- OP-TEE - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by 梅建强(禹夜)

Hi, Jens, Olivier, In case of that optee runs at sel1 and hafnium runs at sel2, we want to test benchmark by executing the following command at optee_benchmark path: ./out/benchmark ../optee_examples/out/ca/optee_example_hello_world After entering into the benchmark pta, the bm_timestamp function attempts to read the pmccfiltr_el0 register. In cold boot, the following code will be executed during hafnium initialization: vm->arch.trapped_features |= HF_FEATURE_PERFMON; This will prevent the secondary vm from accessing the performance counter registers. We remove the code, the bm_timestamp function can read pmccfiltr_el0 without trapping into hafnium. But the value of pmccfiltr_el0 remains unchanged and cannot be counted. We tried to read the register in hafnium and found that there was no change either. In contrast, in the normal world, pmccfiltr_el0 counts normally. Is it related to the pmu register configuration or does sel1 not support the pmccfiltr_el0 count at present? Thanks for the support. Regards, Yuye.

2 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v4 0/3] introduce tee-based EFI Runtime Variable Service

by Masahisa Kojima

This series introduces the tee based EFI Runtime Variable Service. The eMMC device is typically owned by the non-secure world(linux in this case). There is an existing solution utilizing eMMC RPMB partition for EFI Variables, it is implemented by interacting with OP-TEE, StandaloneMM(as EFI Variable Service Pseudo TA), eMMC driver and tee-supplicant. The last piece is the tee-based variable access driver to interact with OP-TEE and StandaloneMM. Changelog: v3 -> v4: - replace the reference from EDK2 to PI Specification - remove EDK2 source code reference comments - prepare nonblocking variant of set_variable, it just returns EFI_UNSUPPORTED - remove redundant buffer size check - argument name change in mm_communicate - function interface changes in setup_mm_hdr to remove (void **) cast v2 -> v3: - add CONFIG_EFI dependency to TEE_STMM_EFI - add missing return code check for tee_client_invoke_func() - directly call efivars_register/unregister from tee_stmm_efi.c rfc v1 -> v2: - split patch into three patches, one for drivers/tee, one for include/linux/efi.h, and one for the driver/firmware/efi/stmm - context/session management into probe() and remove() same as other tee client driver - StMM variable driver is moved from driver/tee/optee to driver/firmware/efi - use "tee" prefix instead of "optee" in driver/firmware/efi/stmm/tee_stmm_efi.c, this file does not contain op-tee specific code, abstracted by tee layer and StMM variable driver will work on other tee implementation. - PTA_STMM_CMD_COMMUNICATE -> PTA_STMM_CMD_COMMUNICATE - implement query_variable_store() but currently not used - no use of TEEC_SUCCESS, it is defined in driver/tee/optee/optee_private.h. Other tee client drivers use 0 instead of using TEEC_SUCCESS - remove TEEC_ERROR_EXCESS_DATA status, it is referred just to output error message Masahisa Kojima (3): efi: expose efivar generic ops register function efi: Add EFI_ACCESS_DENIED status code efi: Add tee-based EFI variable driver drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 15 + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 12 + drivers/firmware/efi/stmm/mm_communication.h | 236 +++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/stmm/tee_stmm_efi.c | 637 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 4 + 6 files changed, 905 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/stmm/mm_communication.h create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/stmm/tee_stmm_efi.c -- 2.30.2

