer questions, but we are not doing that as official support provided by Arm, but as members of the community. Mbed TLS is supported by the community and this mailing list is indeed the right place to get that support. I apologise for the nitpick, I just wanted to make sure that we are not giving the wrong impressions.) Best regards, Janos (Mbed TLS developer) From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Sawyer Liu via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Sawyer Liu <sawyer.liu(a)nxp.com> Date: Wednesday, 28 October 2020 at 01:59 To: "mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] About mbedtls CVE Hello ARM Support, About below CVEs, any update? Thanks. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-16150<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcve.mitre…> https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-1000520 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-3739 Best Regards Sawyer Liu Microcontrollers, NXP Semiconductors

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] Questions about PSA Crypto API and mbed TLS

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, On 05/11/2020 17:49, François Beerten via mbed-tls wrote: > Hi, > > Thank you Gilles for the detailed reply. > > Do you prefer that discussion about PSA Crypto API spec go on mailing > list instead of here ? Is there some room for evolution or is the spec > already in a frozen released state ? Please use the psa-crypto list since there may be participants there who don't care about Mbed TLS. Version 1.0 of the PSA Crypto API is official so we won't make incompatible changes unless there is a compelling reason. We can, and will, add features in 1.x versions of the specification. Among planned features are: more algorithm declarations, key wrapping, key stretching, and a better treatment of key establishment (including password-based key establishment). > > For new algorithms, it's of course preferable that they're defined in > the spec itself. But does the mbedtls project want to supports all > algorithms that will be used with PSA Crypto API ? Mbed TLS intends to be a reference implementation of the PSA crypto API. However it isn't clear whether this means that Mbed TLS will eventually support all algorithms that the API declares: we intend to support all methods, but not necessarily all algorithms. A conforming implementation of the API is allowed to support any subset of the algorithms. We (here meaning Arm, not Mbed TLS) don't have a formal policy to decide whether to include a declaration for an algorithm, but here are some criteria that we're likely to follow: * There should be a public specification. (This can be a document that's only for purchase, such as an ISO standard.) * The algorithm should either be in good standing, or in current use in legacy protocols. * The bar is low for adding an algorithm that just requires a #define. It's a lot higher if a new function is needed. * Availability in Mbed TLS is not required. > > For pure ED25519 and ED448 with scattered data, there's one big > gotcha. You need to generate twice a hash that includes the message. > Thus the implementation needs to be able to access the buffers of the > message twice. With a piece of the message given only once as in the > init-update-finish scheme, that does not work well. > > From reading the document on the PSA Crypto driver API, a transparent > driver benefits from the management of keys done by the mbedtls > implementation. But what benefit is there for a driver working with > opaque keys which has to fully handle the protections and restrictions > of keys internally ? > One of the driving goals of PSA is to make security unobtrusive, and to facilitate security improvements. A unified interface to key management makes it easy to upgrade from having all keys inside, to using a single-chip application separation technology (MMU, MPU, secure enclave, …), to wrapping keys in a secure element and storing the wrapped key externally, to storing keys in a secure element (which protects against undeletion). When an application uses a key, it doesn't need to care where the key is stored. Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine > Best, > > François. > > > On 11/2/20 11:01 PM, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: >> Hello, >> >> Thank you for your interest in the PSA crypto API. >> >> On 28/10/2020 15:20, François Beerten via mbed-tls wrote: >>> Hi everybody, >>> >>> After reading the PSA Crypto API specs (as on >>> https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/overview/functionality.html) >>> and looking at the mbed TLS library, a few questions came up. >>> >>> Is there some repository with the sources of the PSA Crypto API specs >>> where one can follow the evolution and eventually send proposals and >>> patches ? >>> >> The PSA specification drafts are not public. You can send feedback about >> the PSA Crypto application and driver interfaces on the psa-crypto >> mailing list (psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org, >> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/psa-crypto). If