November 2024 - OP-TEE - lists.trustedfirmware.org

[PATCH] optee: fix format string for printing optee build_id

by Sahil Malhotra

There has been a recent change in OP-TEE to print 8 and 16 character commit id for 32bit and 64bit architecture respectively. In case if commit id is starting with 0 like 04d1c612ec7beaede073b8c it is printing revision as below removing leading 0 "optee: revision 4.4 (4d1c612ec7beaed)" Signed-off-by: Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra(a)nxp.com> --- drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c index e9456e3e74cc..eb51dc18f32d 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c @@ -1272,8 +1272,9 @@ static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) &res.smccc); if (res.result.build_id) - pr_info("revision %lu.%lu (%08lx)", res.result.major, - res.result.minor, res.result.build_id); + pr_info("revision %lu.%lu (%0*lx)", res.result.major, + res.result.minor, (int)sizeof(res.result.build_id) * 2, + res.result.build_id); else pr_info("revision %lu.%lu", res.result.major, res.result.minor); } -- 2.34.1

1 month

4
3
0 0

[PATCH v3 0/4] TEE subsystem for restricted dma-buf allocations

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, This patch set allocates the restricted DMA-bufs via the TEE subsystem. This a big update compared to the previous patch set [1]. The TEE subsystem handles the DMA-buf allocations since it is the TEE (OP-TEE, AMD-TEE, TS-TEE, or perhaps a future QTEE) which sets up the restrictions for the memory used for the DMA-bufs. I've added a new IOCTL, TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC, to allocate the restricted DMA-bufs. This IOCTL reaches the backend TEE driver, allowing it to choose how to allocate the restricted physical memory. TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC takes in addition to a size and flags parameters also a use-case parameter. This is used by the backend TEE driver to decide on allocation policy and which devices should be able to access the memory. Three use-cases (Secure Video Playback, Trusted UI, and Secure Video Recording) has been identified so far to serve as examples of what can be expected. More use-cases can be added in userspace ABI, but it's up to the backend TEE drivers to provide the implementation. Each use-case has it's own restricted memory pool since different use-cases requires isolation from different parts of the system. A restricted memory pool can be based on a static carveout instantiated while probing the TEE backend driver, or dynamically allocated from CMA and made restricted as needed by the TEE. This can be tested on QEMU with the following steps: repo init -u https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/manifest.git -m qemu_v8.xml \ -b prototype/sdp-v3 repo sync -j8 cd build make toolchains -j$(nproc) make SPMC_AT_EL=1 all -j$(nproc) make SPMC_AT_EL=1 run-only # login and at the prompt: xtest --sdp-basic The SPMC_AT_EL=1 parameter configures the build with FF-A and an SPMC at S-EL1 inside OP-TEE. The parameter can be changed into SPMC_AT_EL=n to test without FF-A using the original SMC ABI instead. Please remember to do %rm -rf ../trusted-firmware-a/build/qemu for TF-A to be rebuilt properly using the new configuration. https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/building/prerequisites.html list dependencies needed to build the above. The tests are pretty basic, mostly checking that a Trusted Application in the secure world can access and manipulate the memory. There are also some negative tests for out of bounds buffers etc. Thanks, Jens [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20241015101716.740829-1-jens.wiklander@linaro.… Changes since the V2 RFC: * Based on v6.12 * Replaced the flags for SVP and Trusted UID memory with a u32 field with unique id for each use case * Added dynamic allocation of restricted memory pools * Added OP-TEE ABI both with and without FF-A for dynamic restricted memory * Added support for FF-A with FFA_LEND Changes since the V1 RFC: * Based on v6.11 * Complete rewrite, replacing the restricted heap with TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC Changes since Olivier's post [2]: * Based on Yong Wu's post [1] where much of dma-buf handling is done in the generic restricted heap * Simplifications and cleanup * New commit message for "dma-buf: heaps: add Linaro restricted dmabuf heap support" * Replaced the word "secure" with "restricted" where applicable Jens Wiklander (4): tee: add restricted memory allocation optee: account for direction while converting parameters optee: sync secure world ABI headers optee: support restricted memory allocation drivers/tee/Makefile | 1 + drivers/tee/optee/Makefile | 1 + drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 10 +- drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 1 + drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 178 +++++++++++++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_ffa.h | 27 ++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 65 ++++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 75 ++++-- drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 71 +++++- drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c | 31 ++- drivers/tee/optee/rstmem.c | 380 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 214 +++++++++++++++-- drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 37 ++- drivers/tee/tee_private.h | 2 + drivers/tee/tee_rstmem.c | 201 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 2 + drivers/tee/tee_shm_pool.c | 69 +++++- include/linux/tee_core.h | 15 ++ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 4 +- include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 37 ++- 20 files changed, 1344 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/rstmem.c create mode 100644 drivers/tee/tee_rstmem.c -- 2.43.0