2 years, 1 month

4
7
0 0

[PATCH v3 0/3] introduce tee-based EFI Runtime Variable Service

by Masahisa Kojima

This series introduces the tee based EFI Runtime Variable Service. The eMMC device is typically owned by the non-secure world(linux in this case). There is an existing solution utilizing eMMC RPMB partition for EFI Variables, it is implemented by interacting with OP-TEE, StandaloneMM(as EFI Variable Service Pseudo TA), eMMC driver and tee-supplicant. The last piece is the tee-based variable access driver to interact with OP-TEE and StandaloneMM. Changelog: v2 -> v3: - add CONFIG_EFI dependency to TEE_STMM_EFI - add missing return code check for tee_client_invoke_func() - directly call efivars_register/unregister from tee_stmm_efi.c rfc v1 -> v2: - split patch into three patches, one for drivers/tee, one for include/linux/efi.h, and one for the driver/firmware/efi/stmm - context/session management into probe() and remove() same as other tee client driver - StMM variable driver is moved from driver/tee/optee to driver/firmware/efi - use "tee" prefix instead of "optee" in driver/firmware/efi/stmm/tee_stmm_efi.c, this file does not contain op-tee specific code, abstracted by tee layer and StMM variable driver will work on other tee implementation. - PTA_STMM_CMD_COMMUNICATE -> PTA_STMM_CMD_COMMUNICATE - implement query_variable_store() but currently not used - no use of TEEC_SUCCESS, it is defined in driver/tee/optee/optee_private.h. Other tee client drivers use 0 instead of using TEEC_SUCCESS - remove TEEC_ERROR_EXCESS_DATA status, it is refered just to output error message Masahisa Kojima (3): efi: expose efivar generic ops register function efi: Add EFI_ACCESS_DENIED status code efi: Add tee-based EFI variable driver drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 15 + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 12 + drivers/firmware/efi/stmm/mm_communication.h | 249 ++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/stmm/tee_stmm_efi.c | 626 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 4 + 6 files changed, 907 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/stmm/mm_communication.h create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/stmm/tee_stmm_efi.c -- 2.30.2

2 years, 1 month

2
5
0 0

[PATCH] tee: add FOLL_LONGTERM for CMA case when alloc shm

by Xiaoming Ding

FOLL_LONGTERM will avoid share memory alloc from CMA region, which may be used in secure playback case. if part of CMA region taken by share memory for long term usage, CMA will failed to get whole buffer back. Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ding <xiaoming.ding(a)mediatek.com> --- drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c index 673cf0359494..ddd3947e2229 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c @@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ register_shm_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr, size_t num_pages; void *ret; int rc; + u32 page_flag = FOLL_WRITE; if (!tee_device_get(teedev)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); @@ -255,9 +256,11 @@ register_shm_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr, ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); goto err_free_shm; } - +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CMA) + page_flag |= FOLL_LONGTERM; +#endif if (flags & TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED) - rc = pin_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE, + rc = pin_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, page_flag, shm->pages); else rc = shm_get_kernel_pages(start, num_pages, shm->pages); -- 2.18.0

2 years, 1 month

6
12
0 0

[GIT PULL] Fix uninitialized variable in OP-TEE driver for v6.3

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull this small patch fixing an unintialized variable in the OP-TEE driver. The error has been reported recently by the kernel test robot. I realize that this is late for v6.3, please queue this for v6.4 instead if v6.3 isn't possible. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit eeac8ede17557680855031c6f305ece2378af326: Linux 6.3-rc2 (2023-03-12 16:36:44 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: https://git.linaro.org/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git tags/optee-async-notif-fix-for-v6.3 for you to fetch changes up to 654d0310007146fae87b0c1a68f81e53ad519b14: optee: fix uninited async notif value (2023-04-20 14:52:25 +0200) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Fixes an uninitialized variable in OP-TEE driver ---------------------------------------------------------------- Etienne Carriere (1): optee: fix uninited async notif value drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

2 years, 1 month

1
1
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[PATCH v2 1/1] tee: amdtee: Add return_origin to 'struct tee_cmd_load_ta'