you >> prefer to send confidential feedback, you can email mbed-crypto(a)arm.com >> (feedback at this address will only be discussed inside Arm). An issue >> in the Mbed TLS repository will also reach PSA Crypto architects. >> >>> A note says "Hash suspend and resume is not defined for the SHA3 >>> family of hash algorithms". Why are they not defined for SHA3 ? >>> >> The hash suspend/resume operations marshall the internal state of the >> hash operation. They mimic an existing JavaCard API >> (https://docs.oracle.com/javacard/3.0.5/api/javacard/security/InitializedMes…). >> >> There is a de facto standard representation of the internal state for >> common Merkle-Damgård constructions, which covers all the currently >> defined hash algorithms except SHA3. If there's interest in this >> functionality, we could standardize a representation for SHA3. >> >>> How can or should one add support in PSA Crypto AP for not yet defined >>> algorithms (for example a KDF) ? >>> >> Answer from a PSA Crypto architect: preferably by requesting an encoding >> for this KDF as a PSA_ALG_xxx value (as well as new >> PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx values if applicable). If you can't do >> that, use an encoding in the vendor range (most significant bit set). >> >> The world of key derivation functions is unfortunately messy: there are >> many similar, but not functionally equivalent constructions (such as >> hashing a secret together with a nonce, formatted in all kinds of >> different ways). The set of KDF in PSA Crypto 1.0.0 was the minimum set >> required for the TLS protocol. We expect 1.0.x updates to define more >> KDF algorithms. >> >> Answer from an Mbed TLS maintainer: contributing an implementation would >> be appreciated (but not required). >> >>> In multipart operations, can the user reuse the input buffers >>> immediately after doing an 'update' (for example after >>> psa_hash_update()) ? And can he reuse the input buffers immediately >>> after some "setup" functions like psa_cipher_set_iv() or >>> psa_aead_set_nonce() ? >>> >> Yes. PSA crypto API functions that take a buffer as a parameter never >> take ownership of that buffer. Once the function returns, you can do >> whatever you want with the buffer. >> >> The PSA specification even guarantees that you can use the same buffer, >> or overlapping buffers, as inputs and outputs to the same function call. >> However beware that the Mbed TLS implementation does not always support >> such overlap (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3266). >> >>> Do you plan to support (pure) ED25519 and ED448 only via >>> psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message() ? What about messages in >>> multiple chunks ? >>> >> We plan to add a multi-part message signature interface, both for the >> sake of pureEdDSA and suitable for Mbed TLS's restartable ECDSA. I >> expect the design to be “what you'd expect” but I haven't yet verified >> that there aren't any gotchas. >> >>> In psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), why is the salt provided explicitely. >>> Shouldn't it be generated randomly internally when needed ? >>> >> Some applications use a fixed or deterministic salt which they check on >> decryption. Note that this parameter is what PKCS#1 calls “label”. >> >>> With PSA Crypto API, you define a flexible API for cryptographic >>> operations. Apparently, other providers could make their own >>> implementation of PSA Crypto API. Will mbed TLS then be able to use >>> those alternate PSA Crypto API implementations ? How would that work >>> practically ? >>> >> The X.509 and TLS layer of Mbed TLS are currently designed to use the >> mbedtls_xxx crypto API. We have already added partial support for the >> psa_xxx crypto API (with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO), however it is not yet >> possible to fully decouple the X.509/TLS layers from the Mbed TLS crypto >> implementation. (I think this is already possible for a small set of >> cipher suites, but it isn't something that we've tried or currently >> actively support.) Before this can happen, some Mbed TLS APIs need to >> change, which will happen in 2021 with Mbed TLS 3.0. After that, we plan >> to decouple the PSA crypto reference implementation (Mbed TLS's current >> crypto implementation) from the X.509/TLS layer (which will remain “Mbed >> TLS”). Our plans >> (https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/roadmap/) that far >> into the future are still vague and may change. >> >> Note that for the most common case of wanting a different implementation >> of cryptography, which is to leverage hardware such as accelerators and >> secure elements, PSA is defining a driver interface which is currently >> being implemented in Mbed TLS >> (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/proposed/psa-drive…). >> >> The driver interface lets you combine mechanisms supported by your >> hardware with Mbed TLS's implementation for mechanisms without hardware >> support. >>

