Hi all,
I have some questions.
1) If you have an established TLS connection (mbed TLS 3.x) and while the
connection is up the (server-) certificate expires: Will the connection stay
up? Or is a new handshake (with valid cert) REQUIRED?
2) Related to question 1: CAN mbed TLS switch to a new cert on an existing
TLS connection? (e.g. by doing another handshake from server OR client side)
3) With 3.x some struct members are now "private". Even if you can allow
private access by a define it would be better to use a getter. But for ssl
context's "state" I am missing this and also for "p_bio" (to access fd). Is
there a chance to get this implemented?
BTW - a big "LIKE" for 3.x! I really appreciate the changes. Thank you!
kind regards,
Frank
Hi All,
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Best regards,
Don Harbin
TrustedFirmware Community Manager
don.harbin(a)linaro.org
Hi all,
I'm using an mbedTLS server on a CPU with a small memory foot print. In a search to serve as many as possible TLS clients, I found that the mbedtls_ssl_session.master[48] structure member is still in memory after the handshake is over.
(I filed an issue to start with, but was quickly directed to this mailing list, thanks to Tom Cosgrove. See Clear master secret from mbedtls_ssl_session after handshake is ready * Issue #5832 * Mbed-TLS/mbedtls (github.com)<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/5832>)
I'm wondering why this is needed. The `master` secret references I can find in the code are either related to the TLS handshake, or to serialization/deserialization. I am wondering whether it makes sense to serialize/deserialize the master secret but I'm not sure if it is a use case to support serialization of ongoing handshake operations.
Based on this 2 questions:
* Is the master secret relevant when the handshake is over?
* Is the master secret really useful in serialization/deserialization? If so, I could use `MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION` in my eventual merge request to keep facilitating this.
Looking forward for relevant answers. Thanks in advance,
Maarten
Hi,
I am using mbedTLS v3.0.0 on a low performance CPU on a non-threaded environment, a custom task manager, which is not a preemptive operating system.
I have been using MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE so even the long ECC calculations during the handshake periodically returned so the external logic and task manager could run without being blocked for too long.
Recently an IoT SAFE implementation was introduced through PSA API. It is used for RNG and verification calculation, but not for ECDSA and ECDH during key exchange.
PSA API is designed for threaded environments and can not simultaneously use MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. Now the ECC functions block for several seconds.
Do you have a recommendation on how to use PSA on non-threaded environments, or how to inject external logic execution during these long ECC operations?
Thanks,
Gergely
Hi,
I am using mbedTLS v3.0.0 on a low performance CPU on a non-threaded
environment, a custom task manager, which is not a preemptive operating
system.
I have been using MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE so even the long ECC calculations
during the handshake periodically returned so the external logic and task
manager could run without being blocked for too long.
Recently an IoT SAFE implementation was introduced through PSA API. It is
used for RNG and verification calculation, but not for ECDSA and ECDH
during key exchange.
PSA API is designed for threaded environments and can not simultaneously
use MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. Now the ECC functions block for several
seconds.
Do you have a recommendation on how to use PSA on non-threaded
environments, or how to inject external logic execution during these long
ECC operations?
Thanks,
Gergely
Hi all,
I can see a "RAW RSA" encoding method for signatures both implemented in mbed TLS and PSA API and I'm wondering about the motivations and rational of this variant.
Could you tell more about it, please ?
Below details.
Thierry
It was introduced since 2017 in mbed TLS in this sha1 ID : fdf38030de70b95a77205f17d65591f05e74be08 ("Outsource code for generating PKCS1 v1.5 encoding").
As far as I know, standard does not specifically mention it but
RFC 8017 ($9.2) specifies EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as a deterministic encoding method (no randomness) with a buffer that is built as an encoded message EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T,
where
PS being padding bytes,
T being a DER encoding of a digestInfo,
where digestInfo contains :
- the hash function
(so called AlgorithmIdentifier applied on the message)
- and the hash value
(so called digest H = = Hash(M))
PSA defines the RAW RSA in its API. It is said a signature algorithm, without hashing.
In this raw RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, the hash parameter to psa_sign_hash is computed "externally". It is a DER encoding, “ready-to-use" hash, so called raw data in PSA and mbed TLS.
In the RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, the hash parameter to psa_sign_hash is H (computed with the hash function as indicated in the standard).
mbed TLS implementation manages RAW data in rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(), it copies raw data as they are given and pads accordingly.
Even if from a security perspective, this variant does not seem to introduce vulnerabilities, there is no information on the used hash algorithm inside the signature itself, therefore making mandatory for the verifier to know exactly which algorithm is used, and therefore less trivial in term of device interoperability.
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