by Rijo Thomas

After TEE has completed processing of TEE_CMD_ID_LOAD_TA, set proper value in 'return_origin' argument passed by open_session() call. To do so, add 'return_origin' field to the structure tee_cmd_load_ta. The Trusted OS shall update return_origin as part of TEE processing. This change to 'struct tee_cmd_load_ta' interface requires a similar update in AMD-TEE Trusted OS's TEE_CMD_ID_LOAD_TA interface. This patch has been verified on Phoenix Birman setup. On older APUs, return_origin value will be 0. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Tested-by: Sourabh Das <sourabh.das(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> --- v2: * Added Fixes tag. drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h | 10 ++++++---- drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++------------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h b/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h index ff48c3e47375..e2014e21530a 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_if.h @@ -118,16 +118,18 @@ struct tee_cmd_unmap_shared_mem { /** * struct tee_cmd_load_ta - load Trusted Application (TA) binary into TEE - * @low_addr: [in] bits [31:0] of the physical address of the TA binary - * @hi_addr: [in] bits [63:32] of the physical address of the TA binary - * @size: [in] size of TA binary in bytes - * @ta_handle: [out] return handle of the loaded TA + * @low_addr: [in] bits [31:0] of the physical address of the TA binary + * @hi_addr: [in] bits [63:32] of the physical address of the TA binary + * @size: [in] size of TA binary in bytes + * @ta_handle: [out] return handle of the loaded TA + * @return_origin: [out] origin of return code after TEE processing */ struct tee_cmd_load_ta { u32 low_addr; u32 hi_addr; u32 size; u32 ta_handle; + u32 return_origin; }; /** diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c index e8cd9aaa3467..e9b63dcb3194 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c @@ -423,19 +423,23 @@ int handle_load_ta(void *data, u32 size, struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg *arg) if (ret) { arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS; arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION; - } else if (arg->ret == TEEC_SUCCESS) { - ret = get_ta_refcount(load_cmd.ta_handle); - if (!ret) { - arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS; - arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - - /* Unload the TA on error */ - unload_cmd.ta_handle = load_cmd.ta_handle; - psp_tee_process_cmd(TEE_CMD_ID_UNLOAD_TA, - (void *)&unload_cmd, - sizeof(unload_cmd), &ret); - } else { - set_session_id(load_cmd.ta_handle, 0, &arg->session); + } else { + arg->ret_origin = load_cmd.return_origin; + + if (arg->ret == TEEC_SUCCESS) { + ret = get_ta_refcount(load_cmd.ta_handle); + if (!ret) { + arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS; + arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + /* Unload the TA on error */ + unload_cmd.ta_handle = load_cmd.ta_handle; + psp_tee_process_cmd(TEE_CMD_ID_UNLOAD_TA, + (void *)&unload_cmd, + sizeof(unload_cmd), &ret); + } else { + set_session_id(load_cmd.ta_handle, 0, &arg->session); + } } } mutex_unlock(&ta_refcount_mutex); -- 2.25.1

2 years, 1 month

3
2
0 0

Linaro OP-TEE Contribution (LOC) monthly meeting May 23

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, Tomorrow it's time for another LOC monthly meeting. For time and connection details see the calendar at https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/ We are considering bumping the major version number of OP-TEE to 4 and removing old and unused or not-so-frequently tested compatibility code. We'll switch to MbedTLS 3.4 instead of the old 2.x branch. Any other topics? Thanks, Jens

2 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [PATCH] tee: add FOLL_LONGTERM for CMA case when alloc shm

by David Hildenbrand

On 18.05.23 08:40, Xiaoming Ding (丁晓明) wrote: > From 35fd062d5cbc4d182eee0183843cd6350d126788 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Xiaoming Ding <xiaoming.ding(a)mediatek.com> > Date: Wed, 10 May 2023 10:15:23 +0800 > Subject: [PATCH v2] tee: add FOLL_LONGTERM for CMA case when alloc shm > > CMA is widely used on insufficient memory platform for > secure media playback case, and FOLL_LONGTERM will > avoid tee_shm alloc pages from CMA region. > without FOLL_LONGTERM, CMA region may alloc failed since > tee_shm has a chance to use it in advance. > > modify is verified on OPTEE XTEST and kinds of secure + clear playback > > > Fixes: 033ddf12bcf5 ("tee: add register user memory") > Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ding <xiaoming.ding(a)mediatek.com> > --- > v1 -> v2: take off the ifdef and apply FOLL_LONGTERM by default > > drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c > index 673cf0359494..38878e549ca4 100644 > --- a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c > +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c > @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ register_shm_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, > unsigned long addr, > } > > if (flags & TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED) > - rc = pin_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE, > + rc = pin_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE | > FOLL_LONGTERM, > shm->pages); > else > rc = shm_get_kernel_pages(start, num_pages, shm- >> pages); I didn't dive deeply into that code, but I can spot that we can end up long-term pinning multiple pages -- possibly unbound or is there any sane limit on the number of pages? Take a look at io_uring/rsrc.c and how we account long-term pinned pages against user->locked_vm/ctx->mm_account->pinned_vm in io_account_mem(). If user space could only end up pinning one or two pages via that interface, ok. But it looks like this interface could be abused to create real real trouble by unprivileged users that should be able to long-term pin that many pages. Am I missing something important (i.e., interface is only accessible by privileged users) or should there be proper accounting and RLIMIT_MEMLOCK checks? -- Thanks, David / dhildenb