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Tomorrow

by Shebu Varghese Kuriakose

Hi Francois, The workshop slides and recordings are now available here - https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/ Regards, Shebu From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of François Beerten via mbed-tls Sent: Thursday, November 5, 2020 4:52 PM To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [mbed-tls] Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Tomorrow Hi Shebu, Will you post the slides of the presentations of the workshop ? Thanks, François. On 11/2/20 9:01 PM, Shebu Varghese Kuriakose via mbed-tls wrote: Hi All, Gentle reminder about the Mbed TLS workshop tomorrow (Tuesday, November 3rd) from 2 to 6pm GMT. See agenda and zoom link here - https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/ Thanks, Shebu -----Original Appointment----- From: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings <linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c(a)group.calendar.google.com><mailto:linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c@group.calendar.google.com> Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 12:32 AM To: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose; mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Don Harbin; psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Dave Rodgman Subject: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 2:00 PM-6:00 PM (UTC+00:00) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London. Where: Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… You have been invited to the following event. Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When Tue Nov 3, 2020 7am – 11am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Where Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… (map<https://www.google.com/maps/search/Zoom:+https:%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj…>) Calendar shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> Who • Don Harbin - creator • shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> • mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • dave.rodgman(a)arm.com<mailto:dave.rodgman@arm.com> more details »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Hi, Trustedfirmware.org community project would like to invite you to the Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop. The purpose of the workshop is to bring together the Mbed TLS community including maintainers, contributors and users to discuss * The future direction of the project and * Ways to improve community collaboration Here is the agenda for the workshop. Topic Time (in GMT) Welcome 2.00 - 2.10pm Constant-time code 2.10 – 2.30pm Processes - how does work get scheduled? 2.30 – 2.50pm PSA Crypto APIs 2.50 – 3.20pm PSA Crypto for Silicon Labs Wireless MCUs - Why, What, Where and When 3.20 – 3.50pm Break Roadmap, TLS1.3 Update 4.10 – 4.30pm Mbed TLS 3.0 Plans, Scope 4.30 – 5.00pm How do I contribute my first review and be an effective Mbed TLS reviewer 5.00 – 5.30pm Regards, Don Harbin Trusted Firmware Community Manager ==============Zoom details below:==================== Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Time: Nov 3, 2020 02:00 PM Greenwich Mean Time Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT…<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9531520…> Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Passcode: 143755 One tap mobile +16699009128,,95315200315# US (San Jose) +12532158782,,95315200315# US (Tacoma) Dial by your location +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/apL3hgti4<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fu%2FapL3hgt…> Going (shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com>)? 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5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Tomorrow