1 month, 2 weeks

2
12
0 0

[PATCH RFC 0/3] Introduce orphan tee_shm and default tee_context

by Amirreza Zarrabi

The TEE subsystem manages three main structures: tee_device, the device that represents the TEE; tee_context, the context that represents the TEE client; and tee_shm, which represents the shared memory with the TEE. When a tee_device is opened, it creates a tee_context instance. The tee_shm is created for the tee_device when allocating shared memory with the TEE but is linked to a context. The lifespan of the device is determined by the presence of context and shared memory, while the lifespan of a context depends on the client closing the device. This behavior has been modified, making the lifespan of context dependent on shared memory. If a client closes the device but doesn’t release the shared memory, the linked context will remain active, preventing the release callback from freeing resources in the TEE. This could lead to a deadlock if the TEE holds a reference to the shared memory and relies on the release callback to remove the reference. In this pachset we introduce orphan tee_shm and default tee_context. When a shared memory becomes orphan because its associated context is released, it no longer has a tee_context. One method to differentiate between orphaned and regular shared memory is to use NULL as the linked context. However, this can cause issues if releasing the shared memory triggers additional calls, like those to the supplicant, which require a valid context. Instead of using NULL, an internal tee_context for the driver can be used. The driver relies on tee_device_unregister which is a blocking calls waiting for all context to be released and all shared memory to be freed before unloading the driver. This means that all contexts, including internal context, should be closed before tee_device_unregister can proceed. This can introduce a short window where there is no valid context to use when releasing the shared memory. The default tee_context has lifespan similar to the device. For an orphan tee_shm, default context is used. This has not been tested. Looking for feedback if this is a reasonable change. Signed-off-by: Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com> --- Amirreza Zarrabi (3): tee: revert removal of redundant teedev in struct tee_shm tee: revert removal of linked list of struct tee_shm tee: introduce orphan tee_shm and default context drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 2 +- drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 2 +- drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 2 +- drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- drivers/tee/tee_private.h | 3 -- drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 41 ++++++++++++---------- include/linux/tee_core.h | 15 ++++++++ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 13 ++++--- 8 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) --- base-commit: ae58226b89ac0cffa05ba7357733776542e40216 change-id: 20241120-fix-tee_shm-refcount-upstream-c671b89fbe67 Best regards, -- Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com>

1 month, 3 weeks

3
21
0 0

Linaro OP-TEE Contribution, LOC, monthly meeting November 26

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, Tomorrow, Tuesday, it's time for another LOC monthly meeting. For time and connection details see the calendar at https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/ The fTPM pull request https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_ftpm/pull/1 to import the TA-specific parts of fTPM into optee_ftpm.git is even more relevant now that https://github.com/microsoft/ms-tpm-20-ref/pull/112 removed Samples/ARM32-FirmwareTPM/optee_ta from upstream. Can we start to review https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_ftpm/pull/1? Are there any other topics? Thanks, Jens

1 month, 4 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v13 0/7] Introduction of a remoteproc tee to load signed firmware

by Arnaud Pouliquen

Main updates from version V12[1]: Fix warning build by fixing the inline declaration in remoteproc_tee.h (when CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TEE is not set). Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202410262040.PWNrKv2Q-lkp@intel.com/ Main updates from version V11[2]: - rename structures, functions, and variables from "tee_rproc_xxx" to "rproc_tee_xxx", - update rproc_tee_register to return an error instead of "struct rproc_tee *" pointer [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20241025205924.2087768-1-arnaud.pouliquen@foss… [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZxZ4cBilIlpf3IPw@p14s/T/ Tested-on: commit 42f7652d3eb5 ("Linux 6.12-rc4") Description of the feature: -------------------------- This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating and loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context. 1) Principle: The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE). The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle: - authenticating and loading firmware images, - isolating and securing the remote processor memories, - supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33), - managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE. 2) Format of the signed image: Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc… 3) OP-TEE trusted application API: Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem… 4) OP-TEE signature script Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py Example of usage: sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem 5) Impact on User space Application No sysfs impact. The user only needs to provide the signed firmware image instead of the ELF image. For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here (note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation and the integration in OP-TEE). https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds Arnaud Pouliquen (7): remoteproc: core: Introduce rproc_pa_to_va helper remoteproc: Add TEE support remoteproc: core: Refactor resource table cleanup into rproc_release_fw remoteproc: Introduce release_fw optional operation dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add compatibility for TEE support remoteproc: stm32: Create sub-functions to request shutdown and release remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware .../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 58 +- drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 10 + drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 + drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 72 ++- drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c | 510 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 139 +++-- include/linux/remoteproc.h | 8 + include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h | 105 ++++ 8 files changed, 848 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c create mode 100644 include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h base-commit: 42f7652d3eb527d03665b09edac47f85fb600924 -- 2.25.1

