- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

RSA signature with Montgomery

by Prasad Hegde

Hi, Is there any API's available to convert the RSA signature to the Montgomery format. Thanks Prasad

3 years, 7 months

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Code style discussions

by David Horstmann

Hi All, Mbed TLS is planning to move to a new code style by the end of this year. The proposed new style is currently being discussed in the GitHub pull request: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/6591 If you have any feedback on this new style, or you think we should tweak it, feel free to comment on the pull request. We will take your thoughts into account when we decide on the final style. Discussions will continue until the evening of THIS FRIDAY (UK time). Many thanks, David Horstmann for the Mbed TLS Team

3 years, 7 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - US/Europe

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the US-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday at 4:30 PM UK time. Invite details can be found on the online calendar here <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years, 7 months

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Certificate Verify in Client Authentication does not work as expected

by Simon Nachtigall

Hello everyone, We observed a strange behavior in the mbedTLS client, when client authentication is requested by the TLS server. This behavior was observed in the newer version 3.0.0 as well as in older versions. The scenario is the following: The server selects a ciphersuite e.g. ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 and sends a CertificateRequest message that only includes the ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 signature algorithm. However, the mbedTLS client simply ignores the requested hash function and uses ecdsa_secp256r1_sha384 for the signature in the ClientVerify. Then, the server complains since the signature does not match with the requested signature algorithm and sends a handshake failure. It seems that mbedTLS does not store the requested signature algorithms/hash function from the CertificateRequest and always uses the hash function from the selected ciphersuite. In the ssl_write_certificate_verify function, we find the following comment: /* * digitally-signed struct { * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length]; * }; * * Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the * PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature * algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message. * * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this * shortcut. * * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server * side. */ Is this a known problem and is there any fix available? Cheers, Simon Nachtigall

3 years, 8 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the Asia-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is next *Monday, Nov 7 at 10:00am UK time*. Invite details can be found on the online calendar here <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman, cc'd, know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years, 8 months

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Simple question about support of TLS1.2 and TLS1.3 on server side

by caoyxsh＠outlook.com

Is there a plan for adding support of TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 at same time on server side? According to : https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/architecture/tls1… only one version can be configured at runtime via `mbedtls_ssl_conf_{min,max}_tls_version` for a server endpoint.

3 years, 8 months

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Get size of available application data without calling mbedtls_ssl_read()

by Bruckner, Jan

Hi all, I'd like to know if there is some way to retrieve the currently available number of bytes of application data without calling mbedtls_ssl_read()? I'm writing a "TLS socket" for higher layers to use and would like to notify them when new application data is available, tell them how much it is, but leave it up to them when and how much to retrieve. I'd like to prevent having to buffer all application data inside my TLS socket, because that would mean copying it once from mbedtls' buffer to my socket and then again from there to the application whenever it actually requests the data. After a quick look into the sources, it seems like, if at all, this might be possible for single records. But all related fields are private and I could not find any API for this. Issue #551 [1] seems related, but is more about peeking into the application data, while I would be fine with knowing just the size of available application data. Thanks for any hints on how I could achieve this. Best regards, Jan [1] https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/551 ________________________________ This message is for the designated recipient only and may contain privileged, proprietary, or otherwise private information. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete the original. Any other use of the email by you is prohibited.

3 years, 8 months

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Feedback requested: Mbed TLS builds with PSA and legacy implementations of the same algorithm with different characteristics

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, Summary: I am soliciting feedback about builds of Mbed TLS where *there is both a PSA implementation and the built-in software implementation of the same algorithm, by design, *and the PSA implementation isn't just calling the built-in implementation because the two have different characteristics, each desirable in some context. Please read this message if you are doing this or considering it. Feel free to ignore otherwise. For example, both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256 are enabled, so that calls to mbedtls_md_xxx() use the software implementation and calls to psa_hash_xxx() use the hardware accelerator via the PSA driver. And this is deliberate: there is a reason why mbedtls_md_xxx() must not call the PSA driver. In most cases, this is not desirable: if there's an accelerator, why not use it? And we're working to allow getting rid of the software implementation in more and more cases. Ultimately, PSA will be the only crypto interface in Mbed TLS, so all interfaces to calculate SHA-256 will go through psa_hash_xxx() and therefore will dispatch the call to the driver if there is one. This will be an API break, since it will require calling psa_crypto_init() before performing any cryptography. Currently we are planning to introduce this requirement in Mbed TLS 4.0. But it is currently possible to have dual algorithm support, and I can think of unusual cases where it might desirable. Scenario 1, with accelerator drivers: there is a driver, but it can only be used after some initialization. The application needs to use the algorithm before calling psa_crypto_init(), so it calls the legacy interface. After psa_crypto_init() has been called, the application would like to use the driver as much as possible. A typical use case is a bootloader which wants to verify a signature before initializing the random generator, so it calls mbedtls_md_xxx() and mbedtls_rsa_xxx(). Scenario 1 is clearly desirable, and for that we have a planned solution, which is staged initialization. The bootloader will be able to (1) initialize drivers, (2) perform a hash calculation, (3) initialize the keystore, (4) verify a signature, all without initializing the RNG. We won't make psa_crypto_init() mandatory until this feature is implemented. Scenario 2: with a cryptography service. This is a build of Mbed TLS with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT, so all psa_xxx() calls call the service. But, for some reason, there is also a local implementation of some cryptography algorithms. So you can call mbedtls_md() to calculate a hash even before the connection to the service has been established. Or maybe you want to call mbedtls_md() for short messages and psa_hash_compute() for long messages, because the crypto service has a faster implementation but the communication overhead offsets the gain for short messages. We are currently working on improving support for PSA drivers, and in particular, saving code size by eliminating more unnecessary code when a driver is present, and increasing the set of APIs that benefit from drivers. The obvious way to do that is to make all cryptography calls (especially from X.509 and TLS) go via the PSA interface, but we can't do that yet due to the need to have initialized the keystore and RNG. We are considering routing /certain/ crypto calls via PSA, in a way that would break scenario 2, and would also break scenario 1 in some cases, but not for hashes or signature verification. If, for example, in Mbed TLS 3.4, mbedtls_md() starts calling psa_hash_(), would this break your code? Are you in scenario 1, scenario 2, or some other variant I haven't thought of? If so, *please reply to this message and let us know what your needs are*. Feel free to reply to me in private if you don't want to discuss this publicly (I won't share directly outside Arm, but the eventual design might leak information about the unusual scenario). If we don't hear objections, there is a chance that a future Mbed TLS 3.x will break scenarios 1 and 2. If we do hear objections, we'll work to keep the current behavior or arrange a migration path. Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer

3 years, 8 months

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problem PSA_CRYPTO (Mbedtls 2.28.0)

by xlin＠murata.com

I have port mbedtls 2.28.0 into my platform and am able to connect to a few websites in PKI mode. But after enabling MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO & MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG, with everything else stay the same, I can't connect to the same websites anymore. in the working case (no MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO), after the client (my app) sends "Certificate, Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message", the server responds with "Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message". In the broken case (with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO), after the client (my app) sends "Certificate, Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message", the server doesn't respond with "Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message". I don't know how to debug the issue, any suggestion what my cause the server to drop off at the last step?

3 years, 8 months

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How much bigger is MbedTLS 2.28.1 relative to 2.16.2? (STM 32F417 GCC)

by Peter

I may need TLS 1.3 support which I believe arrived in 2.28, or maybe a bit later. I don't want to change to TLS 3 just yet. It looks like many changes. My target is "OK" on FLASH (150k of the 350k total code size) but is tight on RAM (after allocating 50k for the MbedTLS heap, we have just 20k RAM left). Ideally I would like the very last version of v2. The problem just found is that Cloudflare is asking for TLS 1.3 which MbedTLS 2.16 does not support. But it may be that Cloudflare can fall back and the problem is elsewhere. Many thanks for any input.

3 years, 8 months

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Performance tuning of SHA256 on big files

by Liu James

Hi, This is an updated post from https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/6464, which should be posted in mbedtls mail list. My question is how to significantly improve SHA256 performance on big files (regardless of architectures). *=== Updates* I use same code with mbedtls-3.1.0 to run tests in x86, and performance is still downgraded. Mbed TLS version (number or commit id): *3.1.0* Operating system and version: * Centos-8.5, CPU 11900K* Configuration (if not default, please attach mbedtls_config.h): Compiler and options (if you used a pre-built binary, please indicate how you obtained it): *gcc/g++ 8.5* Additional environment information: *Test files and performance* CentOS-8.5.2111-x86_64-boot.iso (827.3 MB): sha256 *5 sec* CentOS-8.5.2111-x86_64-boot.iso (10.79 GB): sha256 *66 sec* Also, as advised I try to turn on "MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT " and "MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT" using mbedtls-3.2.0 in M1, but compiler reported the following error: CMake Error at library/CMakeLists.txt:257 (add_library): Cannot find source file: psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c Tried extensions .c .C .c++ .cc .cpp .cxx .cu .mpp .m .M .mm .ixx .cppm .h .hh .h++ .hm .hpp .hxx .in .txx .f .F .for .f77 .f90 .f95 .f03 .hip .ispc CMake Error at library/CMakeLists.txt:257 (add_library): No SOURCES given to target: mbedcrypto Thanks for your help. *=== Original message at github* Summary sha256() and sha1() incurs significant overhead on big files(~1G above). *This might not be an issue*, and I'm looking for an efficient way to calculate hash on big files. System information Mbed TLS version (number or commit id): 3.1.0 Operating system and version: M1 OSX Configuration (if not default, please attach mbedtls_config.h): Compiler and options (if you used a pre-built binary, please indicate how you obtained it): Clang++ Additional environment information: Expected behavior Fast calculation of big files in less than 1 second Actual behavior Test files: CentOS-8.5.2111-x86_64-boot.iso (827.3 MB): sha1 *3.3 sec*, sha256 *5.9 sec* CentOS-8.5.2111-x86_64-boot.iso (10.79 GB): sha1 *40 sec*, sha256 *78 sec* Steps to reproduce ISO files can be downloaded at: http://ftp.iij.ad.jp/pub/linux/centos-vault/8.5.2111/isos/x86_64/ Make sure use fast disk, say nvme, to store ISO files, or else loading big files could take lots of time. Also use user from time command to measure performance. Workable code of sha256: string test_sha256(string file_path) { mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; FILE *fp; string output; int BUFFER_SIZE = 4096; uint8_t buffer[BUFFER_SIZE]; size_t read, k_bytes; uint8_t hash[32]; mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx); mbedtls_sha256_starts(&ctx, 0); fp = fopen(file_path.c_str(), "r"); if (fp == NULL) { mbedtls_sha256_free(&ctx); return output; } while ((read = fread(buffer, 1, BUFFER_SIZE, fp))) { mbedtls_sha256_update(&ctx, buffer, read); } mbedtls_sha256_finish(&ctx, hash); mbedtls_sha256_free(&ctx); fclose(fp); // update hash string, omit here return output; }

3 years, 8 months

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Is there a server somewhere which can be used for testing various MbedTLS client cipher suites

by Peter

Hi All, There are machines out there for testing servers but I don't know of one which can be used for testing a client. This is a tricky area. For example I have a board running, LWIP and MbedTLS, uploading little test files to two sites. One was running EC and AES256. It worked fine. The other was running RSA and AES256 but didn't work, and after some work it was found that its certificate chain was running SHA-1 on the top level certificate, dated 2006. This is actually a major name on the internet! And we didn't have SHA-1 enabled because it is supposed to be deprecated. I wonder if there is some practical way to test out all this. We can probably enable all the MbedTLS crypto options (TLS is taking up 150k out of 350k of code for the whole product, but we can probably throw in some more) but testing them is something else. There is a test suite in TLS but it needs to be embedded in the product itself. Has someone implemented that code on a server somewhere? Thank you in advance for any pointers. Peter

3 years, 8 months

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Error about psa_crypto_init

by 韩轾

I meet a problem when I call function `psa_crypto_init`, it return error code -148 that was PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY. I track this function step by step and found it caused by MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED. Code in entropy.c, if( ctx->source_count == 0 ), return this error. My question: I run code on Ubuntu, it runs well. But in some arm board, it returns this error. Why this count will be 0 sometimes? What is the root cause of this error.