2 years, 1 month

2
1
0 0

[PATCH v8 0/4] tee: introduce TEE system session

by Etienne Carriere

This series introduces TEE system sessions for TEE service sessions that require TEE to provision resources to prevent deadlock when clients call the TEE. This deadlock situation can happen when a TEE service is used by low level system resources as for example when Linux kernel uses SCMI service embedded in TEE for clock, reset, regulator, etc... controls. This case is detailled in patch 3/4: > This feature is needed to prevent a system deadlock when several TEE > client applications invoke TEE, consuming all TEE thread contexts > available in the secure world. The deadlock can happen in the OP-TEE > driver for example if all these TEE threads issue an RPC call from TEE > to Linux OS to access an eMMC RPMB partition (TEE secure storage) which > device clock or regulator controller is accessed through an OP-TEE SCMI > services. In that case, Linux SCMI driver must reach OP-TEE SCMI > service without waiting until one of the consumed TEE threads is freed. Etienne Carriere (4): tee: optee: system call property tee: system session tee: optee: support tracking system threads firmware: arm_scmi: optee: use optee system invocation drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/optee.c | 4 + drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 155 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 5 +- drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 13 +-- drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 39 +++++++- drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 31 ++++-- drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 8 ++ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 16 +++ 8 files changed, 235 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) --- No change since v7 Changes since v6: - Added this cover letter missing in previous patch series revisions. -- 2.25.1

