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From: Saheer Babu via Tf-openci <tf-openci(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Date: Wednesday, 10 September 2025 at 15:17
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Hi Team,
I am working on exploring DTLS handshake using the mbedtls-3.6.4 version on
our embedded platform. I enabled the hello verify request feature and got
stuck at hello verify request state on server side if I don't reset the ssl
context and don't set the client transport ID. I want to know if there is
any way to complete a handshake by bypassing the reset of ssl context and
setting the client transport ID.
Also, our environment only supports C89 constructs. I could not see
inttypes.h in the mbedtls-3.6.4, is there any specific reason to remove
this file? I am getting compilation errors without inttypes.h and stdint.h.
Is there any macro to be enabled to support the c89 compilation in mbedtls
stack?
Looking forward to your response.
Thanks and regards,
Ankita Hatmode
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Dear MbedTLS maintainers,
we are already using MBedTLS, however, we recently enabled TLS 1.3 and
found that our certificates doesn't work anymore, because they are
brainpoolP256r1 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8734). So the
question would be, if I missed any configuration to enable the usage of
brainpool curves (which are working for TLS 1.2) or if there are any
plans, that these are getting supported by MBedTLS 3.6.x?
Best regards,
Maren Konrad
Hi
We migrated from mbedtls 2.28 to mbedtls 3.6.2
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/107ea89daaefb9867ea9121002fbbdf926…
and
we see TLS handshake fails when we use TLS 1.2 in mbedtls 3.6.2 instead of
1.3.
We get below error
20E094B0FFFF0000:error:0A000126:SSL routines:ssl3_read_n:unexpected eof
while reading:/usr/src/debug/openssl/3.1.0-r0/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c:303:
# openssl s_client -connect 192.168.142.1:7001 -no_tls1_3 fails
After seeing the trace we have enabled ciphers but still we see the issue.
please advise, thanks.
Thanks
Kavitha
Hi Mbed TLS users,
We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.6.4.
These releases of Mbed TLS address several security issues, provide bug fixes, and bring other minor changes. Full details are available in the release notes (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.4).
We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately.
Hi,
Prior to the first TLS handshake our application is required to perform input validation of the provided credentials (from file or smart card) for this peer.
One of those checks is to verify that private and public key match.
We used to use mbedtls_pk_sign() with a custom mbedtls_pk_context for that.
But in version 3.X mbedtls_pk_info_t was made private so mbedtls_pk_setup() with a custom mbedtls_pk_info_t whose sign_func would call into our smart card wrapper is no longer possible.
Is there still a way to provide custom callback functions for signing in 3.6.4 somehow? Or any other workaround for early check of a key pair?
Looking at 4.0.0-beta, also pk.h is no longer public.
Will it still be possible to perform early validation of this peer's credentials prior to a first TLS handshake? How?
While I am at it, it would be good to implement something that is future-proof.
What else I have looked at:
* mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque() might be the way to go but I do not find an example of how to link a key id to a custom signature function.
* mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt() would be useful if our application was always using RSA.
* Both functions are no longer public in 4.0
Related:
Early validation of a CRL (whether it was signed by the expected CA) used to be possible with mbedtls_pk_verify_ext().
But to properly set the input parameters requires access to private members of mbedtls_x509_crl in 3.6.4 (maybe an acceptable move?) but in 4.0.0 mbedtls_pk_verify_ext() is no longer public.
How perform explicit/"manual" CRL validation especially given the possibly skipped CRL validation in mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() as per the comment below?
"It is your responsibility to provide up-to-date CRLs for all trusted CAs. If no CRL is provided for the CA that was used t sign the certificate, CRL verification is skipped silently..."
Any future-proof ideas for this?
Best regards,
/Almut
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I am happy to announce the joint-release of Mbed TLS 4.0.0-beta & TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0-beta
PSA-Crypto now lives in its own repository while TLS and X.509 remain in Mbed TLS.
This beta release breaks compatibility with earlier versions of Mbed TLS.
Please do not use it in production.
It’s intended for the community to verify codebase integrations against the split and API changes, and for early adopters to experiment and provide feedback.
For full details, please see the release pages:
Mbed TLS 4.0.0-beta: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-4.0.0-beta
TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0-beta: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/releases/tag/tf-psa-crypto-1.0.0-…
I am happy to announce the joint-release of Mbed TLS 4.0.0-beta & TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0-beta
PSA-Crypto now lives in its own repository while TLS and X.509 remain in Mbed TLS.