by François Beerten

Hi Shebu, Will you post the slides of the presentations of the workshop ? Thanks, François. On 11/2/20 9:01 PM, Shebu Varghese Kuriakose via mbed-tls wrote: > > Hi All, > > Gentle reminder about the Mbed TLS workshop tomorrow (Tuesday, > November 3^rd ) from 2 to 6pm GMT. > > See agenda and zoom link here - > https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/ > <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/> > > Thanks, > > Shebu > > -----Original Appointment----- > *From:* Trusted Firmware Public Meetings > <linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c(a)group.calendar.google.com> > *Sent:* Friday, October 23, 2020 12:32 AM > *To:* Trusted Firmware Public Meetings; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose; > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Don Harbin; > psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Dave Rodgman > *Subject:* Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop > *When:* Tuesday, November 3, 2020 2:00 PM-6:00 PM (UTC+00:00) Dublin, > Edinburgh, Lisbon, London. > *Where:* Zoom: > https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… > > > *You have been invited to the following event.* > > > Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop > > When > > > > Tue Nov 3, 2020 7am – 11am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix > > Where > > > > Zoom: > https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… > (map > <https://www.google.com/maps/search/Zoom:+https:%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj…>) > > Calendar > > > > shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com <mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> > > Who > > > > • > > > > Don Harbin- creator > > • > > > > shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com <mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> > > • > > > > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > <mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > > • > > > > psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > <mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > > • > > > > dave.rodgman(a)arm.com <mailto:dave.rodgman@arm.com> > > *more details » > <https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…>*** > > Hi, > Trustedfirmware.org community project would like to invite you to the > Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop. > > The purpose of the workshop is to bring together the Mbed TLS > community including maintainers, contributors and users to discuss > > * The future direction of the project and > * Ways to improve community collaboration > > Here is the agenda for the workshop. > > *Topic Time (in GMT)* > Welcome 2.00 - 2.10pm > Constant-time code 2.10 – 2.30pm > Processes - how does work get scheduled? 2.30 – 2.50pm > PSA Crypto APIs 2.50 – 3.20pm > PSA Crypto for Silicon Labs Wireless > MCUs - Why, What, Where and When 3.20 – 3.50pm > > *Break * > > Roadmap, TLS1.3 Update 4.10 – 4.30pm > Mbed TLS 3.0 Plans, Scope 4.30 – 5.00pm > How do I contribute my first review > and be an effective Mbed TLS reviewer 5.00 – 5.30pm > > Regards, > > Don Harbin > Trusted Firmware Community Manager > > > ==============Zoom details below:==================== > Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. > > Topic: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop > Time: Nov 3, 2020 02:00 PM Greenwich Mean Time > > Join Zoom Meeting > https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… > <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9531520…> > > Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 > Passcode: 143755 > One tap mobile > +16699009128,,95315200315# US (San Jose) > +12532158782,,95315200315# US (Tacoma) > > Dial by your location > +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) > +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) > +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) > +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) > +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) > +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) > 888 788 0099 US Toll-free > 877 853 5247 US Toll-free > Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 > Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/apL3hgti4 > <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fu%2FapL3hgt…> > > Going (shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com > <mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com>)? *Yes > <https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…>**- > **Maybe > <https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…>**- > **No > <https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…>*more > options » > <https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> > > Invitation from Google Calendar <https://www.google.com/calendar/> > > You are receiving this courtesy email at the account > shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com > <mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> because you are an attendee > of this event. > > To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. > Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at > https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification > settings for your entire calendar. > > Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a > response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite > others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your > RSVP. Learn More > <https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding>. > >

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] Questions about PSA Crypto API and mbed TLS

