Hello,
The driver code I'm working on hard-codes
#define TEE_SMC_FAST_CALL_VAL(func_num) \
ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \
ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS, (func_num))
#define TEE_SMC_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01
#define TEE_SMC_CALLS_UID \
ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \
ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END, \
TEE_SMC_FUNCID_CALLS_UID)
arm_smccc_smc(TEE_SMC_CALLS_UID,
0, 0, 0/*is_swap*/, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res);
dev_err(dev, "TEE UID %x %x %x %x\n", res.a0, res.a1, res.a2, res.a3);
but it seems I would be required to somehow use
OPTEE_SMC_CALL_GET_OS_UUID
But it's not exported, and no code seems to use it...?
$ git grep OPTEE_SMC_CALL_GET_OS_UUID
Documentation/tee/op-tee.rst:- OPTEE_SMC_CALL_GET_OS_UUID returns the particular OP-TEE implementation, used
drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h:#define OPTEE_SMC_CALL_GET_OS_UUID \
How do I make calls to OP-TEE from driver code?
Regards,
Marc Gonzalez
On Sun, Feb 18, 2024 at 12:24 PM murali selvaraj <
muraliselvaraj2020(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Team,
>
> We would like to know the support of OP-TEE support for RPI4.
> If we have the support, can you please share the details.
>
> Thankx
> Murali.S
>
Hi,
It's been a while since Shyam posted the last version [1] of this patch
set. I've pinged Shyam, but so far I've had no reply so I'm trying to make
another attempt with the RPMB subsystem. If Shyam has other changes in mind
than what I'm adding here I hope we'll find a way to cover that too. I'm
calling it version two of the patchset since I'm trying to address all
feedback on the previous version even if I'm starting a new thread.
This patch set introduces a new RPMB subsystem, based on patches from [1],
[2], and [3]. The RPMB subsystem aims at providing access to RPMB
partitions to other kernel drivers, in particular the OP-TEE driver. A new
user space ABI isn't needed, we can instead continue using the already
present ABI when writing the RPMB key during production.
I've added and removed things to keep only what is needed by the OP-TEE
driver. Since the posting of [3], there has been major changes in the MMC
subsystem so "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
is in practice completely rewritten.
With this OP-TEE can access RPMB during early boot instead of having to
wait for user space to become available as in the current design [4].
This will benefit the efi variables [5] since we wont rely on userspace as
well as some TPM issues [6] that were solved.
The OP-TEE driver finds the correct RPMB device to interact with by
iterating over available devices until one is found with a programmed
authentication matching the one OP-TEE is using. This enables coexisting
users of other RPMBs since the owner can be determined by who knows the
authentication key.
I've put myself as a maintainer for the RPMB subsystem as I have an
interest in the OP-TEE driver to keep this in good shape. However, if you'd
rather see someone else taking the maintainership that's fine too. I'll
help keep the subsystem updated regardless.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230722014037.42647-1-shyamsaini@linux.micros…
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220405093759.1126835-2-alex.bennee@linaro.or…
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mmc/1478548394-8184-2-git-send-email-tomas.wi…
[4] https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/architecture/secure_storage.html#rpm…
[5] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
[6] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
Thanks,
Jens
Changes since Shyam's RFC:
* Removed the remaining leftover rpmb_cdev_*() function calls
* Refactored the struct rpmb_ops with all the previous ops replaced, in
some sense closer to [3] with the route_frames() op
* Added rpmb_route_frames()
* Added struct rpmb_frame, enum rpmb_op_result, and enum rpmb_type from [3]
* Removed all functions not needed in the OP-TEE use case
* Added "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem", based
on the commit with the same name in [3]
* Added "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem" for integration
with OP-TEE
* Moved the RPMB driver into drivers/misc/rpmb-core.c
* Added my name to MODULE_AUTHOR() in rpmb-core.c
* Added an rpmb_mutex to serialize access to the IDA
* Removed the target parameter from all rpmb_*() functions since it's
currently unused
Jens Wiklander (3):
rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem
mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem
optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem
MAINTAINERS | 7 +
drivers/misc/Kconfig | 9 ++
drivers/misc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/misc/rpmb-core.c | 247 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/mmc/core/block.c | 177 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 1 +
drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 2 +
drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 6 +
drivers/tee/optee/optee_rpc_cmd.h | 33 ++++
drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c | 221 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 2 +
include/linux/rpmb.h | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++
12 files changed, 890 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/misc/rpmb-core.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/rpmb.h
base-commit: 41bccc98fb7931d63d03f326a746ac4d429c1dd3
--
2.34.1
Updates from the previous version [1]
- fix issues reported by kernel test robot,
- address Rob Herring comment on bindings.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20240115135249.296822-1-arnaud.pou…
This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to
communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating and
loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context.
1) Principle:
The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE
trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE).
The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle:
- authenticating and loading firmware images,
- isolating and securing the remote processor memories,
- supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33),
- managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE.
2) Format of the signed image:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc…
3) OP-TEE trusted application API:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem…
4) OP-TEE signature script
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py
Example of usage:
sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem
5) Impact on User space Application
No sysfs impact.the user only needs to provide the signed firmware image
instead of the ELF image.