3 years, 8 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - US/Europe

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the US-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday at 4:30 PM UK time. Invite details can be found on the online calendar here <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years, 8 months

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PKCS#7 format of certificate

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, I have developed a TLS and EST client application. Where the EST server issues the certificate in PKCS#7 format. It seems mbedtls library not support certificates in PKCS#7 format. Is there any plan to support PKCS#7 in future? Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

3 years, 9 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the Asia-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is next *Monday, Oct 10 at 10:00am UK time*. Invite details can be found on the online calendar here <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman, cc'd, know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years, 9 months

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Re: Writing mbedtls_x509_crt chain to PEM ?

by Nicolas Pillot

Hello Please note that this is a repost from my previous message from yesterday as it seemd to have bugged (empty text + html attachement) when viewed from the archive. Apologies. Short question : how do i output an in-memory mbedtls_x509_crt chain to PEM text ? Context : I have a project where the user provides a PEM bundle to be used for HTTPS As it is provided by a user, may be incomplete or malformed : - no private key - more than 1 private key - no certificate at all - duplicate certificates - no certificate matching the private key - broken chain - extraneous certificates not part of the chain… So i want to full validate user input. Here is what i have succeeded so far : - parse the bundle into atomic parts, based on « BEGIN/END » labels - try to mbedtls_x509_crt_parse / mbedtls_pk_parse_key each part (no chain) - check that i only have one private key in the bundle - search for the certificat C matching the private key - starting from that atomic certificate, verify it against each other candidate certificate - if it validates, add it to the chain of C, and repeat until no candidate validates - then check that there are no remaining certificate (which never validated anything) - finally print and store the chain (as it’s now deemed correct and minimal) Now i want to store it in PEM format for later use. But i do not understand the way to do it : - there are no write functions for mbedtls_x509_crt - the mbedtls_x509write_cert structure shares few members with mbedtls_x509_crt - i have not found yet how to get/convert many of the missing members - as memory is tight i have have cleaned the « atomic parts » text buffers (but if there is no other way, i'll keep and reuse them) I guess it should be pretty simple, but i cannot wrap my head around it. Thanks in advance for your help Nicolas PS : if steps 1-8 could be done more elegantly, please do not hesitate to point me in the right direction.

3 years, 9 months

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Writing mbedtls_x509_crt chain to PEM ?

by Nicolas PILLOT

3 years, 9 months

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Mbed TLS4.0 - Remove legacy cipher APIs

by S Krishnan, Archanaa

Hi, In mbedTLS road map, there is a future task to remove legacy cipher API (https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/roadmap/). Does that mean all existing mbedtls crypto APIs will not be supported anymore? mbedTLS is used for both its TLS and crypto library. I am curious how the planned changes will affect both set of users. * Are the crypto library users expected to only use PSA crypto APIs and key IDs? * Are the TLS library users expected to see API changes to TLS functions to support key IDs? Thank, Archanaa

3 years, 9 months

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Question about handshake MTU

by Martin Man

Hi guys, I use mbedtls for years (since 2.10 IIRC) upgrading to latest available as time goes by. For DTLS that is. I remember a case in the past where a link would have a small MTU (around 500 bytes) and I had to tune ssl_context.handshake.mtu to a lower value to successfully complete handshakes. I do not remember exactly why, but I did not want to actually restrict maximum value via mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu, maybe it was even ignored back then for handshakes… but Now when working on migration to 3.2.1 (gave some time to 3x releases to stabilize) I noticed that the whole ssl_context.handshake member is now private and inaccessible, which I guess is fine. Could somebody with more knowledge of the code recommend what is the best strategy for DTLS app where MTU may not always be 1400? thanks a lot for your time, Martin

3 years, 9 months

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Regarding Connection ID (RFC 9146) support in Mbed TLS

by Jérémy Audiger

Hi everyone, I would like to know what is the current support of Mbed TLS regarding the RFC 9146 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9146) published in March 2022. Mbed TLS is currently supporting a draft version of this RFC (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) through the define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID, but I just wanted to know the progress on supporting the newly RFC released this year. Are there any plan to support it soon ? If yes, will it be in the coming weeks / months (i.e.: next release) ? I'm asking since I'm currently playing with the Connection ID on both a DTLS 1.2 Server and DTLS 1.2 Client. Anyway, have a nice day, Best regards, Jérémy Audiger [ioterop-your-lwm2m-partner]<https://ioterop.com/> [social-icon-linkedin]<https://www.linkedin.com/company/7955832/> [social-icon-twitter] <https://twitter.com/ioteropcompany> [social-icon-facebook] <https://www.facebook.com/IoteropCompany/>

3 years, 9 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - US/Europe

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the US-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday at 4:30 PM UK time. Invite details can be found on the online calendar here <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years, 9 months

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Re: What am I doing wrong?

by Marco Nilsson

We're seeing pretty much the same issue on 3.0.0 ARM. However, if I build the ssh_client2 tool on my host machine (x64) and try to mimic the config as close as possible, it works just fine. Do you think we're seeing the same problem? Will try with a newer version next week.

3 years, 10 months

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HMAC and CMAC Verification

by Ahmed Mohammed

Hello, I am wondering if there are APIs for Hmac and Cmac verification? from md.h and cmac.h, Hmac and Cmac generation functionalities are provided in a single and streaming approach. But is there a plan to add verification APIs for future releases maybe? Kind regards, Ahmed Mohammed

3 years, 10 months

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User configuration

by Ahmed Mohammed

Hello, What is the difference between these two macros in include/mbedtls/build_info.h: MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE In other words, why would I have two different user configuration files? Or I misunderstand the difference between such files. Kind regards, Ahmed Mohammed

3 years, 10 months

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Slowness in verification of a ecdsa secp256r1 signature using S32K Microcontroller (clock speed 112MHz) - bare metal implementation

by ammar.ahmed.mughal＠gmail.com

I am verifying a signature generated using ecdsa secp256r1. The signature is getting verified but the time taken by the verification step is too long. It takes 4-5 seconds to verify the signature. The implementation is bare metal i.e. no RTOS (one realizes the use of RTOS but still the time is too long). Can you please guide a way around for this issue. How to make it work faster , the ideal verification time would be 30ms - 60ms. Here is a gist of my code mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = NULL; mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_context; /// Initialization mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa_context); curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(23); /// 23 is tls_id of secp256r1 mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecdsa_context.grp, curve_info->grp_id); /// Processing result = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary( &ecdsa_context.grp, &ecdsa_context.Q, public_key_data, // public key data in uncompressed format i.e. including leading 0x04 sizeof(public_key_data) ); /// 32 /// 71 status_verify_signature = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature(&ecdsa_context, hash, sizeof(hash), signature, sizeof(sig)); /// converts the signature data to ASN1, verifies the signature Thank you :)

3 years, 10 months

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Mutual authentication support in Embed tls

by Anupma Jain

Hello, Can please provide me with any example on "how to achieve Mutual authentication(Client and server certificate validation)" in mbed-tls. Please help me with this.It is a little urgent. Thank you Regards Anupma Jain

3 years, 10 months

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Website update

by Dave Rodgman

Hi all, Apologies for the website outage. We have now restored the majority of the old content, which is reachable via our Trusted Firmware website (the old website address will redirect here). The new location for our documentation, including the knowledge base and security advisories, is: https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ Please let us know (on the mailing list, via the Tech Forum, or raise a GitHub issue or PR) if you find any issues or missing documentation. The source repository for the docs is here: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-docs Community contributions to the docs are welcome! Regards Dave Rodgman

3 years, 10 months

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OID Issue

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, We have developed a propriety protocol that authenticate node using certificate. In our PKI, we have four level of certificates as ROOT_CA, PROXY_CA, LOCAL_CA, and DEVICE_CERTIFICATE. Parsing of trusted CA certificate is getting success. However, verifying PROXY_CA against ROOT_CA fails with below error code. MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND I have viewed the certificates transacted using OpenSSL command, the ASN1 OID is ECDSA_SHA384. Though, I have enabled the algorithm, it is failing. Any support would be appreciated. Attached the config.h for your reference. Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

3 years, 10 months

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Adding option to disable the zeroisation of internal buffers

by joel.petersson＠dirac.com

After recently updating mbedtls I noticed a considerable slowdown (over 70% on my cortex-m7 board) in the sha256 implementation, and after some digging I found the offending commit: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/commit/76749aea784cfec245390d0d6f0ab0a2… I understand the motivation behind the commit, but I think it may not be relevant to all use cases. So my question is if an option to disable the clearing of internal buffers in mbedtls_config.h would be a reasonable improvement? Or would that be considered to much of a foot gun? Regards, Joel Petersson

3 years, 10 months

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support of Certificate exchange between client and server in Mbedtls

by Anupma Jain

Hi, In Embed tls version 2.28, is there any support to validate client certificate fields like for example: validity of certificate, CA validation or role extraction ? If support is present then, how can we enable that ? Please help me with this.Thanks in advance. Regards Anupma

3 years, 11 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - US/Europe

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the US-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday at 4:30 PM UK time. Invite details can be found on the online calendar here <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years, 11 months

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totally beginner question...