by François Beerten

Hi, Thank you Gilles for the detailed reply. Do you prefer that discussion about PSA Crypto API spec go on mailing list instead of here ? Is there some room for evolution or is the spec already in a frozen released state ? For new algorithms, it's of course preferable that they're defined in the spec itself. But does the mbedtls project want to supports all algorithms that will be used with PSA Crypto API ? For pure ED25519 and ED448 with scattered data, there's one big gotcha. You need to generate twice a hash that includes the message. Thus the implementation needs to be able to access the buffers of the message twice. With a piece of the message given only once as in the init-update-finish scheme, that does not work well. From reading the document on the PSA Crypto driver API, a transparent driver benefits from the management of keys done by the mbedtls implementation. But what benefit is there for a driver working with opaque keys which has to fully handle the protections and restrictions of keys internally ? Best, François. On 11/2/20 11:01 PM, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote: > Hello, > > Thank you for your interest in the PSA crypto API. > > On 28/10/2020 15:20, François Beerten via mbed-tls wrote: >> Hi everybody, >> >> After reading the PSA Crypto API specs (as on >> https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/overview/functionality.html) >> and looking at the mbed TLS library, a few questions came up. >> >> Is there some repository with the sources of the PSA Crypto API specs >> where one can follow the evolution and eventually send proposals and >> patches ? >> > The PSA specification drafts are not public. You can send feedback about > the PSA Crypto application and driver interfaces on the psa-crypto > mailing list (psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org, > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/psa-crypto). If you > prefer to send confidential feedback, you can email mbed-crypto(a)arm.com > (feedback at this address will only be discussed inside Arm). An issue > in the Mbed TLS repository will also reach PSA Crypto architects. > >> A note says "Hash suspend and resume is not defined for the SHA3 >> family of hash algorithms". Why are they not defined for SHA3 ? >> > The hash suspend/resume operations marshall the internal state of the > hash operation. They mimic an existing JavaCard API > (https://docs.oracle.com/javacard/3.0.5/api/javacard/security/InitializedMes…). > There is a de facto standard representation of the internal state for > common Merkle-Damgård constructions, which covers all the currently > defined hash algorithms except SHA3. If there's interest in this > functionality, we could standardize a representation for SHA3. > >> How can or should one add support in PSA Crypto AP for not yet defined >> algorithms (for example a KDF) ? >> > Answer from a PSA Crypto architect: preferably by requesting an encoding > for this KDF as a PSA_ALG_xxx value (as well as new > PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx values if applicable). If you can't do > that, use an encoding in the vendor range (most significant bit set). > > The world of key derivation functions is unfortunately messy: there are > many similar, but not functionally equivalent constructions (such as > hashing a secret together with a nonce, formatted in all kinds of > different ways). The set of KDF in PSA Crypto 1.0.0 was the minimum set > required for the TLS protocol. We expect 1.0.x updates to define more > KDF algorithms. > > Answer from an Mbed TLS maintainer: contributing an implementation would > be appreciated (but not required). > >> In multipart operations, can the user reuse the input buffers >> immediately after doing an 'update' (for example after >> psa_hash_update()) ? And can he reuse the input buffers immediately >> after some "setup" functions like psa_cipher_set_iv() or >> psa_aead_set_nonce() ? >> > Yes. PSA crypto API functions that take a buffer as a parameter never > take ownership of that buffer. Once the function returns, you can do > whatever you want with the buffer. > > The PSA specification even guarantees that you can use the same buffer, > or overlapping buffers, as inputs and outputs to the same function call. > However beware that the Mbed TLS implementation does not always support > such overlap (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3266). > >> Do you plan to support (pure) ED25519 and ED448 only via >> psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message() ? What about messages in >> multiple chunks ? >> > We plan to add a multi-part message signature interface, both for the > sake of pureEdDSA and suitable for Mbed TLS's restartable ECDSA. I > expect the design to be “what you'd expect” but I haven't yet verified > that there aren't any gotchas. > >> In psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), why is the salt provided explicitely. >> Shouldn't it be generated randomly internally when needed ? >> > Some applications use a fixed or deterministic salt which they check on > decryption. Note that this parameter is what PKCS#1 calls “label”. > >> With PSA Crypto API, you define a flexible API for cryptographic >> operations. Apparently, other providers could make their own >> implementation of PSA Crypto API. Will mbed TLS then be able to use >> those alternate PSA Crypto API implementations ? How would that work >> practically ? >> > The X.509 and TLS layer of Mbed TLS are currently designed to use the > mbedtls_xxx crypto API. We have already added partial support for the > psa_xxx crypto API (with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO), however it is not yet > possible to fully decouple the X.509/TLS layers from the Mbed TLS crypto > implementation. (I think this is already possible for a small set of > cipher suites, but it isn't something that we've tried or currently > actively support.) Before this can happen, some Mbed TLS APIs need to > change, which will happen in 2021 with Mbed TLS 3.0. After that, we plan > to decouple the PSA crypto reference implementation (Mbed TLS's current > crypto implementation) from the X.509/TLS layer (which will remain “Mbed > TLS”). Our plans > (https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/roadmap/) that far > into the future are still vague and may change. > > Note that for the most common case of wanting a different implementation > of cryptography, which is to leverage hardware such as accelerators and > secure elements, PSA is defining a driver interface which is currently > being implemented in Mbed TLS > (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/proposed/psa-drive…). > The driver interface lets you combine mechanisms supported by your > hardware with Mbed TLS's implementation for mechanisms without hardware > support. >

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] Write private key into buffer using encrypted PEM format

by Janos Follath

Hi Mate, I had a look and I couldn’t find such a feature implemented either. I don’t think that Mbed TLS supports that at the moment. Best regards, Janos From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of "Z.Máté via mbed-tls" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: "Z.Máté" <enleszekakalozkiraly(a)gmail.com> Date: Monday, 2 November 2020 at 21:01 To: "mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] Write private key into buffer using encrypted PEM format Dear mbedtls list members! Sorry if this is the second time I ask, I'm not sure the previous question is still on the list. I'm asking if there's a way to export a private key into a buffer in an encrypted format. So that mbedtls_pk_parse_key() has to be called with a password. In the example program key_app.c (I hope that's how it's called) I can see there are password encrypted PEM formatted keys. But how to generate one? For clarity, this is the type of header I'm looking for. —–BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY—– Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,AB8E2B5B2D989271273F6730B6F9C687 ………………………………………………. ………………………………………………. ……………………………………… —–END RSA PRIVATE KEY—– I was only able to generate something like this by, using command line openssl. But I'd like a better solution, in code, using mbedtls. Yours Zombor Máté