This beta release breaks compatibility with earlier versions of Mbed TLS.
Please do not use it in production.
It’s intended for the community to verify codebase integrations against the split and API changes, and for early adopters to experiment and provide feedback.
For full details, please see the release pages:
Mbed TLS 4.0.0-beta: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-4.0.0-beta
TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0.0-beta: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/releases/tag/tf-psa-crypto-1.0.0-…
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Hi Mbed TLS users,
We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.6.4.
These releases of Mbed TLS address several security issues, provide bug fixes, and bring other minor changes. Full details are available in the release notes (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.4).
We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately.
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
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Hi
We are using mbedtls 2.28.9 and want to offload crypto operations to HSM
from NXP imx-secure-enclave.
is the below approach correct or please suggest alternate approaches if any?
1.Transition all apis from traditional apis to psa in modules
Use PSA crypto module
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/psa-transition.md
2. Integrate PSA module with imx-secure-enclave in our custom mbedtls
3. All modules will use custom mbedtls which will internally offload crypto
operations to HSM
or Do you recommend to use MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT? and implement the
key creation/signing/export of public key operations ?
Thanks,
Kavitha
Hi!
We are working with Mbed TLS 3.6.0 library and need the following information:
1.
Is there any End-Of-Life date planned for this library?
2. What is the current version?
3. How can we obtain support for the library enquiries? Does this support has a cost?
4.
How is the library update? Does this update has a cost?
5.
Are this library Open Source?
Thanks in advance for your help! 🙂
Have a great day!
Héctor J. Solís Castillo
Embedded Engr I
Honeywell | HTS Building Automation
990, Av. Eje 5 Norte, Mexico City
CDMX
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honeywell.com<http://www.honeywell.com/>
Pronouns: He/Him<https://www.mypronouns.org/what-and-why>
Hello,
I have the following two certificate chains: server <- intermediateCA <-
rootCA and client <- intermediateCA <- rootCA.
Currently there are two ways the client is authenticated by the server:
both the intermediateCA and rootCA certificates are configured as CAs on
the server or if only intermediateCA is configured.
I am using a custom verify callback set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify().
I would like to achieve two separate cases:
1) Make the MbedTLS' built-in pre-verify be successful, even when only
the rootCA certificate is set as the server's CA.
2) Always obtain the whole certificate chain up to the root in the
verify callback.
For case 1) this is how our OpenSSL TLS implementation works, it is
discussed here <https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/7871>. From my
understanding the server should be able to build the certificate chain
by inquiring the client about its certificate's issuer, etc.
For case 2), whenever both rootCA and intermediateCA are configured on
the server, only the chain client <- intermediateCA is received by the
callback. I would like to be able to receive the chain client <-
intermediateCA <- rootCA.
Are these two cases achievable with mbedTLS? For reference I am using
mbedTLS 3.5.2. For my server I would like to utilize both cases 1) and
2) and for the client only the case 1).
Kind regards,
Roman Janota
Hello,
I notice in 'crypto.h' of mbedTLS 3.6.3, PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR & PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR show the version implemented as v1.0.
Per the github page of TF-PSA-Crypto (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto/blob/development/README.md), the implementation is of v1.1. I verified that this mismatch between the README and crypto.h exists on the development branch of TF-PSA-Crypto as well.
What is the correct version implemented, as of mbedTLS 3.6.3?
Regards,
Kevin
Hi,
I'm trying to build the mbedtls v3.6.3 for an embedded 386 device. The
build is configured as `crypto_baremetal`. In the snippet below I use the
make build process with a GCC 11.2 cross toolchain that's installed in
`/opt/x-tools/i386-elf but the build process ends with an error:
```
(venv) dev [ /workspaces/mbedtls ]$ make
CC=/opt/x-tools/i386-elf/bin/i386-elf-gcc
AR=/opt/x-tools/i386-elf/bin/i386-elf-ar
make[1]: Entering directory '/workspaces/mbedtls/library'
CC aes.c
CC aesni.c
CC aesce.c
...