by boddeke＠mac.com

hello, we are testing a secure communication and got example code that uses the mbed-tls library. i am using the online keil studio with mbed.org: created a new project (compiles fine) and added in the mbed-tls library but this already gives compile errors. see below. i am using the latest greatest versions (mbed-os 6.16.0 and mbedtls-3.2.1) and tried some older versions. all seem to give the same problems. see below. i have tried commenting out MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME in mbedtls_config.h but that does not seem to make any difference tried different target boards, also no difference any help is greatly appreciated! thanks frank Build started Using toolchain ARMC6 profile {'ENV': {'ARMLMD_LICENSE_FILE': '8224@10.10.101.194:8224@10.10.109.222'}, 'PATHS': {'ARMC6_PATH': '/opt/ARMCompiler6.15.13/bin/', 'ARM_PATH': '/opt/armcc5_06_u6/'}, 'common': ['-c', '--gnu', '-O3', '-Otime', '--split_sections', '--apcs=interwork'], 'cxx': ['--cpp', '--no_rtti'], 'COMPILE_C_AS_CPP': False, 'NEW_SCAN_RESOURCES': True} scan /tmp/chroots/ch-59110c86-ee99-44c4-9ef0-79f3efde74a7/src scan /tmp/chroots/ch-59110c86-ee99-44c4-9ef0-79f3efde74a7/extras/mbed-os.lib compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Config/RTX_Config.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/TOOLCHAIN_ARM/TARGET_RTOS_M4_M7/irq_cm4f.S compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_evflags.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_lib.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_mempool.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Library/cmsis_os1.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_evr.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_memory.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_delay.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_msgqueue.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_kernel.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_mutex.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_semaphore.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_system.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/Source/os_systick.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/TARGET_CORTEX_M/Source/mbed_tz_context.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_timer.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/Source/os_tick_ptim.c compile mbed-os/cmsis/CMSIS_5/CMSIS/RTOS2/RTX/Source/rtx_thread.c "time.h included in a configuration without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME" unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? compile mbed-os/cmsis/device/rtos/source/mbed_rtos_rtx.c In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/cmsis/device/rtos/source/mbed_rtos_rtx.c:23: In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_error.h:21: In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_retarget.h:107: /src/mbedtls/tests/include/baremetal-override/time.h:18:2: error: "time.h included in a configuration without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME" #error "time.h included in a configuration without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME" ^ In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/cmsis/device/rtos/source/mbed_rtos_rtx.c:23: In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_error.h:21: /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_retarget.h:669:5: error: unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? time_t st_atime; ///< Time of last access ^~~~~~ size_t /opt/ARMCompiler6.15.13/bin/../include/stdio.h:53:26: note: 'size_t' declared here typedef unsigned int size_t; /* see <stddef.h> */ ^ In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/cmsis/device/rtos/source/mbed_rtos_rtx.c:23: In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_error.h:21: /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_retarget.h:670:5: error: unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? time_t st_mtime; ///< Time of last data modification ^~~~~~ size_t /opt/ARMCompiler6.15.13/bin/../include/stdio.h:53:26: note: 'size_t' declared here typedef unsigned int size_t; /* see <stddef.h> */ ^ In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/cmsis/device/rtos/source/mbed_rtos_rtx.c:23: In file included from /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_error.h:21: /extras/mbed-os.lib/platform/include/platform/mbed_retarget.h:671:5: error: unknown type name 'time_t'; did you mean 'size_t'? time_t st_ctime; ///< Time of last status change ^~~~~~ size_t /opt/ARMCompiler6.15.13/bin/../include/stdio.h:53:26: note: 'size_t' declared here typedef unsigned int size_t; /* see <stddef.h> */ ^ 4 errors generated. Internal error. Build failed Build failed

3 years, 11 months

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misc. questions

by Frank Bergmann

Hi all, I have some questions. 1) If you have an established TLS connection (mbed TLS 3.x) and while the connection is up the (server-) certificate expires: Will the connection stay up? Or is a new handshake (with valid cert) REQUIRED? 2) Related to question 1: CAN mbed TLS switch to a new cert on an existing TLS connection? (e.g. by doing another handshake from server OR client side) 3) With 3.x some struct members are now "private". Even if you can allow private access by a define it would be better to use a getter. But for ssl context's "state" I am missing this and also for "p_bio" (to access fd). Is there a chance to get this implemented? BTW - a big "LIKE" for 3.x! I really appreciate the changes. Thank you! kind regards, Frank

3 years, 11 months

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inline assembly MULADDC_CORE for Cortex M4

by Work Only

Hello everyone, Can anyone share some example code or hints on writing MULADDC_CORE for Cortex M4 in bn_mul.h? With Many thanks! Wade

3 years, 11 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - US/Europe

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the US-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is tomorrow (Monday) at 4:30 PM UK time. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years, 12 months

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[Mbed-tls-announce] Mbed TLS 3.2.1 release

by Paul Elliott via Mbed-tls-announce

Hi Mbed TLS users, We have released Mbed TLS version 3.2.1. This release is functionally identical to 3.2.0, but includes a file that was missing from the 3.2.0 release (see https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/6084). Full details are available in the release notes (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v3.2.1). We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately. Many thanks, Mbed TLS Team. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

4 years

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Release of Mbed TLS 3.2.0 and 2.28.1

by Dave Rodgman

Hi Mbed TLS users, We have released Mbed TLS versions 3.2.0 and 2.28.1. These releases of Mbed TLS address several security issues, provide bug fixes, and for 3.2.0, add various features. Full details are available in the release notes (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v3.2.0, https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.1). We recommend all users to consider whether they are impacted, and to upgrade appropriately. Dave Rodgman

4 years

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What is the URL to access the Mbed TLS knowledge base?

by Max Peng

Hi mbed-tls Team, I notice that https://tls.mbed.org has been directed to https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/mbed-tls/. However, I does not see any link to the old Mbed TLS knowledge base. It is a good resource for learning Mbed TLS. What is the URL to access it? Thanks, Max Peng

4 years

2
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State of documentation

by Tim Becker

Hi all, it feels like the state of documentation has deteriorated since the last time I've used mbedtls (a couple of months ago). I'm not sure if the google index hasn't fully been updated yet, or I don't understand the new structure of the docs or ... Also, is this the proper forum to make suggestions? Should I raise an issue on Github? 1.) a lot of previously linked, useful information now redirects here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/mbed-tls/ which (please excuse my frankness) feels like an utterly useless abomination that only marketing people could love. - Some examples of previously useful links: from the wiki ( https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/) : > Old Mbed TLS website > Documentation: Mbed TLS API Reference; Knowledge base; Dev corner all redirect to trustedfirmware.org ! As do nearly all the links in https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/SUPPORT.md 2.) there is no longer an doxygen generated API documentation anywhere only. I could generate it myself, but then I'd need to get and install Doxygen, figure how to use it, etc. It would be great if this were restored. It can't be that expensive to host :) Anyway, it feels like I've been running around for hours trying to find _anything_ useful, but I just realized everything is redirected to trustedfirmware.org ... Is there any way to still access the old, useful docs? Thanks & sorry that this post is so negative, -tim

4 years

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TLS Handshake failure while connecting to mqtt broker from device

by urvi＠milltech.in

Hello Sir/Madam, I am developing TI's EFM32 series micro controller based IOT device. This device will connect to mqtt broker and publish/ subscribes to/from data. In my application, I am trying to connect to AWS using mbedtls library over lwIP (no rtos mode). While my device is in debug mode (i.e. JTAG programmer connected) then it gets connected to AWS successfully. But when I remove JTAG programmer and operate device in normal running mode, then it failed to get connect to broker (i.e. AWS). I observe following errors occured while performing TLS handshaking stage: SSL - The connection indicated an EOF X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signatur SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed

4 years

1
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Setup to test and debug a single funciton.

by Victor Micó

Hi all, First of all apologies if this is not the right place for this topic. For my master thesis I am using the mbedtls library to analyze it using side channel analysis. My objective was to use it as a starting point to analyze the resistance of different exponentiation algorithms. With this objective I am trying to set up a environment where I can call the function "mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod" https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/f5b7082f6e8af72868966b6ea99eae228f… and debug it. I have been trying for at least two weeks but I couldn't be able to succeed. I believe that when If I can get a debugging environment for that function I will be able to adapt it and use other exponentiation algorithms such as the Left-to-right k-ary (HAC 14.82). I am using VScode and the code is located in WLS Ubuntu 20.04. So far I been able to compile the full library and run all the tests. Anyone here could give mean indication on how to set up the environment to debug this function? Thanks! Victor.

4 years

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Looking for information regarding the long-term support of the MbedTls library.

by heinrich.mueller＠g-ushin.com

Hello, Currently, we are evaluating the MbedLib to be eventually used in small and midsized automotive ECUs. * Since we have to follow the UNECE Regulation R155, R156, and ISO/SAE 21434 I need some information regarding the long-term support of the library and how the communication of bugs is organized? * I also do not understand the involvement and responsibility of ARM company? * Furthermore, I'm not sure if I understood the terms PSA and MbedTls and their mutual dependencies as well as the technical meaning? I checked the web for I but did not find anything about it yet. It would be just great if somebody can give me some hints or links to the information I am looking for. Regards Heico

4 years

2
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How to secure two simultaneous sockets?

by Fred Wedemeier

I have an application using mbedTls 2.9.0 that's been running successfully for a few years. It secures connections for the AWS MQTT broker, for https GET/PUT transfers, and for SSL/TLS email servers - But only one secure connection at a time. I need to add support for an FTPS client. This requires opening/securing a control channel on port 21, then opening/securing a second port for data transfer. Opening/securing the control channel works as expected. Then, when the client calls connect() for the data transfer socket, the server log shows messages indicating it is preparing for a TLS handshake. Now, here's where I may be missing something... The client calls the same code as for the control connection: Allocates a second mbedtls_ssl_context, mbedtls_ssl_config, mbedtls_x509_crt, et.al, and calls some mbedtls_ssl_*() functions which were copy/pasted from example code several years ago. The server name and root cert are the same. I think the only difference in the second negotiation is the underlying socket descriptor allocated by the IP stack for the data channel. When mbedtls_ssl_handshake() is called, both the filezilla log and client log show a successful handshake. The filezilla log then shows it trying to establish yet another secure data connection, which fails, and reports "TLS session of data connection not resumed." Questions: -- Is the above sequence correct for opening and securing a second connection? -- In searching through ssl.h I see mbedtls_ssl_get_session() and mbedtls_ssl_set_session(). Are these relevant to the situation? I cannot tell from their one-sentence descriptions.

4 years

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How to use just RSA algorithm in the tls library with stm32

by arman_ilmak＠yahoo.com

Hi I just needed to use rsa.c but its a little complicated. Can anyone help me or give me any document about how i can use it without use of tls. I just saw a doc on tls.mbed.org but the site is not working anymore.