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] Questions about PSA Crypto API and mbed TLS

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, Thank you for your interest in the PSA crypto API. On 28/10/2020 15:20, François Beerten via mbed-tls wrote: > > Hi everybody, > > After reading the PSA Crypto API specs (as on > https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/overview/functionality.html) > and looking at the mbed TLS library, a few questions came up. > > Is there some repository with the sources of the PSA Crypto API specs > where one can follow the evolution and eventually send proposals and > patches ? > The PSA specification drafts are not public. You can send feedback about the PSA Crypto application and driver interfaces on the psa-crypto mailing list (psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org, https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/psa-crypto). If you prefer to send confidential feedback, you can email mbed-crypto(a)arm.com (feedback at this address will only be discussed inside Arm). An issue in the Mbed TLS repository will also reach PSA Crypto architects. > A note says "Hash suspend and resume is not defined for the SHA3 > family of hash algorithms". Why are they not defined for SHA3 ? > The hash suspend/resume operations marshall the internal state of the hash operation. They mimic an existing JavaCard API (https://docs.oracle.com/javacard/3.0.5/api/javacard/security/InitializedMes…). There is a de facto standard representation of the internal state for common Merkle-Damgård constructions, which covers all the currently defined hash algorithms except SHA3. If there's interest in this functionality, we could standardize a representation for SHA3. > How can or should one add support in PSA Crypto AP for not yet defined > algorithms (for example a KDF) ? > Answer from a PSA Crypto architect: preferably by requesting an encoding for this KDF as a PSA_ALG_xxx value (as well as new PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx values if applicable). If you can't do that, use an encoding in the vendor range (most significant bit set). The world of key derivation functions is unfortunately messy: there are many similar, but not functionally equivalent constructions (such as hashing a secret together with a nonce, formatted in all kinds of different ways). The set of KDF in PSA Crypto 1.0.0 was the minimum set required for the TLS protocol. We expect 1.0.x updates to define more KDF algorithms. Answer from an Mbed TLS maintainer: contributing an implementation would be appreciated (but not required). > In multipart operations, can the user reuse the input buffers > immediately after doing an 'update' (for example after > psa_hash_update()) ? And can he reuse the input buffers immediately > after some "setup" functions like psa_cipher_set_iv() or > psa_aead_set_nonce() ? > Yes. PSA crypto API functions that take a buffer as a parameter never take ownership of that buffer. Once the function returns, you can do whatever you want with the buffer. The PSA specification even guarantees that you can use the same buffer, or overlapping buffers, as inputs and outputs to the same function call. However beware that the Mbed TLS implementation does not always support such overlap (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/3266). > Do you plan to support (pure) ED25519 and ED448 only via > psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message() ? What about messages in > multiple chunks ? > We plan to add a multi-part message signature interface, both for the sake of pureEdDSA and suitable for Mbed TLS's restartable ECDSA. I expect the design to be “what you'd expect” but I haven't yet verified that there aren't any gotchas. > In psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), why is the salt provided explicitely. > Shouldn't it be generated randomly internally when needed ? > Some applications use a fixed or deterministic salt which they check on decryption. Note that this parameter is what PKCS#1 calls “label”. > With PSA Crypto API, you define a flexible API for cryptographic > operations. Apparently, other providers could make their own > implementation of PSA Crypto API. Will mbed TLS then be able to use > those alternate PSA Crypto API implementations ? How would that work > practically ? > The X.509 and TLS layer of Mbed TLS are currently designed to use the mbedtls_xxx crypto API. We have already added partial support for the psa_xxx crypto API (with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO), however it is not yet possible to fully decouple the X.509/TLS layers from the Mbed TLS crypto implementation. (I think this is already possible for a small set of cipher suites, but it isn't something that we've tried or currently actively support.) Before this can happen, some Mbed TLS APIs need to change, which will happen in 2021 with Mbed TLS 3.0. After that, we plan to decouple the PSA crypto reference implementation (Mbed TLS's current crypto implementation) from the X.509/TLS layer (which will remain “Mbed TLS”). Our plans (https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/roadmap/) that far into the future are still vague and may change. Note that for the most common case of wanting a different implementation of cryptography, which is to leverage hardware such as accelerators and secure elements, PSA is defining a driver interface which is currently being implemented in Mbed TLS (https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/proposed/psa-drive…). The driver interface lets you combine mechanisms supported by your hardware with Mbed TLS's implementation for mechanisms without hardware support. -- Gilles Peskine PSA Cryptography architect and Mbed TLS developer > Thank you for your attention, > > François. > > >