2 years, 1 month

2
7
0 0

[PATCH v6 1/4] tee: optee: system call property

by Etienne Carriere

Adds an argument to do_call_with_arg() handler to tell whether the call is a system call or nor. This change always sets this info to false hence no functional change. This change prepares management of system invocation proposed in a later change. Co-developed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere(a)linaro.org> --- No changes since v5 Changes since v4: - New change, extracted from PATCH v4 1/2 (tee: system invocation") and revised to cover preparatory changes in optee driver for system session support with contribution from Jens. --- drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------ drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 5 +++-- drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 3 ++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 7 +++++-- drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 9 +++++---- 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c index df5fb5410b72..dba5339b61ae 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c @@ -328,7 +328,8 @@ int optee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, goto out; } - if (optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm, offs)) { + if (optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm, offs, + sess->use_sys_thread)) { msg_arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION; msg_arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS; } @@ -360,7 +361,8 @@ int optee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, return rc; } -int optee_close_session_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) +int optee_close_session_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session, + bool system_thread) { struct optee *optee = tee_get_drvdata(ctx->teedev); struct optee_shm_arg_entry *entry; @@ -374,7 +376,7 @@ int optee_close_session_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) msg_arg->cmd = OPTEE_MSG_CMD_CLOSE_SESSION; msg_arg->session = session; - optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm, offs); + optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm, offs, system_thread); optee_free_msg_arg(ctx, entry, offs); @@ -385,6 +387,7 @@ int optee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) { struct optee_context_data *ctxdata = ctx->data; struct optee_session *sess; + bool system_thread; /* Check that the session is valid and remove it from the list */ mutex_lock(&ctxdata->mutex); @@ -394,9 +397,10 @@ int optee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) mutex_unlock(&ctxdata->mutex); if (!sess) return -EINVAL; + system_thread = sess->use_sys_thread; kfree(sess); - return optee_close_session_helper(ctx, session); + return optee_close_session_helper(ctx, session, system_thread); } int optee_invoke_func(struct tee_context *ctx, struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg *arg, @@ -408,12 +412,15 @@ int optee_invoke_func(struct tee_context *ctx, struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg *arg, struct optee_msg_arg *msg_arg; struct optee_session *sess; struct tee_shm *shm; + bool system_thread; u_int offs; int rc; /* Check that the session is valid */ mutex_lock(&ctxdata->mutex); sess = find_session(ctxdata, arg->session); + if (sess) + system_thread = sess->use_sys_thread; mutex_unlock(&ctxdata->mutex); if (!sess) return -EINVAL; @@ -432,7 +439,7 @@ int optee_invoke_func(struct tee_context *ctx, struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg *arg, if (rc) goto out; - if (optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm, offs)) { + if (optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm, offs, system_thread)) { msg_arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION; msg_arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS; } @@ -457,12 +464,15 @@ int optee_cancel_req(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 cancel_id, u32 session) struct optee_shm_arg_entry *entry; struct optee_msg_arg *msg_arg; struct optee_session *sess; + bool system_thread; struct tee_shm *shm; u_int offs; /* Check that the session is valid */ mutex_lock(&ctxdata->mutex); sess = find_session(ctxdata, session); + if (sess) + system_thread = sess->use_sys_thread; mutex_unlock(&ctxdata->mutex); if (!sess) return -EINVAL; @@ -474,7 +484,7 @@ int optee_cancel_req(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 cancel_id, u32 session) msg_arg->cmd = OPTEE_MSG_CMD_CANCEL; msg_arg->session = session; msg_arg->cancel_id = cancel_id; - optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm, offs); + optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm, offs, system_thread); optee_free_msg_arg(ctx, entry, offs); return 0; diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/core.c b/drivers/tee/optee/core.c index 2a258bd3b6b5..d01ca47f7bde 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/core.c @@ -129,7 +129,8 @@ int optee_open(struct tee_context *ctx, bool cap_memref_null) static void optee_release_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, int (*close_session)(struct tee_context *ctx, - u32 session)) + u32 session, + bool system_thread)) { struct optee_context_data *ctxdata = ctx->data; struct optee_session *sess; @@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ static void optee_release_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, list_for_each_entry_safe(sess, sess_tmp, &ctxdata->sess_list, list_node) { list_del(&sess->list_node); - close_session(ctx, sess->session_id); + close_session(ctx, sess->session_id, sess->use_sys_thread); kfree(sess); } kfree(ctxdata); diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c index 0828240f27e6..52cec9d06041 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c @@ -612,7 +612,8 @@ static int optee_ffa_yielding_call(struct tee_context *ctx, */ static int optee_ffa_do_call_with_arg(struct tee_context *ctx, - struct tee_shm *shm, u_int offs) + struct tee_shm *shm, u_int offs, + bool system_thread) { struct ffa_send_direct_data data = { .data0 = OPTEE_FFA_YIELDING_CALL_WITH_ARG, diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h index 72685ee0d53f..3da7960ab34a 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h @@ -154,7 +154,8 @@ struct optee; */ struct optee_ops { int (*do_call_with_arg)(struct tee_context *ctx, - struct tee_shm *shm_arg, u_int offs); + struct tee_shm *shm_arg, u_int offs, + bool system_thread); int (*to_msg_param)(struct optee *optee, struct optee_msg_param *msg_params, size_t num_params, const struct tee_param *params); @@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ struct optee { struct optee_session { struct list_head list_node; u32 session_id; + bool use_sys_thread; }; struct optee_context_data { @@ -252,7 +254,8 @@ int optee_supp_send(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 ret, u32 num_params, int optee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg *arg, struct tee_param *param); -int optee_close_session_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session); +int optee_close_session_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session, + bool system_thread); int optee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session); int optee_invoke_func(struct tee_context *ctx, struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg *arg, struct tee_param *param); diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c index 49702cb08f4f..56ebbb96ac97 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static int optee_shm_register(struct tee_context *ctx, struct tee_shm *shm, msg_arg->params->u.tmem.buf_ptr = virt_to_phys(pages_list) | (tee_shm_get_page_offset(shm) & (OPTEE_MSG_NONCONTIG_PAGE_SIZE - 1)); - if (optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm_arg, 0) || + if (optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm_arg, 0, false) || msg_arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) rc = -EINVAL; @@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ static int optee_shm_unregister(struct tee_context *ctx, struct tee_shm *shm) msg_arg->params[0].attr = OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_RMEM_INPUT; msg_arg->params[0].u.rmem.shm_ref = (unsigned long)shm; - if (optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm_arg, 0) || + if (optee->ops->do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm_arg, 0, false) || msg_arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) rc = -EINVAL; out: @@ -885,7 +885,8 @@ static void optee_handle_rpc(struct tee_context *ctx, * Returns return code from secure world, 0 is OK */ static int optee_smc_do_call_with_arg(struct tee_context *ctx, - struct tee_shm *shm, u_int offs) + struct tee_shm *shm, u_int offs, + bool system_thread) { struct optee *optee = tee_get_drvdata(ctx->teedev); struct optee_call_waiter w; @@ -977,7 +978,7 @@ static int simple_call_with_arg(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 cmd) return PTR_ERR(msg_arg); msg_arg->cmd = cmd; - optee_smc_do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm, offs); + optee_smc_do_call_with_arg(ctx, shm, offs, false); optee_free_msg_arg(ctx, entry, offs); return 0; -- 2.25.1

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