4 years

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psa_crypto_init() asks for entropy even it is not needed for every use case

by heinrich.mueller＠g-ushin.com

Hello, currently, I am evaluating the mbed-tls. I already created some smaller demos regarding AES and RSA. I do so on a PC with cygwin and with Keil micro vision for a NXP S32K144. One demo is just validating some data with a signature and an existing public key. Here is the point that puzzles me a bit. As far as I understand this cybersecurity stuff entropy is not needed for the above use case. Some of my colleagues would agree with me. Once psa_crypto_init() is called on a target NXP S32K144 the function returns PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY. So far so good https://os.mbed.com/docs/mbed-os/v6.15/porting/entropy-sources.html gives the hints on how to handle this in general but I did not find any information on how to disable the "request for entropy" in a save way once your use case does not need any new secrets. Can you give me a hint why psa_crypto_init() is implemented that way? It may also be that I still have a conceptual understanding problem!? Regards Heico

4 years

2
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*_ALT vs PSA for HW crypto and upstreaming

by mathieu.rondonneau＠broadcom.com

Hi mbed-tls Team, PSA crypto API for HW acceleration seems pretty new. Question1: is there some reference code or project I could poke around to see how it is being used? Currently I have added (locally) a set of driver to make use of our HW crypto using the *_ALT way (the old way?) and for what I understand, the PSA API is the "new way" to do things. But It is still unclear how vendor do upstream there HW acceleration drivers. If this part is kept in another repo, then the mbedTLS build does not have any "hooks" to pull-in the vendor specific code to build the mbedTLS library with. The current implementation seems to be agnostic to any vendor specific HW so I am wondering if there is a "standard" way for vendor to upstream their mbedTLS HW acceleration code that would be built as part of mbedTLS library. I have posted a similar thread to the "issue" ticket of the mbedtls repo for reference: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5975 Thanks for any feedback/pointers/ideas. Regards, -Mathieu

4 years

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LWIP/MbedTLS - any idea if SPI SRAM (block-accessible RAM) could be used for buffers?

by Peter

Hi All, My target has 128k SRAM which has about 60k spare, and 64k CCM which is allocated whole to FreeRTOS stacks etc (its private heap, memory model #4). I am running a simplified HTTP server (for local config etc), which uses fairly minimal RAM (a few k), and an HTTPS/TLS client which uses about 50k (for its private heap). So if both of the above are running concurrently, there is only ~10k RAM left, but it does work, but when TLS is doing its handshake/negotiation (which on a 168MHz 32F417 takes 2-3 seconds) the HTTP server temporarily hangs. Investigating this, it appears that LWIP is running out of buffers during TLS and is rejecting incoming packets. I don't really want to change the CPU to the next one up which has another 64k RAM, because a) I have stock of the 417 and this took about a year to get, b) the design is rock solid and I don't want to tempt fate (there is a lot of subtle hardware usage e.g. DAC ADC DMA timers) even though in theory it should be just alternate function pin changes, c) some versions of the product may not need TLS at all. I have an option of an 8 megabyte SPI-attached RAM https://www.eevblog.com/forum/microcontrollers/lyontek-ly68l6400-8-megabyte… which does work and is not bad at $3 (there are cheaper 128kbyte versions too), but obviously cannot be addressed as normal RAM. The ESP32 can do that but the 32F4 can't. Does anyone know enough about the internals of MbedTLS, or even LWIP, to know whether the memory usage structure lends itself to this kind of "overlay" memory? One can read or write say 1k bytes in 400us, in my target (21MHz SPI with DMA). Obviously this would be horribly inefficient for a byte at a time emulation but perhaps one can switch buffers in and out... Thank you in advance. If somebody knows of a concrete route, I am happy to pay for the time. Regards, Peter

4 years

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum next Monday

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

Hi All, This is a gentle reminder that the next MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday 4:30 PM UK time. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don MBed TLS Technical Forum Monday Jul 4, 2022 ⋅ 8:30am – 9:30am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum Time: Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM Nov 22, 2021 04:30 PM Dec 20, 2021 04:30 PM Jan 17, 2022 04:30 PM Feb 14, 2022 04:30 PM Mar 14, 2022 04:30 PM Apr 11, 2022 04:30 PM May 9, 2022 04:30 PM Jun 6, 2022 04:30 PM Jul 4, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 1, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 29, 2022 04:30 PM Sep 26, 2022 04:30 PM Oct 24, 2022 04:30 PM Nov 21, 2022 04:30 PM Dec 19, 2022 04:30 PM Jan 16, 2023 04:30 PM Feb 13, 2023 04:30 PM Mar 13, 2023 04:30 PM Apr 10, 2023 04:30 PM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJEkceuurT4sGdaksikbUn6FARB9Kuk3ac2o/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95962635632?pwd=STFkQVltejAzRDJ6NmoxZjhmZC9RUT… Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Passcode: 018366 One tap mobile +13462487799,,95962635632# US (Houston) +16699009128,,95962635632# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) 877 853 5247 US Toll-free 888 788 0099 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/aewUpnQu5y Guests psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org nnac123(a)gmail.com

4 years

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Is tls.mbed.org down?

by Max Peng

I wanted to access Mbed TLS knowledge Base (https://tls.mbed.org/kb) but fails. It seems tls.mbed.org was down for few days. Is this a known issue?

4 years

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RFC: removing support for DHE in TLS 1.2 in Mbed TLS 4.0?

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi all, We're seeking feedback on our plans regarding support for Finite-Field DHE (also known as FFDH(E), as opposed to the Elliptic Curve version, ECDH(E)). Currently the PSA Crypto API only supports FFDH with named groups, which aligns well with modern cryptographic practice and the needs of TLS 1.3, but less well with TLS 1.2 where arbitrary parameters can be chosen by the server, leading to various interoperability and security issues (see the introduction of RFC 7919, hence the general move to named groups). Some data suggests that FFDH is already seeing very little use (less than 1% of TLS 1.2 traffic) on major websites, and presumably this would be even less when constrained devices are involved, since ECDH is less resource-intensive. So, we are currently planning on removing support for DHE-RSA and DHE-PSK key exchanges in TLS 1.2 in the next major version of Mbed TLS. We would retain support of ECDHE in TLS 1.2, and of DHE (in addition to ECDHE) in TLS 1.3. (Support for FFDH in TLS 1.2 would also be present in the LTS version released around the same time as the next major version.) If you have any objection to this plan, please let us know about your use case and motivations, either by responding to this email, or by commenting on the corresponding github issue: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5278 Thank you! Best regards, Manuel for the Mbed TLS team.

4 years

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Verify cert chain

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, I have one root ca, intermediate ca, and device certificate in der format. While am trying to verify one by one as intermediate-ca with root-ca and device cert with intermediate-ca; things work fine. But if I tried to verify like having two context one for ca and one chain. I parse root ca on CA context and intermediate ca and device cert on chain context. Now verification fails with flag 8 error code -0x2700. I have attached verify_der_one_by_one.c it is working without any issue; but verify_der_chain.c is causing the issue stated above. Any help would be appreciated. Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

4 years

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VIA padlock support

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, Mbed TLS supports AES acceleration with VIA Padlock (MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C). We do not have the hardware to test it, so this should be considered strictly community-maintained. We are making a patch to the AES module which has a small risk of breaking VIA padlock support: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/5896 . If you are using VIA padlock, please test this change and let us know if something's wrong. On a related note, we intend to drop the Padlock code in the next major version of Mbed TLS (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5903). If you care about this feature, please let us know. Best regards, -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer

4 years, 1 month

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Clear master secret from mbedtls_ssl_session after handshake is ready

by Maarten Meijer

Hi all, I'm using an mbedTLS server on a CPU with a small memory foot print. In a search to serve as many as possible TLS clients, I found that the mbedtls_ssl_session.master[48] structure member is still in memory after the handshake is over. (I filed an issue to start with, but was quickly directed to this mailing list, thanks to Tom Cosgrove. See Clear master secret from mbedtls_ssl_session after handshake is ready * Issue #5832 * Mbed-TLS/mbedtls (github.com)<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5832>) I'm wondering why this is needed. The `master` secret references I can find in the code are either related to the TLS handshake, or to serialization/deserialization. I am wondering whether it makes sense to serialize/deserialize the master secret but I'm not sure if it is a use case to support serialization of ongoing handshake operations. Based on this 2 questions: * Is the master secret relevant when the handshake is over? * Is the master secret really useful in serialization/deserialization? If so, I could use `MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION` in my eventual merge request to keep facilitating this. Looking forward for relevant answers. Thanks in advance, Maarten

4 years, 1 month

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Invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 2am to 2:50am on Monday 20 times (MST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

You have been invited to the following event. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Every 4 weeks from 2am to 2:50am on Monday 20 times Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin - creator * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com * schoenle.thomas(a)googlemail.com * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MzE1cHJuZGxwMDFo… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

4 years, 1 month

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum June 6th

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the next MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday at 4:30pm UK time. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

4 years, 1 month

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PSA API on non-threaded environment

by gergely.nagymate＠generalmechatronics.com

Hi, I am using mbedTLS v3.0.0 on a low performance CPU on a non-threaded environment, a custom task manager, which is not a preemptive operating system. I have been using MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE so even the long ECC calculations during the handshake periodically returned so the external logic and task manager could run without being blocked for too long. Recently an IoT SAFE implementation was introduced through PSA API. It is used for RNG and verification calculation, but not for ECDSA and ECDH during key exchange. PSA API is designed for threaded environments and can not simultaneously use MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. Now the ECC functions block for several seconds. Do you have a recommendation on how to use PSA on non-threaded environments, or how to inject external logic execution during these long ECC operations? Thanks, Gergely

4 years, 1 month

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PSA API on non-threaded environment

by Gergely Nagymáté

Hi, I am using mbedTLS v3.0.0 on a low performance CPU on a non-threaded environment, a custom task manager, which is not a preemptive operating system. I have been using MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE so even the long ECC calculations during the handshake periodically returned so the external logic and task manager could run without being blocked for too long. Recently an IoT SAFE implementation was introduced through PSA API. It is used for RNG and verification calculation, but not for ECDSA and ECDH during key exchange. PSA API is designed for threaded environments and can not simultaneously use MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. Now the ECC functions block for several seconds. Do you have a recommendation on how to use PSA on non-threaded environments, or how to inject external logic execution during these long ECC operations? Thanks, Gergely

4 years, 1 month

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"RAW RSA" encoding method for signatures

by THIERRY BINIGUER

Hi all, I can see a "RAW RSA" encoding method for signatures both implemented in mbed TLS and PSA API and I'm wondering about the motivations and rational of this variant. Could you tell more about it, please ? Below details. Thierry It was introduced since 2017 in mbed TLS in this sha1 ID : fdf38030de70b95a77205f17d65591f05e74be08 ("Outsource code for generating PKCS1 v1.5 encoding"). As far as I know, standard does not specifically mention it but RFC 8017 ($9.2) specifies EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as a deterministic encoding method (no randomness) with a buffer that is built as an encoded message EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T, where PS being padding bytes, T being a DER encoding of a digestInfo, where digestInfo contains : - the hash function (so called AlgorithmIdentifier applied on the message) - and the hash value (so called digest H = = Hash(M)) PSA defines the RAW RSA in its API. It is said a signature algorithm, without hashing. In this raw RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, the hash parameter to psa_sign_hash is computed "externally". It is a DER encoding, “ready-to-use" hash, so called raw data in PSA and mbed TLS. In the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, the hash parameter to psa_sign_hash is H (computed with the hash function as indicated in the standard). mbed TLS implementation manages RAW data in rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(), it copies raw data as they are given and pads accordingly. Even if from a security perspective, this variant does not seem to introduce vulnerabilities, there is no information on the used hash algorithm inside the signature itself, therefore making mandatory for the verifier to know exactly which algorithm is used, and therefore less trivial in term of device interoperability.