2 months

3
18
0 0

Dynamic shared memory

by Patryk

Hello, I've been currently looking at the possibility of storing u-boot environment variables in RPMB and I've stumbled upon this article: https://www.linaro.org/blog/protected-uefi-variables-with-u-boot/ which briefly describes what needs to be done in order to achieve this. Unfortunately there is no comment section in this article so I cannot ask the author so I decided to try here. The article mentions that for that purpose, my board should support dynamic shared memory, therefore the OP-TEE port for my board should register that memory in platform main using the "register_ddr" function. For my platform (ls1028ardb) I do not see anything like this, thus I assume it's not supported. However, I'm wondering - is it my platform's hardware limitation or missing software implementation? Making this question more generic - does dynamic shared memory depend on hardware, meaning that there is no way to register dynamic shared memory if hardware does not support some particular features? I would be grateful for some hints. Best regards Patryk

2 months

2
1
0 0

tee-supplicant priority

by Matteo Facchinetti

Hi, I have a doubt about the correct priority that tee-supplicant should have in the system. In detail, we have 2 user-space applications (user-pkcs11-0, user-pkcs11-1) that use the same PKCS11 services from OPTEE-OS (access to RPDB partition for private key). For project reason we use the following nice priority values: user-pkcs11-0, nice=-5 user-pkcs11-1, nice=-10 .... tee-supplcant, nice=0 ... a lot of other services with nice=0 ... Unfortunately, in some strange case when CPU is overload (booting).... appear a strange problem in user-pkcs11-1: occasionally the time for the certificate's signature check explode to 400ms. Due to the problem to replicate this defect, I have try to investigate in theory if could be verify a starvation/race-condition between tee-supplicant and user-pkcs11-1 or other-services. In this scenario, what is the correct priority value that tee-supplicant should have? I suspect that we should change the priority of tee-supplcant = user-pkcs11-1 = -10 Is it make sense for you, or maybe better to search the problem from an other side :-) ? Thanks in advance for your attention BR Matteo Facchinetti

2 months

2
1
0 0

optee-based efi runtime variable service on TI j784s4 platforms

by Enric Balletbo i Serra

Hi all, I'm looking for any advice/clue to help me to progress on enabling TEE-base EFI Runtime Variable Service on TI a j784s4 platforms. I basically followed the steps described in u-boot documentation [1], I enabled some debugging messages but I think I'm at the point that the problem might be in the StandaloneMM application, and I'm not sure how to debug it. What I see is that when I run the tee-supplicant daemon, it looks like the tee_client_open_session() call loops forever and the tee_stmm_efi driver never ends to probe. With debug enabled I got the following messages. # tee-supplicant D/TC:? 0 tee_ta_init_session_with_context:557 Re-open trusted service 7011a688-ddde-4053-a5a9-7b3c4ddf13b8 D/TC:? 0 load_stmm:297 stmm load address 0x40004000 D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:859 Received FFA version D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request And tracing the function calls gives me that: tee_stmm_efi_probe() { tee_client_open_context() { optee_get_version() { tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800) } (ret=0xd) tee_ctx_match(); (ret=0x1) optee_smc_open() { tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800) optee_open() { tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800) } (ret=0x0) } (ret=0x0) } (ret=0xffff000004e71c80) tee_client_open_session() { optee_open_session() { tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800) optee_get_msg_arg() { tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800) tee_shm_get_va(); (ret=0xffff000002909000) } (ret=0xffff000002909000) tee_session_calc_client_uuid(); (ret=0x0) optee_to_msg_param(); (ret=0x0) optee_smc_do_call_with_arg() { tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800) tee_shm_get_va(); (ret=0xffff000002909000) tee_shm_get_va(); (ret=0xffff000002909060) optee_cq_wait_init(); (ret=0xffff000002e55910) optee_smccc_smc(); (ret=0xffff0004) tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800) optee_smccc_smc(); (ret=0xffff0004) tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800) optee_smccc_smc(); (ret=0xffff0004) tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800) optee_smccc_smc(); (ret=0xffff0004) tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800) optee_smccc_smc(); (ret=0xffff0004) ... continues sending this forever ... ... Hit ^C to stop recording ... tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800) optee_smccc_smc() { [1] https://docs.u-boot.org/en/latest/develop/uefi/uefi.html#using-op-tee-for-e… Thanks in advance, Enric

2 months, 1 week

2
17
0 0

Linux user-level implementation of OP-TEE

by Jork Loeser (he/him)

Hello, I am Jork Loeser from Microsoft, and we are looking into providing the OP-TEE internal core API from Linux user-level, as well as hosting a derivative of OP-TEE OS in Linux user-level. Can you say is something like this has been attempted in the past, and perhaps provide pointers? How interesting would it be for OP-TEE to have such an implementation - e.g., for early/rapid-development purposes? Best, Jork

2 months, 1 week

2
2
0 0

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OP-TEE November 2024