For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here
(note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation
and the integration in OP-TEE).
https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds
Arnaud Pouliquen (4):
remoteproc: Add TEE support
dt-bindings: remoteproc: add compatibility for TEE support
remoteproc: stm32: create sub-functions to request shutdown and
release
remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware
.../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 52 ++-
drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 9 +
drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 233 +++++++++--
drivers/remoteproc/tee_remoteproc.c | 393 ++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/tee_remoteproc.h | 99 +++++
6 files changed, 740 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/tee_remoteproc.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/tee_remoteproc.h
base-commit: 0dd3ee31125508cd67f7e7172247f05b7fd1753a
--
2.25.1
Hello,
In the configuration makefile mk/config.mk there are following lines:
# Enable support for detected undefined behavior in C
# Uses a lot of memory, can't be enabled by default
CFG_CORE_SANITIZE_UNDEFINED ?= n
I've read the sources of the conditionally compiled ubsan.c and, IIUC,
how UBSAN is working (mostly by adding simple checks), I don't understand,
why UBSAN is marked as using a lot of memory.
Is this comment still valid?
Thank you.
Hi,
Cc the OP-TEE mailing list, as I sense this might be more of an OP-TEE (/ OPTEED) design question than TF-A generic.
I agree with Manish/Achin the best way to eliminate the return by NS interrupt while OP-TEE kernel runs handling a PSCI request is to mask interrupts globally in the GIC e.g. from within opteed_system_reset?
Additional questions:
On https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/lib/psci/p…
The PSCI layer calls into OP-TEE SPD and then resumes OP-TEE to handle the PSCI call in a platform defined manner.
As suggested here https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/services/s… , it looks this invocation is not supposed to return into TF-A?
Did you redefine the weak psci_system_reset function within OP-TEE for your platform?
Is this function designed to end up in a loop and never returns to TF-A?
As a side question, is this an issue that the TF-A's PSCI platform hook is possibly never called https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/lib/psci/p… ?
Regards,
Olivier.
________________________________
From: Neely, Brian via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 13 November 2023 19:01
To: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Ethridge, Caleb <Caleb.Ethridge(a)analog.com>
Subject: [TF-A] Re: Handling of normal world interrupts with BL31 PSCI handler
Hi Manish,
Just following up on your comment below. Are you planning to provide guidance as to which PSCI calls should have NS interrupts masked? Are these changes that should go in the mainline TF-A repo, or do you believe they are specific to our use case?
Thanks,
Brian
From: Manish Pandey2 via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Friday, November 10, 2023 11:31 AM
To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Ethridge, Caleb <Caleb.Ethridge(a)analog.com>
Subject: [TF-A] Re: Handling of normal world interrupts with BL31 PSCI handler
[External]
Hi Caleb,
The quick answer to your query is to mask the NS interrupts in BL31 (option a), You should not remove the callback to OPTEE as it may need to do its own state maintained before system RESET.
There are other scenarios in PSCI (e.g. CPU power down) path which need to consider disabling NS interrupts before invoking Secure world hooks, will provide further analysis on those later.
Thanks
Manish Pandey
________________________________
From: Caleb Ethridge via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: 10 November 2023 15:12
To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Subject: [TF-A] Handling of normal world interrupts with BL31 PSCI handler
Hello,
If normal world interrupts are received while invoking TF-A's PSCI reset handler, we have observed that the reset can be aborted.
In TF-A's PSCI reset handler, a call out to OP-TEE is made before performing the platform-specific reset:
https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/lib/psci/p…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firm…>
https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/services/s…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firm…>
When OP-TEE is entered, it is possible to receive foreign (normal world) interrupts, which invokes the procedure described here: https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/3.16.0/architecture/core.html#deliver-non-s…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/optee.readthedocs.io/en/3.16.0/architect…>
When the SMC call is aborted as described above, this results in the reboot failing. Linux does not retry the PSCI reset (https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/drivers/firmware/psci/psci.c#…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/dr…>). This makes sense because it is not expecting the SMC call to fail (it expected to make an uninterruptable SMC call into the secure monitor, not a call into OP-TEE).
If OP-TEE itself is setup to handle PSCI reset calls, it also handles them in (uninterruptable) SMC context:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/core/arch/arm/sm/psci.c#L140<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/c…>
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/core/arch/arm/sm/sm_a32.S#L96<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/c…>
Based on this, we see two possible solutions:
a) Masking the non-secure interrupts in BL31 while we are doing a reset
b) Removing the call to OPTEE in the reset handler so that we never leave the SMC context
Which option do you suggest? Or are we missing an important detail here?
Thanks,
Caleb
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Hi,
Tomorrow, Tuesday, January 25 it's time for another LOC monthly meeting. For
time and connection details see the calendar at
https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/
- OP-TEE 4.1.0 has been released
- There's an ongoing effort to move tee-supplicant processing into the
kernel to avoid user space dependency during boot
Any other topics?
Thanks,
Jens