4 years, 1 month

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Cancelled event: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ (BST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Mike Holmes

This event has been cancelled. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: United Kingdom Time Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin- creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com * schoenle.thomas(a)googlemail.com Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

4 years, 1 month

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Updated invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 21:00 to 21:50 on Monday from Mon 31 Jan to Mon 23 May (AEDT) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by santosdanillo＠gmail.com

This event has been changed. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Every 4 weeks from 21:00 to 21:50 on Monday from Mon 31 Jan to Mon 23 May Eastern Australia Time - Sydney (changed) Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin- creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com * schoenle.thomas(a)googlemail.com Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MmU4dm1iNzJ0dmV1… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

4 years, 1 month

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Updated invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 19:00 to 19:50 on Monday 13 times (AEST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by santosdanillo＠gmail.com

This event has been changed. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Every 4 weeks from 19:00 to 19:50 on Monday 13 times Eastern Australia Time - Sydney (changed) Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin- creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com * schoenle.thomas(a)googlemail.com Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MmU4dm1iNzJ0dmV1… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

4 years, 1 month

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Require cross compilation steps

by Krunal Chauhan

Hi, I need updated mbed TLS library version 3.1.0 I need step/procedure to cross compile mbed TLS library. Best Regards, [Logo]<https://www.slscorp.com/> Krunal Chauhan Senior Engineer Email: krunal.chauhan(a)slscorp.com | www.slscorp.com<http://www.slscorp.com> Plot#32, Zone-D/4, Phase-1, GIDC Estate V.U. Nagar - 388 121, Gujarat, India

4 years, 1 month

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Re: AES Memory Leak

by Minos Galanakis

Hi Subramanian. Thank you for your report. Would it be possible to provide some further information on how the program is structured? Is the code snippet running in a single thread or a multithreaded application? How often is data transmitted (As to many invocations are we considering for an 8-hour window)? How is that while(1) loop interrupted? Which platform architecture is the program running at? I have been trying to reproduce it by expanding the Valgrind test suite, as to repeat the logic included in the example for UINT_MAX iterations, without success. Minos ________________________________ From: Subramanian Gopi Krishnan via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 16 March 2022 04:24 To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] AES Memory Leak Hi, I have developed a program to send encrypted data continuously. The program is working fine for few hours. After 6 to 8 Hrs, I get returned MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED -0x6180 Do I need to free the gcm context for every time I send data? What would be the root cause. #define AEAD_KEY_SIZE (32) /**< AEAD Key Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_IV_SIZE (12) /**< AEAD IV Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_AD_SIZE (16) /**< AEAD AAD Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_TAG_SIZE (16) /**< AEAD Tag Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_ID_SIZE (4) /**< AEAD Tag Size(in bytes). */ #define MAX_CIPHER_SIZE (2048)/**< AEAD Cipher/Plaintext Segent Size unoperation(in bytes). */ typedef struct { mbedtls_gcm_context CtxAead; /**< aes-gcm 3rd party library context */ uint8_t pu8Key[AEAD_KEY_SIZE]; /**< Key - Randomly Generated */ uint8_t pu8InitVector[AEAD_IV_SIZE]; /**< Randomly Generated */ uint8_t pu8AddData[AEAD_AD_SIZE]; /**< Additional Associated Data - md5sum() */ uint8_t pu8Tag[AEAD_TAG_SIZE]; /**< Hold Digest/Tag of encryped data */ uint8_t pu8Id[AEAD_ID_SIZE]; /**< KeyID is generated */ uint8_t pu8Data[MAX_CIPHER_SIZE]; /**< Buffer to hold plain-text after decipher */ uint8_t pu8Cipher[MAX_CIPHER_SIZE]; /**< Buffer to hold cipher-text after cipher */ uint16_t u16Length; /**< Current length of buffer to encrypt/decrypt */ }S_Aead; int32_t i32Aead_EncryptionCycle(S_Aead *ctx ,uint8_t *pu8AddData, uint16_t u16Length ) { int32_t i32Ret = 0; if(NULL == ctx) { return (NULL_AEAD_CTX); } /* Initilaze GCM Context **/ mbedtls_gcm_init ( &(ctx->CtxAead) ); /*SETTING ADDITIONAL DATA as MD5 of incoming data **/ if( AEAD_AD_SIZE < u16Length ) { return (ERROR_INPUT_BUFFER_TOO_LONG); } memset( ctx->pu8AddData, 0x00, AEAD_AD_SIZE ); i32Ret = mbedtls_md5_ret(pu8AddData, u16Length, ctx->pu8AddData); if (i32Ret) { return (i32Ret); } /* symetric key for testing */ memset( ctx->pu8Key, 0xAB, AEAD_KEY_SIZE ) /* Setting the key */ if( i32Ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey ( &(ctx->CtxAead), MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, ctx->pu8Key, AEAD_KEY_SIZE*OCTETS ) ) { return (i32Ret); } while(1) { /* OS Wait for 1000ms for data to get ready */ if( OS_WaitSingleEventTimed( TX_DATA_BUFFER_READY, WAIT_1000MS ) ) { if( ctx->u16Length == 0 ) { /* No data ready for sending (or) timed-out */; continue; } /* New Initial Vector */ if( i32Ret = i32NewRandomByte( ctx->pu8InitVector, AEAD_IV_SIZE, "AEAD_NEW_IV_GENERATION" ) ) { return(i32Ret); } ctx->u16Length = u16Length; if( i32Ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &(ctx->CtxAead), MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, ctx->u16Length, ctx->pu8InitVector, AEAD_IV_SIZE, ctx->pu8AddData, AEAD_AD_SIZE, ctx->pu8Data, ctx->pu8Cipher, AEAD_TAG_SIZE, ctx->pu8Tag)) { return(i32Ret); } if( ctx->u16Length == send_data(ctx->pu8Cipher, ctx->u16Length) ) { /* tx success*/ memset( ctx->pu8Data, 0x00, ctx->u16Length ); memset( ctx->pu8Cipher, 0x00, ctx->u16Length ); ctx->u16Length = 0; } } } /* Free GCM Context */ mbedtls_gcm_free( &(ctx->CtxAead) ); /* Reset context memory */ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(S_Aead)); }

4 years, 2 months

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Re: mbed-tls Digest, Vol 26, Issue 5

by Christie Su

Hi, Is there anyone who can tell me how to send the question related to MbedTLS? Which forum can I sign in? Thanks, Christie -----Original Message----- From: mbed-tls-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: April-25-22 8:00 PM To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: mbed-tls Digest, Vol 26, Issue 5 Send mbed-tls mailing list submissions to mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To subscribe or unsubscribe via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to mbed-tls-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org You can reach the person managing the list at mbed-tls-owner(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of mbed-tls digest..." Today's Topics: 1. misc. questions (Frank Bergmann) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 12:47:07 +0200 From: Frank Bergmann <mbedtls(a)tuxad.com> Subject: [mbed-tls] misc. questions To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Message-ID: <20220425104707.GA3579(a)treferpol.tuxad.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi all, I have some questions. 1) If you have an established TLS connection (mbed TLS 3.x) and while the connection is up the (server-) certificate expires: Will the connection stay up? Or is a new handshake (with valid cert) REQUIRED? 2) Related to question 1: CAN mbed TLS switch to a new cert on an existing TLS connection? (e.g. by doing another handshake from server OR client side) 3) With 3.x some struct members are now "private". Even if you can allow private access by a define it would be better to use a getter. But for ssl context's "state" I am missing this and also for "p_bio" (to access fd). Is there a chance to get this implemented? BTW - a big "LIKE" for 3.x! I really appreciate the changes. Thank you! kind regards, Frank ------------------------------ Subject: Digest Footer mbed-tls mailing list -- mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org ------------------------------ End of mbed-tls Digest, Vol 26, Issue 5 ***************************************

4 years, 2 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the Asia-Europe timezone-friendly MBest TLS Tech forum is next Monday. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Mon Apr 25, 2022 2am – 2:50am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Who: * Don Harbin - creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com * schoenle.thomas(a)googlemail.com

4 years, 2 months

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Mbed tls handshake returns –x7200

by arman_ilmak＠yahoo.com

Hey friends Im trying to do a secure connection between my stm32 board and server. I wrote the code based on GitHub - eziya/STM32F4_HAL_ETH_MBEDTLS: STM32 mbedTLS library testing (SSL/TLS client) that i found. My board is based on stm32h7 series. And im using google to test my app.(ip 142.250.74.196 port 443) This is the debug section: https://aws1.discourse-cdn.com/standard17/uploads/mbed/original/2X/e/ee636c… How should i solve the problem?

4 years, 2 months

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Issues with mbedtls_rsa_import_raw + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify

by m4D

Greetings! I'm having an issue while veryfing signature with imported RSA2048 public key, generated with Win7 CryptoAPI (PUBLICKEYBLOB) into latest mbedtls 2.28.x. The blob contains RSA modulus N (256 bytes) and public exponent E (4 bytes) - I do extract them succesfully, then provide into mbedtls_rsa_import_raw. It all goes smth. like this: u32 errval = mbedtls_rsa_init(ctx, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0); // errval == 0 here errval = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(ctx, n, nlen, 0l, 0, 0l, 0, 0l, 0, e, elen); // errval == 0 here errval = mbedtls_rsa_complete(ctx); // errval == 0 here errval = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(ctx); // errval == 0 here Then i ran: errval = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(ctx, 0l, 0l, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, 0, _src, _sign); and get -0x4380 (verify failed) _src - is sha512 hash of data to be verified (64 bytes) _sign - is 256 bytes of signature, provided by win7 cryptoapi P.S. just in case, i did tried messing with endianess in every way for e AND n, it didn't help. I added a little debugging inside library/rsa.cpp, turned out we do call mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify, and there is a memcmp between 'encoded' and 'encoded_expected' bufs. 'encoded' is derived from signature (_sign), and 'encoded_expected' is derived from hash (_src) printhex for 'encoded' looks like this: 1a1da83b 14be17a2 c8401d41 1d453909 ... total 16 lines (256 bytes) ... 7fb37ea2 719a5562 aebdb3ed 296e0ed1 but printhex for 'encoded_expected' looks like this: ffff0100 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ... wtf??? padding ??? ... ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 30513000 6009060d 65014886 03020403 40040005 b190b45a a40b354f 32271b34 f022abd3 ... sha512-derived data here, 64 bytes 557abf2b e2cc4e0f 0b77bdfc b45688b0 So, there is no way these two bufs match. I wonded if there is some issue in parsing _sign, or I didn't prepared input data good enough. Any ideas? B.R., m4D.