5 years, 1 month

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Write private key into buffer using encrypted PEM format

by Z.Máté

Dear mbedtls list members! Sorry if this is the second time I ask, I'm not sure the previous question is still on the list. I'm asking if there's a way to export a private key into a buffer in an encrypted format. So that mbedtls_pk_parse_key() has to be called with a password. In the example program key_app.c (I hope that's how it's called) I can see there are password encrypted PEM formatted keys. But how to generate one? For clarity, this is the type of header I'm looking for. —–BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY—– Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,AB8E2B5B2D989271273F6730B6F9C687 ………………………………………………. ………………………………………………. ……………………………………… —–END RSA PRIVATE KEY—– I was only able to generate something like this by, using command line openssl. But I'd like a better solution, in code, using mbedtls. Yours Zombor Máté

5 years, 1 month

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Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Tomorrow

by Shebu Varghese Kuriakose

Hi All, Gentle reminder about the Mbed TLS workshop tomorrow (Tuesday, November 3rd) from 2 to 6pm GMT. See agenda and zoom link here - https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/ Thanks, Shebu -----Original Appointment----- From: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings <linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c(a)group.calendar.google.com> Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 12:32 AM To: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose; mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Don Harbin; psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Dave Rodgman Subject: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 2:00 PM-6:00 PM (UTC+00:00) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London. Where: Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… You have been invited to the following event. Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When Tue Nov 3, 2020 7am – 11am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Where Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… (map<https://www.google.com/maps/search/Zoom:+https:%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj…>) Calendar shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> Who • Don Harbin - creator • shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> • mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • dave.rodgman(a)arm.com<mailto:dave.rodgman@arm.com> more details »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Hi, Trustedfirmware.org community project would like to invite you to the Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop. The purpose of the workshop is to bring together the Mbed TLS community including maintainers, contributors and users to discuss * The future direction of the project and * Ways to improve community collaboration Here is the agenda for the workshop. Topic Time (in GMT) Welcome 2.00 - 2.10pm Constant-time code 2.10 – 2.30pm Processes - how does work get scheduled? 2.30 – 2.50pm PSA Crypto APIs 2.50 – 3.20pm PSA Crypto for Silicon Labs Wireless MCUs - Why, What, Where and When 3.20 – 3.50pm Break Roadmap, TLS1.3 Update 4.10 – 4.30pm Mbed TLS 3.0 Plans, Scope 4.30 – 5.00pm How do I contribute my first review and be an effective Mbed TLS reviewer 5.00 – 5.30pm Regards, Don Harbin Trusted Firmware Community Manager ==============Zoom details below:==================== Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Time: Nov 3, 2020 02:00 PM Greenwich Mean Time Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT…<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9531520…> Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Passcode: 143755 One tap mobile +16699009128,,95315200315# US (San Jose) +12532158782,,95315200315# US (Tacoma) Dial by your location +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/apL3hgti4<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fu%2FapL3hgt…> Going (shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com>)? Yes<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> - Maybe<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> - No<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> more options »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Invitation from Google Calendar<https://www.google.com/calendar/> You are receiving this courtesy email at the account shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn More<https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding>.

5 years, 1 month

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