CC src/certs.c
CC src/psa_test_wrappers.c
CC src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c
make[1]: Leaving directory '/workspaces/mbedtls/tests'
make[1]: Entering directory '/workspaces/mbedtls/programs'
CC aes/crypt_and_hash.c
/opt/x-tools/i386-elf/lib/gcc/i386-elf/11.2.0/../../../../i386-elf/bin/ld:
cannot find crt0.o: No such file or directory
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
make[1]: *** [Makefile:160: aes/crypt_and_hash] Error 1
make[1]: Leaving directory '/workspaces/mbedtls/programs'
make: *** [Makefile:34: programs] Error 2
(venv) dev [ /workspaces/mbedtls ]$
```
So I have two questions:
This error says it fails to link find crt0.o but the output
(library/libmbedcrypto.a) exists and looks ok (altho I've yet to try
linking against it). Is the error message spurious or is the library it
produced unusable?
Do I really need a version of crt0.o to link successfully? (The same
configuration builds with no errors using the host's x64 compiler toolchain
- and that toolchain also doesn't have a crt0.o file).
Thanks in advance!
Hi,
I'm the main developer of Leshan Library. This is a Java open source
implementation of LWM2M protocol hosted at Eclipse Foundation.
We currently use Scandium (from Californium Project) as DTLS library.
This library fits our needs until now but we have some concerns about
future-proofness of it (Especially, there is no plan for DTLS 1.3) and
there is no support of TLS.
So we explore some other way for the future.
I had consider to use OpenJdk but there is a lot of missing IoT
Features. I contact OpenJdk security dev and they makes me understand
politely that IoT is not the priority (at least this is my understanding)
Another solution we explore would be to use an mbedtls Java binding.
(as mbedtls is well supported and focus IoT)
There is a not official one at :
https://github.com/open-coap/kotlin-mbedtls
*Questions :
*
1. Is there any official java binding ?
2. If no, is there any plan for that kind of binding ?
3. If no, if there is a community initiative could it be hosted by you ?
Thx,
Simon
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Hi all,
I am writing in behalf of Security Pattern, a security firm specialized
in embedded systems.
We are a member of the QUBIP European Funded Project (https://qubip.eu),
which aims at transitioning protocols, networks, and systems to Post
Quantum algorithms.
As a result of the project, we have integrated a set of Post Quantum
algorithms in the TLS1.3 stack of the MbedTLS code (see here
https://github.com/QUBIP/pq-mqtt-client-mbedtls).
We have code running on STM32 Nucleo board in two versions:
the former is a full software, by leveraging the crypto primitives
provided in a library developed by another partner, the latter using a
Secure Element emulated by FPGA connected via I2C (also developed by
another partner of QUBIP).
Our main work has beed dedicated to integrating the new hybrid KEM and
signatures (MLKEM768-x25519 and MLDSA44-Ed25519) into the TLS stack, in
order to demonstrate communication with an MQTT broker running OpenSSL.
At the current stage we are about to publish the code on github with MIT
license (here https://github.com/QUBIP/pq-mqtt-client-mbedtls).
Meanwhile, we think the effort we made could be of help for MBedTLS
development/developers. So I would like to ask if you can address me to
some contact that is responsible in MbedTLS or ARM about the PQC
transition or the best way to facilitate the use/integration of our work.
Best Regards,
Alberto
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Hi all,
We have encountered a challenge while using mbedTLS 3.5.1 and would greatly appreciate the assistance of the experts. Thank you in advance for your support.
I used mbedTLS 3.5.1 to connect to the server acc.connect.cpms.milence.com, and the TLS handshake failed with an Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version) error. Detailed information is described at this GitHub issue<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/10141>.
* We attempted to connect with the Windows EDGE browser and found through packet capture that the handshake was successful.
* We were also able to successfully handshake using TLS 1.2.
* When we limited the supported group to only: MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 and used TLS 1.3, the handshake was also successful.
For more details, please refer to the discussion on GitHub: Handshake fail with "Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version)" ・ Issue #10141 ・ Mbed-TLS/mbedtls<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/10141>.
Best Regards,
Fu Baicheng
Dear Mbed TLS users,
We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.6.3 and 2.28.10. These releases provide bugfixes, security fixes and minor improvements.
This release of Mbed TLS provides the fix for the TLS compatibility issue of handling fragmented handshake messages. This release includes fixes for security issues.
Full details are available in the release notes:
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-2.28.10https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.3
We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately.
Many thanks,
Minos Galanakis
Mbed TLS developer
Dear Mbed TLS users,
We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.6.3 and 2.28.10. These releases provide bugfixes, security fixes and minor improvements.
This release of Mbed TLS provides the fix for the TLS compatibility issue of handling fragmented handshake messages. This release includes fixes for security issues.
Full details are available in the release notes:
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-2.28.10https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.3
We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately.
Many thanks,
Minos Galanakis
Mbed TLS developer
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
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