4 years, 3 months

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How to verify in a server that session cache resumption was used for a given connection

by eoin.mcmahon.dev＠gmail.com

I am trying to modify the dtls_server.c example to keep track of whether session caching was used for a given connection. Ideally I would have an interget value i.e `session_resumed = #1 or 0` One way I tried to do this was by reading the value of the mbedtls_ssl_context struct `ssl`: ``` /* * 5. Handshake */ do ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ); while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ); if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ) { printf( " hello verification requested\n" ); ret = 0; goto reset; } else if( ret != 0 ) { printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret ); goto reset; } printf( " session cache status: %d\n", ssl.handshake.resume ); ``` The issue with this is that the ssl struct is set to private, so the code fails to compile with the error: 'struct mbedtls_ssl_context' has no member named 'handshake' Can somebody help me with some example code that would make this possible?

4 years, 3 months

3
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Mbed TLS GitHub migration

by Dave Rodgman

Hi all, Please note that in the next couple of weeks, we will migrate Mbed TLS to a new GitHub organisation. Your existing scripts, links etc for accessing Mbed TLS on GitHub should not be affected. This will change the url from https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls to https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls . GitHub will redirect any accesses to the old URL for the foreseeable future, but we would recommend updating your links once the migration is complete. All of the Mbed TLS repositories will migrate to this new organisation, i.e.: mbedtls mbedtls-docs mbedtls-test Thanks Dave Rodgman

4 years, 3 months

1
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ECDSA Help

by Deep Patel

Hello, mbedTLS has ECDSA module that takes Signature with ASN1 encoding as input mbedtls_pk_verify() The Signature I receive is without ASN1 encoded. Trying to find an implementation within mbedTLS that can add ASN1 to signature before I feed into the verify function. Any help ? [RF IDeas]<http://www.rfideas.com/> Deep Patel Sr. Embedded Software Engineer D: 224-333-2084 P: 847-870-1723 Ext 437 E: ddpatel(a)rfideas.com<mailto:ddpatel@rfideas.com> A: <https://www.rfideas.com/> 425 North Martingale Road, Suite 1680, Schaumburg, IL 60173 <https://www.rfideas.com/>

4 years, 3 months

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TrustedFirmware Code of Conduct

by Don Harbin

Hi All, Please find the link to the TrustedFirmware Community Code of Conduct here: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/community_guidelines/… Trusted Firmware has a very diverse and global developer community. It is important that we adhere to the code of conduct in all our interactions. For some of you all this may be new and for others just a gentle reminder. In either case, if you have any questions, please feel free to reach out to me directly. And thanks to you all for your contributions to the TrustedFirmware community! Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

4 years, 3 months

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Official release with mutual authentication support

by Tove Rumar

Hello! Is there a time plan for when there will be an official release with TLS 1.3 (Client) that supports mutual authentication? Kind Regards Tove Rumar Software Engineer u-blox Malmo Östra Varvsgatan 4 SE- Malmö www.u-blox.com<https://www.u-blox.com> Reliable. Smart. Secure.

4 years, 3 months

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AES Memory Leak

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, I have developed a program to send encrypted data continuously. The program is working fine for few hours. After 6 to 8 Hrs, I get returned MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED -0x6180 Do I need to free the gcm context for every time I send data? What would be the root cause. #define AEAD_KEY_SIZE (32) /**< AEAD Key Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_IV_SIZE (12) /**< AEAD IV Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_AD_SIZE (16) /**< AEAD AAD Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_TAG_SIZE (16) /**< AEAD Tag Size(in bytes). */ #define AEAD_ID_SIZE (4) /**< AEAD Tag Size(in bytes). */ #define MAX_CIPHER_SIZE (2048)/**< AEAD Cipher/Plaintext Segent Size unoperation(in bytes). */ typedef struct { mbedtls_gcm_context CtxAead; /**< aes-gcm 3rd party library context */ uint8_t pu8Key[AEAD_KEY_SIZE]; /**< Key - Randomly Generated */ uint8_t pu8InitVector[AEAD_IV_SIZE]; /**< Randomly Generated */ uint8_t pu8AddData[AEAD_AD_SIZE]; /**< Additional Associated Data - md5sum() */ uint8_t pu8Tag[AEAD_TAG_SIZE]; /**< Hold Digest/Tag of encryped data */ uint8_t pu8Id[AEAD_ID_SIZE]; /**< KeyID is generated */ uint8_t pu8Data[MAX_CIPHER_SIZE]; /**< Buffer to hold plain-text after decipher */ uint8_t pu8Cipher[MAX_CIPHER_SIZE]; /**< Buffer to hold cipher-text after cipher */ uint16_t u16Length; /**< Current length of buffer to encrypt/decrypt */ }S_Aead; int32_t i32Aead_EncryptionCycle(S_Aead *ctx ,uint8_t *pu8AddData, uint16_t u16Length ) { int32_t i32Ret = 0; if(NULL == ctx) { return (NULL_AEAD_CTX); } /* Initilaze GCM Context **/ mbedtls_gcm_init ( &(ctx->CtxAead) ); /*SETTING ADDITIONAL DATA as MD5 of incoming data **/ if( AEAD_AD_SIZE < u16Length ) { return (ERROR_INPUT_BUFFER_TOO_LONG); } memset( ctx->pu8AddData, 0x00, AEAD_AD_SIZE ); i32Ret = mbedtls_md5_ret(pu8AddData, u16Length, ctx->pu8AddData); if (i32Ret) { return (i32Ret); } /* symetric key for testing */ memset( ctx->pu8Key, 0xAB, AEAD_KEY_SIZE ) /* Setting the key */ if( i32Ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey ( &(ctx->CtxAead), MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, ctx->pu8Key, AEAD_KEY_SIZE*OCTETS ) ) { return (i32Ret); } while(1) { /* OS Wait for 1000ms for data to get ready */ if( OS_WaitSingleEventTimed( TX_DATA_BUFFER_READY, WAIT_1000MS ) ) { if( ctx->u16Length == 0 ) { /* No data ready for sending (or) timed-out */; continue; } /* New Initial Vector */ if( i32Ret = i32NewRandomByte( ctx->pu8InitVector, AEAD_IV_SIZE, "AEAD_NEW_IV_GENERATION" ) ) { return(i32Ret); } ctx->u16Length = u16Length; if( i32Ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &(ctx->CtxAead), MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, ctx->u16Length, ctx->pu8InitVector, AEAD_IV_SIZE, ctx->pu8AddData, AEAD_AD_SIZE, ctx->pu8Data, ctx->pu8Cipher, AEAD_TAG_SIZE, ctx->pu8Tag)) { return(i32Ret); } if( ctx->u16Length == send_data(ctx->pu8Cipher, ctx->u16Length) ) { /* tx success*/ memset( ctx->pu8Data, 0x00, ctx->u16Length ); memset( ctx->pu8Cipher, 0x00, ctx->u16Length ); ctx->u16Length = 0; } } } /* Free GCM Context */ mbedtls_gcm_free( &(ctx->CtxAead) ); /* Reset context memory */ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(S_Aead)); }

4 years, 4 months

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MBed TLS Technical Forum - reminder

by Don Harbin

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the US-Europe timezone-friendly MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

4 years, 4 months

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signature verification of ECC type

by Sunil Jain

Hello, we are using mbedTLS version 2.16. We are facing a problem in verifying the signed message for ECDSA type of algorithms. Do you have any sample code for this as given for the RSA type algorithm in rsa_verify.c. We have derived the R and S values and their length, but we are not sure which context to use to verify the signature. Please help urgently. -- Regards, Sunil Jain

4 years, 4 months

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Re: How to verify in a server that session cache resumption was used for a given connection

by Eoin McMahon

Hi thanks for getting back to me, That's fine if it doesn't work in future releases, I will most likely stay on 3.0.0. Unfortunately when trying to add this line to the dtls_server example I get: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type 'mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params' {aka 'struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params'} int resumed = ssl.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(handshake)->resume; ^~ my use case for this is to test a client's ability to connect to the server and use session caching, I want to essentially send messages to the server from a client, and have the server send a message back either 'session cache was used' or 'session cache was not used'.

4 years, 4 months

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Realization TLS 1.2. in libiec61850

by kirilllatyshov99＠gmail.com

Good afternoon, I'm trying to implement TLS 1.2. for MMS using the library libiec61850. When a connection is established, the interaction is interrupted at the stage "Client Key Exchange". Also, when monitoring the interaction through wireshark, I see that an error is displayed at the "Certificate Request" stage. I use default certificates, the project is built through CMake on Windows and TLS 1.1. works flawlessly. In the file tls_mbedtls.c I changed only the values of the minimum and maximum versions to TLS 1.2. Thank you in advance for your response.

