On Wed, 2020-10-07 at 15:37 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
+/*
- trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
- */
+static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) +{
- kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
+}
+struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
- .name = "trusted",
- .instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
- .update = trusted_update,
- .destroy = trusted_destroy,
- .describe = user_describe,
- .read = trusted_read,
+}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
+static int __init init_trusted(void) +{
- int i, ret = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(trusted_key_sources); i++) {
if (trusted_key_source &&strncmp(trusted_key_source, trusted_key_sources[i].name,strlen(trusted_key_sources[i].name)))continue;trusted_key_ops = trusted_key_sources[i].ops;ret = trusted_key_ops->init();if (!ret)break;- }
In the case when the module paramater isn't specified and both TPM and TEE are enabled, trusted_key_ops is set to the last source initialized. After patch 2/4, the last trusted source initialized is TEE. If the intention is to limit it to either TPM or TEE, then trusted_key_ops should have a default value, which could be overwritten at runtime. That would address Luke Hind's concerns of making the decision at compile time.
trusted_key_ops should be defined as __ro_after_init, like is currently done for other LSM structures.
- /*
* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if* trusted key implementation is not found.*/- if (ret == -ENODEV)
return 0;- return ret;
+}
+static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) +{
- trusted_key_ops->exit();
If the intention is really to support both TPM and TEE trusted keys at the same time, as James suggested, then the same "for" loop as in init_trusted() is needed here and probably elsewhere.
thanks,
Mimi