4 years, 4 months

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Reminder: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the Asia-Europe timezone-friendly MBest TLS Tech forum is next Monday. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Mon Feb 28, 2022 3am – 3:50am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Who: * Don Harbin - creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com

4 years, 4 months

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Re: ssl_server2 failed with mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned error -30976

by Dave Rodgman

Hi Dmitrij, (Please note, I've moved this question to the main Mbed TLS list as this is the right place for this kind of question). I've tested our example ssl_client2 against test.mosquitto.org, using a client certificate & key generated via https://test.mosquitto.org/ssl/index.php, and CA file from https://test.mosquitto.org/. This connects properly using the command line: ./ssl_client2 server_addr=test.mosquitto.org server_port=8884 ca_file=mosquitto.org.crt server_name=test.mosquitto.org crt_file=client.crt key_file=client.key Similarly, OpenSSL succeeds using the same certificates: openssl s_client -connect test.mosquitto.org:8884 -CAfile mosquitto.org.crt -servername test.mosquitto.org -cert client.crt -key client.key However, if I omit the client key (i.e. remove "-key client.key"), Mbed TLS fails in the manner you describe. It looks like you are not supplying the client key? Regards Dave Rodgman On 21/02/2022, 10:55, "Dmitrij Shabroff via Mbed-tls-announce via mbed-tls" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: Good day Please answer my questions - there is very little literature on the topic. I do not know what to do. I have dealt with the message [2:40] issue. I did not enroll the user certificate using: if((ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(&conf, &clicert, &pkey))!= 0) and this certificate was not transmitted. Now I have taken it a step further, the certificate is successfully transferred and the server does not break the connection. I switched to TLS 1.3. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- But in your examples, I see the use of two certificates: mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cacert, NULL ); ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &clicert, &pkey ) ) And also the key: ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_key, mbedtls_test_cli_key_len, NULL, 0, rng_get, &rng ); In my version, I only have a client certificate. I working with https://test.mosquitto.org/ Would you advise where to get the missing certificates and where to get the key for the mbedtls_pk_parse_key function? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Now in both functions I use the same certificate and a PCA key from the example. I get a message: ..\Src\mbedTLS\library\ssl_msg.c:4645:got an alert message, type: [2:51] ..\Src\mbedTLS\library\ssl_msg.c:4653:is a fatal alert message (msg 51) ..\Src\mbedTLS\library\ssl_msg.c:3763:mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type() returned -30592 (-0x7780) ..\Src\mbedTLS\library\ssl_msg.c:4771:mbedtls_ssl_read_record() returned -30592 (-0x7780) Sincerely, Shabrov Dmitry >Понедельник, 7 февраля 2022, 16:28 +03:00 от B Mahesh via Mbed-tls-announce via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>: > >Hi , > > > >*Problem description :* > > > >Trying to run example >https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/master/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c . > >Updated ssl_server2 port to listen on 7777 for incoming client request >,ssl_server2 >will be waiting for remote connection continuously. > >There was no client request for connection on this port, but still server >is getting some spurious connection request and goes for handshake and >fails with below error code. > > > >Error code: mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned error -30976 > > > > >*Steps to reproduce: =============* > > 1. start ssl_server2 program > 2. Monitor for ssl_server2 connection waiting , observe ssl_server2 will > accept spurious connection request and goes for handshake and fails >with above > mentioned error code. > > > >*Expected behavior:* >ssl_server2 wait for remote connection infinitely and connect to valid >client request and perform handshake every time. > > >*Actual behavior:* >Occasionally ssl_server2 will accept spurious connection request and goes >for handshake and fails with below error code. > > > >Error code: >mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned error -30976 on ssl_server2 > > > >*Analysis:* > >As per below logs what we understand is ssl_server2 will accept spurious >connection request and goes for handshake and fails with error code >-30796 ,MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO >on ssl_server2 side . > > > >Can you please help us to understand this behavior? > >What could be the reason for ssl_server2 to connect to a spurious >connection request?, as mentioned above there was no client request for >connection on this ssl_server2 port( 7777) . > >We have tried this on other SERVER_PORT as well . > > > >*Logs Snippet:* > >*==========* > > > >. Seeding the random number generator... ok > > . Loading the CA root certificate ... ok (0 skipped) > > . Loading the server cert. and key... ok > > . Bind on tcp://*:7777/ ... ok > > . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure... ok > > . Waiting for a remote connection ...ok > > . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... failed > > ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x7900 > > > >Last error was: -30976 - SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake >message failed > > > > . Waiting for a remote connection ... ok > > . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... failed > > ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x7900 > > > >Last error was: -30976 - SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake >message failed > > > > . Waiting for a remote connection ... ok > > . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... failed > > ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x7900 > > > >Last error was: -30976 - SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake >message failed > > > >Regards >Mahesh >-- >Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >-- >mbed-tls mailing list -- mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org -- mbed-tls mailing list -- mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

4 years, 4 months

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TLS PSK display X.509 verified

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, I am evaluating TLS PSK capability on mbedlts-2.16.12 by running following command. I modified TLS client to have only PSK and removed all private key and certificate related code. However, the servier indicated x.509 verification ok. What is it? ./a.out ok . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... ok [ Protocol is TLSv1.2 ] [ Ciphersuite is TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 ] [ Record expansion is 29 ] . Closing the connection... done ./ssl_server2 psk="AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" psk_list="Client_identity","AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 . Seeding the random number generator... ok . Loading the CA root certificate ... ok (0 skipped) . Loading the server cert. and key... ok . Bind on tcp://*:4433/ ... ok . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure... ok . Waiting for a remote connection ... ok . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... ok [ Protocol is TLSv1.2 ] [ Ciphersuite is TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 ] [ Record expansion is 29 ] [ Maximum fragment length is 16384 ] . Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok < Read from client: 34 bytes read GET / HTTP/1.0 Extra-header: > Write to client: 144 bytes written in 1 fragments HTTP/1.0 200 OK Content-Type: text/html <h2>mbed TLS Test Server</h2> <p>Successful connection using: TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256</p> . Closing the connection... done . Waiting for a remote connection ... Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

4 years, 4 months

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Re: TLS PSK display X.509 verified

by Hannes Tschofenig

Hi Gopi, When you say "I modified TLS client to have only PSK and removed all private key and certificate related code." did you set the C processor directives in the include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h file? To me it seems that you didn't do this and hence you still use the default configuration settings, which means that all PKI-related code is compiled into your binary. Ciao Hannes From: Subramanian Gopi Krishnan via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2022 12:15 PM To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] TLS PSK display X.509 verified Hi, I am evaluating TLS PSK capability on mbedlts-2.16.12 by running following command. I modified TLS client to have only PSK and removed all private key and certificate related code. However, the servier indicated x.509 verification ok. What is it? ./a.out ok . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... ok [ Protocol is TLSv1.2 ] [ Ciphersuite is TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 ] [ Record expansion is 29 ] . Closing the connection... done ./ssl_server2 psk="AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" psk_list="Client_identity","AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" force_ciphersuite=TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 . Seeding the random number generator... ok . Loading the CA root certificate ... ok (0 skipped) . Loading the server cert. and key... ok . Bind on tcp://*:4433/ ... ok . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure... ok . Waiting for a remote connection ... ok . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... ok [ Protocol is TLSv1.2 ] [ Ciphersuite is TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 ] [ Record expansion is 29 ] [ Maximum fragment length is 16384 ] . Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok < Read from client: 34 bytes read GET / HTTP/1.0 Extra-header: > Write to client: 144 bytes written in 1 fragments HTTP/1.0 200 OK Content-Type: text/html <h2>mbed TLS Test Server</h2> <p>Successful connection using: TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256</p> . Closing the connection... done . Waiting for a remote connection ... Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

4 years, 4 months

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[Mbed-tls-announce] ssl_server2 failed with mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned error -30976

by B Mahesh via Mbed-tls-announce

Hi , *Problem description :* Trying to run example https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/blob/master/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c . Updated ssl_server2 port to listen on 7777 for incoming client request ,ssl_server2 will be waiting for remote connection continuously. There was no client request for connection on this port, but still server is getting some spurious connection request and goes for handshake and fails with below error code. Error code: mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned error -30976 *Steps to reproduce: =============* 1. start ssl_server2 program 2. Monitor for ssl_server2 connection waiting , observe ssl_server2 will accept spurious connection request and goes for handshake and fails with above mentioned error code. *Expected behavior:* ssl_server2 wait for remote connection infinitely and connect to valid client request and perform handshake every time. *Actual behavior:* Occasionally ssl_server2 will accept spurious connection request and goes for handshake and fails with below error code. Error code: mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned error -30976 on ssl_server2 *Analysis:* As per below logs what we understand is ssl_server2 will accept spurious connection request and goes for handshake and fails with error code -30796 ,MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO on ssl_server2 side . Can you please help us to understand this behavior? What could be the reason for ssl_server2 to connect to a spurious connection request?, as mentioned above there was no client request for connection on this ssl_server2 port( 7777) . We have tried this on other SERVER_PORT as well . *Logs Snippet:* *==========* . Seeding the random number generator... ok . Loading the CA root certificate ... ok (0 skipped) . Loading the server cert. and key... ok . Bind on tcp://*:7777/ ... ok . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure... ok . Waiting for a remote connection ...ok . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x7900 Last error was: -30976 - SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed . Waiting for a remote connection ... ok . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x7900 Last error was: -30976 - SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed . Waiting for a remote connection ... ok . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... failed ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x7900 Last error was: -30976 - SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed Regards Mahesh -- Mbed-tls-announce mailing list -- mbed-tls-announce(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-announce-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

4 years, 4 months

2
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MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED on Embedded Platform

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, I have ported mbedtls library on am embedded platform developed to encrypt / decrypt messages using AES GCM 256 key. After several hours of running, we are experiencing error MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED 0x6180 and malloc functions fails as the heap seems to be piled-up. How could I is using correct free function and the actual allocated memory is freed? Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

4 years, 4 months

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Tentative: MBed TLS Technical Forum

by Gergely Pintér

4 years, 5 months

1
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Future crypto library features

by Hulshof, Robert

All, Not sure if this is the right audience (If it is not let me know if there is a better place to ask the following question) We have been looking at future security requirements for CPE devices, and we think that we need the following functionality that is currently not really available in the current crypto libraries. - Support for Quantum computing secure algorithms (Post Quantum of PQ algorithms) - Support for Hybrid keys ( PQ plus Classic algorithm), preferable in any configuration. - Modularized public key crypto algorithms implementation, to simplify adding new algorithms - Updating public key architecture to simplify off-loading private key operations to a Trusted Execution environment or other security HW. We initially looked at openssl, but found the openssl difficult to work with, so we decided to look at Mbedtls, which has a more lightweight design. We modified the mbedtls 'pkey' code to make it more modularized (building on the pkwrap design), and added to support for Hybrid keys, which was relatively easy to do. Updating the TLS library to support hybrid keys has however been a big challenge. The TLS code is very interwoven with the 'pkey' code, and seems to have almost unique implementation for each type of key, making it difficult to follow and modify. Adding support for other (PQ) algorithms within that design will be challenge. Before spending too much time on this we would like to know if there is an interest in the MBEDTLS community for a redesign of the code to support hybrid keys, PQ algorithms and modularized public key architecture. Thanks, Robert E-MAIL CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: The contents of this e-mail message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information. If you are not the intended recipient of this message or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please immediately alert the sender by reply e-mail and then delete this message and any attachments. If you are not the intended recipient, you are notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, copying, or storage of this message or any attachment is strictly prohibited.

4 years, 5 months

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MBed TLS Technical Forum - reminder

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

Hi All, A gentle reminder that the US-Europe timezone-friendly MBest TLS Tech forum is next Monday. If you have any topics, please let Dave Rodgman know. :) Best regards, Don Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum Time: Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM Nov 22, 2021 04:30 PM Dec 20, 2021 04:30 PM Jan 17, 2022 04:30 PM Feb 14, 2022 04:30 PM Mar 14, 2022 04:30 PM Apr 11, 2022 04:30 PM May 9, 2022 04:30 PM Jun 6, 2022 04:30 PM Jul 4, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 1, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 29, 2022 04:30 PM Sep 26, 2022 04:30 PM Oct 24, 2022 04:30 PM Nov 21, 2022 04:30 PM Dec 19, 2022 04:30 PM Jan 16, 2023 04:30 PM Feb 13, 2023 04:30 PM Mar 13, 2023 04:30 PM Apr 10, 2023 04:30 PM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJEkceuurT4sGdaksikbUn6FARB9Kuk3ac2o/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95962635632?pwd=STFkQVltejAzRDJ6NmoxZjhmZC9RUT… Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Passcode: 018366 One tap mobile +13462487799,,95962635632# US (Houston) +16699009128,,95962635632# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) 877 853 5247 US Toll-free 888 788 0099 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/aewUpnQu5y When: Mon Feb 14, 2022 9:30am – 10:30am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Who: * Don Harbin - creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com

4 years, 5 months

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mbedTLS Question

by SHIRLEY Murray

Hello, I am evaluating the mbedTLS library and trying to create a build with Visual Studio 2010, but I am encountering errors. Below are the steps I have taken: 1. Downloaded "mbedtls-3.1.0.zip" and extracted the contents to my Windows 10 computer. 2. Run Visual Studio 2010 and open the solution "mbedTLS.sln" in the folder "mbedtls-3.1.0\visualc\VS2010". 3. Select the "mbedTLS" project and select "Rebuild Only mbedTLS". This is for the Release configuration targeting Win32. 4. During the build process multiple errors are encounter, which seem to be related to Visual Studio's limited C Compiler support. The build output is attached. Am I missing any steps for configuring the solution or project? I was under the impression that mbedTLS offered support for compiling with Visual Studio 2010? Any help that you can provide would be greatly appreciated. Best regards, Murray Shirley, P.Eng. MicroSurvey Software, Inc. (250) 707-0000 murray.shirley(a)microsurvey.com<mailto:murray.shirley@microsurvey.com>

4 years, 5 months

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TLS Only for Data Authentication

by Subramanian Gopi Krishnan

Hi, I am developing TLS client and server for embedded systems. Considering the operational efficiency, it is sufficient to have data authentication. Is it possible to setup a TLS communication with data authentication and without encryption? Consider a PLC network, 1. Within physical secure zone. 2. Requires faster data transfer. 3. Data are not confidential, but must be cryptographically authenticated. Thanks, Gopi Krishnan

4 years, 5 months

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Please, help me about Mbedtls_ssl_handshake return error -0x2700

by Dmitrij Shabroff

Hello. I am facing the issue of certificate verification error during handshake.The problem is described by me in the appropriate section of the forum. https://forums.mbed.com/t/mbedtls-failing-with-the-certificate-is-not-corre… Please help me figure it out - there is no one else to turn to. Sincerely, Shabrov Dmitry

4 years, 5 months

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Does MbedTLS provide paid tech support?

by Tom Zhu

We are interested in whether there are paid supports from MbedTLS regarding optimization on some ARM MCUs. If so, whom should we contact? Thanks! Tom

4 years, 5 months

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TLS 1.3 support

by Lukas Frei

Good morning, My team and me are starting a bigger project concerning object control on the rail. The security specifications shall use TLS version 1.3. I could read on some forums that you are actually working on it. Could I please get some information about the release date of it? If not provided soon we will be forced to switch to another library. Thanks a lot for your help. Best Regards, Lukas Frei Dipl. MSc Universität Bern und BFH in Biomedical Engineering Embedded Software Engineer CSA Engineering AG Hans Huber-Strasse 38 CH-4500 Solothurn Direkt +41 32 626 35 81 Telefon +41 32 626 35 55 Fax +41 32 626 35 50 mailto:lukas.frei@csa.ch https://www.csa.ch ________________________________ Confidentiality Note: This message is intended only for the use of the named recipient(s) and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the/an intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete this message. Any unauthorized use of the information contained in this message is prohibited.

4 years, 5 months

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Now Im subscribe

by Dmitrij Shabroff

Good afternoon. I am a microcontroller product designer. I ported MBED TLS to STM 32L471 microcontroller. While I do not understand how can I use the certificate. My customer gave me a certificate in the form of a center2m.com.cer file. The file contains the 3 fields: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIGVzCCBT+gAwIBAgIMEnU/ ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIET ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIDDX ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- tell me please, how to port my certificate to certs.c file. The question is which fields to insert where? Please help. No one can answer this question except you. Sincerely, development engineer, Shabrov Dmitrii

4 years, 5 months

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Next MBed TLS Tech Forum - Monday

by Don Harbin

Hi All, This is a gentle reminder that the next MBed TLS Tech forum is next Monday @10am UK time. Reminders: - This is the "Asia timezone friendly" session, but the session recording and supporting content are archived here <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-technical-forum/>. - Dial-in details can be found in the online calendar <https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/>. If you click on this event in the calendar, it also provides the option to add it to your personal calendar if you wish If anyone has topics you would like to see added to the agenda, please share and Dave and the team will work to get these onto the agenda. Best regards, Don

4 years, 5 months

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Tentative: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia

by Gergely Pintér

4 years, 5 months

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mbedtls handshake error

by MATRIX 小牧

Hello. I'm sorry for the sudden email. I have a question about mbedtls. Currently, HTTPS communication is performed by mbedtls with a microcomputer called esp32-wroom-32d. The following error occurs when validating the root certificate. --------------------------------------------- mbedtls: ssl_tls.c: 5808 x509_verify_cert () returned -12288 (-0x3000) --------------------------------------------- I can't find out the details even if I check the error code. Changing the certificate will eliminate the error. It has been confirmed that the certificate is legitimate and can be used. [SecurityCommunicationRootCA1.pem] ---- Success [SecurityCommunicationRootCA2.pem] ---- Failure I would like to have any information. Sorry for the unfamiliar English. I look forward to working with you. Komaki

4 years, 5 months

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Updated invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia @ Every 4 weeks from 3am to 3:50am on Monday 17 times (MST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

This event has been changed. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum - Asia Time: Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Nov 8, 2021 10:00 AM Dec 6, 2021 10:00 AM Jan 3, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 31, 2022 10:00 AM Feb 28, 2022 10:00 AM Mar 28, 2022 10:00 AM Apr 25, 2022 10:00 AM May 23, 2022 10:00 AM Jun 20, 2022 10:00 AM Jul 18, 2022 10:00 AM Aug 15, 2022 10:00 AM Sep 12, 2022 10:00 AM Oct 10, 2022 10:00 AM Nov 7, 2022 10:00 AM Dec 5, 2022 10:00 AM Jan 2, 2023 10:00 AM Jan 30, 2023 10:00 AM Feb 27, 2023 10:00 AM Mar 27, 2023 10:00 AM Apr 24, 2023 10:00 AM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJ0kc-GsqDktHNGa8CWl6wJ7je6CKD-5zgh8/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/99948462765?pwd=SGlHYlF1Z2owUDNFWWppaGlSRDh5UT… Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Passcode: 196117 One tap mobile +12532158782,,99948462765# US (Tacoma) +13462487799,,99948462765# US (Houston) Dial by your location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 999 4846 2765 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/anpWWkRdt When: Every 4 weeks from 3am to 3:50am on Monday 17 times Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin - creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com * santosdanillo(a)gmail.com Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MmU4dm1iNzJ0dmV1… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

4 years, 6 months

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Updated invitation: MBed TLS Technical Forum @ Every 4 weeks from 9:30am to 10:30am on Monday 17 times (MST) (mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by don.harbin＠linaro.org

This event has been changed. Title: MBed TLS Technical Forum Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: MBed TLS Technical Forum Time: Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM London Every 4 weeks on Mon, 20 occurrence(s) Oct 25, 2021 04:30 PM Nov 22, 2021 04:30 PM Dec 20, 2021 04:30 PM Jan 17, 2022 04:30 PM Feb 14, 2022 04:30 PM Mar 14, 2022 04:30 PM Apr 11, 2022 04:30 PM May 9, 2022 04:30 PM Jun 6, 2022 04:30 PM Jul 4, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 1, 2022 04:30 PM Aug 29, 2022 04:30 PM Sep 26, 2022 04:30 PM Oct 24, 2022 04:30 PM Nov 21, 2022 04:30 PM Dec 19, 2022 04:30 PM Jan 16, 2023 04:30 PM Feb 13, 2023 04:30 PM Mar 13, 2023 04:30 PM Apr 10, 2023 04:30 PM Please download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system. Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJEkceuurT4sGdaksikbUn6FARB9Kuk3ac2o/ics… Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95962635632?pwd=STFkQVltejAzRDJ6NmoxZjhmZC9RUT… Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Passcode: 018366 One tap mobile +13462487799,,95962635632# US (Houston) +16699009128,,95962635632# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC) 877 853 5247 US Toll-free 888 788 0099 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 959 6263 5632 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/aewUpnQu5y When: Every 4 weeks from 9:30am to 10:30am on Monday 17 times Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Calendar: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin - creator * psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * nnac123(a)gmail.com Event details: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NWdhMWpuZ2ZpdWNp… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

4 years, 6 months

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Entropy PSA Crypto driver support

by François Beerten

Hi everyone, The PSA Crypto Driver Interface describes entry points for collecting entropy from drivers: |psa_status_t acme_get_entropy(uint32_t flags, size_t *estimate_bits, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size);| Currently, MbedTLS does not have any kind of support for those PSA driver entry points. I'm currently looking at trying to add initial support for those in the code. The idea is to write a very simple solution to get the ball rolling and that can be extended and improved later on. Is there interest for a patch to add this? There are different ways to integrate it into the current MbedTLS code. Do you already have plans or ideas on how it should be done? After multiple attempts locally, I've came up with an approach that can work well. Like for other PSA Crypto drivers, the entropy entry points would be listed in the generated "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c" file. Those entry points can then be used by a sub-function of mbedtls_entropy_gather(). What do you think of that approach? Best regards, François.

4 years, 6 months

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Re: License conflict with OpenVPN

by Dave Rodgman

Hi Max, Unfortunately, it would not be possible for us to re-license the project to GPLv2 - this would require agreement with all copyright holders of code contributed to Mbed TLS 2.17, which isn't feasible. For this reason I'm afraid we cannot offer an exception for individual projects. Regards Dave Rodgman On 13/01/2022, 10:28, "Maximilian Fillinger via mbed-tls" <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: Hello! OpenVPN can be compiled with OpenSSL or mbedtls. However, OpenVPN is licensed under GPLv2 only. If I understand correctly, that means it is not legal to distribute binaries of OpenVPN that are linked with mbedtls 2.17 or later. At Fox Crypto, we produce a hardened version of OpenVPN, called OpenVPN-NL, for use by the Dutch government, which uses mbedtls. (The latest release is rather old and still uses 2.16.) Is there anyone I could ask about making an exception for linking OpenVPN with mbedtls? Regards, Max Fillinger -- mbed-tls mailing list -- mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to mbed-tls-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

4 years, 6 months

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